Unpublished Disposition, 911 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1989)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Edward L. Danzer appeals from the district court's judgment against him with respect to his claims based on alleged civil rights violations by various county and state officials. Danzer argues that the district court erred in determining that the defendants were immune from suit. We affirm.

* Danzer filed this action seeking monetary relief for civil rights violations allegedly committed by two state troopers, the Cowlitz County Superior Court and three of its judges, the Cowlitz County District Court and one of its judges, the Cowlitz County Sheriff, the Cowlitz County Prosecutor and two Deputy Prosecutors, and two court-appointed defense attorneys. The action arises from incidents occurring on June 21, 1988 and the judicial proceedings following those incidents. On June 21, 1988, Danzer was stopped by troopers Walter Michael Chartrand and Donald E. Cook for speeding. An altercation then erupted, and Danzer was arrested, booked into the Cowlitz County jail and charged with third degree assault, a felony. He was also cited for speeding.

Danzer was convicted on the felony charge, and is apparently appealing that conviction to the Washington Court of Appeals.

Danzer's "Complaint for Assault, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, Extortion and Racketeering" was filed on May 3, 1989, listing 18 "claims for relief." The first four are state common law claims which the district court declined to accept under pendent jurisdiction, and which were therefore dismissed without prejudice. The other claims cite a variety of federal constitutional and statutory provisions. After hearing oral argument, the district court granted the appellees' motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.

II

The district court correctly held that the defendant judges and prosecutors "have absolute immunity for what they may have done in regard to Mr. Danzer's case." As we have held:

[j]udges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.... The primary policy of extending immunity to judges and to prosecutors is to ensure independent and disinterested judicial and prosecutorial decisionmaking.... To effectuate this policy, we will broadly construe the scope of immunity.... [In fact,] [a]s long as the judge's ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court's subject matter jurisdiction, immunity applies. [Moreover,] [p]rosecutors are absolutely immune for quasi-judicial activities taken within the scope of their authority.

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075-78 (9th Cir. 1986). The actions taken by the defendant judges and prosecutors were clearly taken within their official capacities. Consequently, they are immune from suit.

III

The district court also held that "the Cowlitz County Sheriff" was not liable to suit as such under Sec. 1983 because he was "not a person under the Will case and the current status of the law." In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (1989), the Supreme Court held that "a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.... As such, it is no different from a suit against the state itself." Because states are protected by the Eleventh Amendment, absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, such suits are barred. Id.

However, Eleventh Amendment protection "does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). Consequently, the ultimate holding in Will does not apply to this case. Nevertheless, we affirm the district court's judgment with respect to Danzer's claim against the Cowlitz County Sheriff. Because the sheriff is named in his official capacity, this suit is no different from a suit against the County itself. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2311. However, the Supreme Court has held that "a local government may not be sued under Sec. 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, a plaintiff must establish that his injury was the result of the government's policy or custom. Id. In this case, Danzer has failed to establish a constitutional violation resulting from a policy or custom of Cowlitz County. Danzer suffered no cognizable harm as a result of the difference between the seven day limitation under the court rule and the 15-day limitation required by state law. Further, his treatment by jail officials was well within the "wide-ranging deference" accorded jail officials. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).

IV

The district court was also correct in holding that troopers Chartrand and Cook are protected from Danzer's claims by qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Their conduct in arresting Danzer and in issuing him a citation for speeding was within their official duties and did not violate clearly established law. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.