United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Roland P. Herrada, Defendant-appellant, 887 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1989)

The appellant, Roland P. Herrada, appeals the district court's denial of his motion to correct the special assessment of $100 imposed upon him pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013 after his conviction on two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.App. (1982 Ed.) Sec. 1202(a) (1). Herrada contends that 18 U.S.C. § 3013 is unconstitutional because it originated in the Senate and had as its principal purpose the raising of revenue and thus violates of the Origination Clause of the United States Constitution. That clause provides that "all Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 7, cl. 1. Because we find that 18 U.S.C. § 3013 is not a "revenue raising" bill for purposes of the Origination Clause, we pretermit determining whether Sec. 3013 raises a nonjusticiable political question¹  and whether the bill that became Sec. 3013 originated in the House of Representatives or in the Senate.

The Supreme Court has spoken three times on the meaning of the term "Bills for raising Revenue" in the Origination Clause. In United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 566, 23 L. Ed. 454 (1875), the Court held that the Act to Establish a Postal Money Order System, 13 Stat. at L. 76, was not revenue raising for purposes of the Origination Clause. The Act provided that " [a]ll moneys received from the sale of money orders, all fees received for selling them, and all moneys transferred in administering the Act, are 'to be deemed and taken to be money in the Treasury of the United States.' " 91 U.S. at 454. The Nortoncourt accepted the Congressional purpose declared at the outset of the first section of the Postal Act: "To promote public convenience, and to insure greater security in the transmission of money through the United States mails."

In Twin City Bank of New Brighton v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 17 S. Ct. 766, 42 L. Ed. 134 (1897), the Court held that an Act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, to meet the expenses of executing the law, and imposing a tax on the average amount of the notes in circulation of banking associations organized under the statutes was not a revenue bill under the Origination Clause. Noting that the "main purpose that Congress had in view was to provide a national currency based upon United States bonds" and that the "tax was a means for effectually accomplishing" that purpose, the Court found no purpose by the Act to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government. Id. at 203, 17 S. Ct. at 769.

In Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 26 S. Ct. 674, 50 L. Ed. 1090 (1906), the Court held that a bill providing for the taxation of property in the District of Columbia to provide funds for adequate railroad terminal facilities in the District of Columbia was not a bill to raise revenue. The Court noted that " [w]hatever taxes are imposed are but means to the purposes provided by the act [i.e., to provide railroad terminal facilities]." Id. at 437, 26 S. Ct. at 675.

Each of these decisions cites with approval the opinion of Mr. Justice Story "that the practical construction of the Constitution, and the history of the origin of the constitutional provision in question, proves that revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue." 1 Story, Const. Sec. 880. See Norton, 91 U.S. at 569; Twin City, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S. Ct. at 769; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436, 26 S. Ct. at 675.

At the outset we acknowledge the Supreme Court's directive that a statute is to be construed to avoid raising doubts as to its constitutionality. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 101 S. Ct. 2142, 68 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1981). 18 U.S.C. § 3013 provides:

Special assessment on convicted persons

(a) The court shall assess on any person convicted of an offense against the United States--

(1) in the case of an infraction or a misdemeanor;

(A) if the defendant is an individual

(i) the amount of $5 in the case of an infraction or a class C misdemeanor;

(ii) the amount of $10 in the case of a class B misdemeanor; and

(iii) the amount of $25 in the case of a class A misdemeanor; and

(B) if the defendant is a person other than an individual--

(i) the amount of $25 in the case of an infraction or a class C misdemeanor;

(ii) the amount of $50 in the case of a class B misdemeanor; and

(iii) the amount of $125 in the case of a class A misdemeanor

(2) in the case of a felony--

(A) the amount of $50 if the defendant is an individual; and

(B) the amount of $200 if the defendant is a person other than an individual.

(b) Such amount so assessed shall be collected in the manner that fines are collected in criminal cases.

(c) The obligation to pay an assessment ceases five years after the date of the judgment. This subsection shall apply to all assessments irrespective of the date of imposition.

(d) For the purposes of this section, an offense under section 13 of this title is an offense against the United States.

The bare language of the statute does not reveal the purposes for the assessment. Thus the legislative history of the Act of which Sec. 3013 was a part may prove instructive.

Section 3013 was part of a legislative package entitled Victims of Crime Act of 1984, which in turn was part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. The report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary states that the purpose of Sec. 3013 was:

to generate needed income to offset the cost of the [victim assistance] programs authorized under S. 2423. Although substantial amounts will not result, the additional amounts will be helpful in financing the program and will constitute new income for the Federal government.

S.Rep. No. 497, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3607, 3619-20. The accompanying report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary declared that the purpose of the Victims of Crime Act was

to provide limited Federal Funding to the States, with minimal bureaucratic "strings attached," for direct compensation and service programs to assist victims of crime, including victims of Federal crime. In addition, it provides funds to improve Federal efforts which assist crime victims, and establishes a Federal Victim of Crime Advisory Committee. A Federal Victim Assistance Administrator in the Department of Justice will coordinate Federal efforts.

S.Rep. No. 497, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3607. Section 3013 was but a subsidiary element of a comprehensive Congressional scheme aimed at aiding the victims of crime. The purpose of the Act was not the prohibited purpose of raising revenue "to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the government." Twin City, 167 U.S. at 203, 17 S. Ct. at 769.² 

Indeed, like the tax to fund a postal money order system in Norton, the tax imposed in Twin City to support the national currency, and the tax to fund the building of railroad terminals in the District of Columbia in Millard, the special assessment imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 3013 does not levy taxes in the strict sense of the word. In each case the Act at issue had as its primary purpose something other than the raising of general funds for the United States Treasury. That an Act may "incidentally create revenue" does not therefore render it a revenue raising bill for the purposes of the Origination Clause. 1 Story, Const. Sec. 880; Norton, 91 U.S. at 455; Twin City, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S. Ct. at 769; Millard, 202 U.S. at 436, 26 S. Ct. at 675.

In accordance with congressional intent, monies collected by way of the special assessment are used to fund the Crime Victims Assistance Fund, whereby the federal government provides financial assistance to victims of crime through qualifying state victims assistance funds. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601(b) (2), 10602; United States v. Davis, 845 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1988). 18 U.S.C. § 3013 simply is not a bill for raising revenue subject to the constraints of the Origination Clause.

Because we believe the Supreme Court precedents outlined above mandate our finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3013 does not violate the Origination Clause, we respectfully disagree with the opinion of our sister circuit in United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 48, 107 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1989). The Munoz-Flores court analyzed Sec. 3013 in isolation and failed to follow the methodology dictated by Norton, Twin City, and Millard. Those cases instruct us to consider the overarching purpose of an Act when one of its provisions is subject to an Origination Clause challenge. Accordingly, the district court's denial of Herrada's motion to correct the special assessment is AFFIRMED.