Unpublished Disposition, 897 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Roberto Vega-Ceja appeals the revocation of his probation, which was imposed after his conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(f). Vega-Ceja contends that the district court erred by revoking his probation because the probation warrant was issued on May 22, 1987, but not executed until October 25, 1988.¹  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

We review a decision to revoke probation for abuse of discretion. United States v. Daly, 839 F.2d 598, 599 (9th Cir. 1988).

Although "a warrant for arrest based on a probation ... violation should be executed within a reasonable time after issuance," United States v. Hill, 719 F.2d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1983), a prisoner subject to a probation-violation detainer does not have a constitutional right to a speedy probation-revocation hearing, Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 731 n. 9 (1985). Cf. United States v. Riggans, 746 F.2d 1379, 1380 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing four-year delay between issuance and execution of probation warrant for arrest of at-liberty probationer). Where the probationer is serving an independent intervening sentence in the jurisdiction that issued the probation warrant, it is not unreasonable to defer execution of the warrant and the probation revocation proceedings until the prisoner has completed his intervening sentence. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87-88 (1976) (parole revocation).

Here, Vega-Ceja was in federal custody serving an independent intervening sentence when the federal probation warrant was issued against him. The probation warrant was executed before the end of Vega-Ceja's intervening sentence, and the revocation proceedings were conducted promptly after execution of the warrant.

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that revocation of Vega-Ceja's probation did not violate his rights. See Moody, 429 U.S. at 87-88; Riggans, 746 F.2d at 1380.

AFFIRMED.