Unpublished Disposition, 904 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Jerry Harris and Alex Valdez appeal their convictions for extortion, bribery and conspiracy. They argue that their right to cross-examination was unconstitutionally restricted and that the jury was not properly instructed as to the requirement of intent under the Hobbs Act. We affirm.

1) Cross-examination

Defendants argue that their cross-examination of witness Carson Rapp was unduly restricted by the trial court. Cross-examination into Rapp's organized crime connection as an FBI agent would have been cumulative for the purpose of showing bias and only tangentially relevant for the purpose of proving entrapment. See United States v. Bonanno, 852 F.2d at 438 (entrapment defense "focuses upon the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime, rather than on the actions of government agents"). Under these circumstances, it is not an abuse of discretion to limit cross-examination to prohibit inquiry into unrelated prior contacts as an FBI informant. See United States v. Jackson, 756 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1985).

2) Jury Instructions

Defendants argue that the jury was not properly apprised that a violation of the Hobbs Act required a showing that the defendants had criminal intent. The Hobbs Act requires an intent to induce payments by promise or threat of official action. United States v. Egan, 860 F.2d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 1988). A review of the jury instructions reveals that the jury was fully apprised that defendants conduct must have been taken with the required intent. Defendants have no right to have their version of the facts incorporated into an otherwise adequate intent instruction. United States v. Davis, 597 F.2d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 1979).

AFFIRMED.