Unpublished Disposition, 902 F.2d 1579 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^*

* Plaintiffs' prolix and convoluted 158-page First Amended Complaint is well beyond the bounds of FRCP 8. That rule dictates that pleadings contain "a short and plain statement of the claim," and that " [e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct." Violations of these requirements in the present complaint are legion. To cite but one flaw: In numerous instances it is impossible to determine which defendants are to be held liable on which claims.

A complaint that fails to comply with Rule 8 may be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to FRCP 41(b). Nevijel v North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F2d 671, 673 (9th Cir 1981). Dismissal is a harsh remedy, however, and we must look to see "whether the district court might have adopted other less drastic alternatives." Id at 674. In particular, the district court here failed to give plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.

We cannot say with certainty that plaintiffs would be unable to amend their complaint to bring it into compliance with Rule 8. They are entitled to at least one opportunity to do so. See Bertucelli v Carreras, 467 F2d 214, 215-16 (9th Cir 1972). While plaintiffs have once amended their complaint, that action followed transfer of venue to Oregon; they have had no opportunity to amend following a Rule 8 dismissal. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' action, but affirm its dismissal of the First Amended Complaint, and remand with instructions to grant plaintiffs leave to amend.

II

We address plaintiffs additional claims briefly.

A. Plaintiffs argue that the district court in Washington improperly transferred their case to Oregon. Most of the plaintiffs and almost all of the defendants in this case are Oregon residents. Most of the acts of which the plaintiffs complain are alleged to have occurred in Oregon. The district court did not abuse its discretion in transferring venue. See Costlow v Weeks, 790 F2d 1486, 1487-88 (9th Cir 1986).

B. Plaintiffs also claim that their Washington attorney should have been granted permission to come aboard as "legal advisor" once the case had been transferred to Oregon. While we are somewhat puzzled by the term "legal advisor," we review a district court's decision to disqualify counsel for abuse of discretion. Paul E. Iacono Structural Engineer, Inc. v Humphrey, 722 F2d 435, 438 (9th Cir 1983). The attorney here was not admitted to practice in Oregon; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his appointment as legal advisor. In any event, the question now appears moot, as plaintiffs seem to have found an Oregon attorney.

C. Our resolution of the Rule 8 issue renders moot the question of defendants' failure to respond to the First Amended Complaint. One of the primary purposes of Rule 8 is to provide defendants a clear statement of that to which they must respond.

Plaintiffs have been given a second chance. We caution them not to come back with another rambling, unintelligible harangue. The opportunity to amend, and the court's patience, are not without bounds.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.¹