Unpublished Disposition, 880 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1989)Annotate this Case
Joseph M. WASKO, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Daniel J. McCARTHY; Mark Raussopaulos, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted* June 7, 1989.Decided July 19, 1989.
Before FARRIS, TROTT and DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.
Joseph M. Wasko ("Wasko") appeals pro se the district court' summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
On appeal, Wasko raises the following questions: (1) whether the district court erred by failing to give Wasko leave to amend his first amended complaint, (2) whether the district court's summary judgment was premature in light of Wasko's pending discovery motion and (3) whether the district court erred by failing to decide Wasko's procedural motions prior to entering summary judgment against him.1 We will consider each question in turn.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting Wasko leave to amend his complaint. Wasko only requested leave to amend to add more defendants. The addition of new defendants would have been pointless. A district court may deny leave to amend a complaint when the plaintiff's proposed amendments could not save the complaint. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1984); Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982).
Wasko next contends the district court's summary judgment was premature given the pendency of his motion to depose defendant Raussopaulos without cost. However, Wasko did not request that the district court stay consideration of the cross-motions for summary judgment pending completion of discovery. Nor did he request a continuance of the summary judgment proceedings under Rule 56(f). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Wasko "can hardly argue at this late date that the district court abused its discretion in ruling on the summary judgment motion [s] in light of the fact that [Wasko himself] failed to pursue the procedural remedy which the Federal Rules so clearly provided." British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979); Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d 271, 277 (9th Cir. 1988) (Rule 56(f) motion is required).
Finally, Wasko argues that the district court abused its discretion in failing to rule on various procedural motions prior to entering summary judgment. No error would have resulted from the district court's denial of these motions, which is effectively what occurred when the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We cannot conclude, therefore, that the district court abused its discretion by failing to rule on Wasko's motions separately prior to entry of summary judgment.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for disposition without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3
In his reply brief, Wasko raises a number of entirely new issues. We decline to reach these issues because Wasko failed to raise them in his opening brief. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., 841 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1988); Thompson v. Commissioner, 631 F.2d 642, 649 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981)