Unpublished Disposition, 902 F.2d 1579 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^** 

In this consolidated appeal, Amir H. Shervin appeals pro se the district court's order dismissing his civil rights actions. Shervin brought these actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against numerous defendants, alleging a conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining his license to practice dentistry in California. Shervin contends that the district court erred in: (1) dismissing the complaints against the state of California Board of Dental Examiners ("Board") and the Regents of the University of California ("Regents") as barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) dismissing the complaints against all other defendants as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations; (3) denying Shervin's motion for court-appointed counsel to represent him in the proceedings below; and (4) refusing to recuse itself. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

* Shervin's contention that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint against the Board and the Regents is meritless. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages against a state and its agencies in federal court. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974). Moreover, "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under [42 U.S.C.] Sec. 1983." Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989). Here, Shervin sought damages and injunctive relief against the Board and the Regents for allegedly conspiring to prevent him from obtaining a license to practice dentistry in California. The district court did not err in dismissing the complaints against these defendants. See Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2312; Quern, 440 U.S. at 337; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662.

II

Shervin's contention that the district court erred in dismissing his complaints against the remaining individual defendants is meritless. In an unpublished order filed August 24, 1988, the district court dismissed Shervin's complaints as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. We affirm the dismissal based on the analysis set forth in the district court's well-reasoned order.

III

Shervin's contention that the district court erred in denying his motion for court-appointed counsel also fails. A motion for appointment of counsel is within the broad discretion of the district court and is granted only in exceptional circumstances. Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). "A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both 'the likelihood of success on the merits [and] the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.' " Id. (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). Shervin has neither demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits nor shown that the complexity of the issues involved was sufficient to require appointment of counsel. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shervin's motion for appointment of counsel. See Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331.

IV

Finally, Shervin's contention that the district court judge erred in refusing to recuse himself is wholly without merit. Shervin presents no facts to support this contention, and argues only that the district judge should be disqualified because he dismissed these actions. Therefore, the district judge did not err in refusing to recuse himself. See Thomassen v. United States, 835 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1987) (party must show extrajudicial bias or prejudice when seeking disqualification of district judge).

AFFIRMED.¹