Unpublished Disposition, 880 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1981)

MEMORANDUM^**

Raymond Rigsby appeals pro se the summary judgment dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Phoenix Police Department and two of its detectives, Harry Rotsteen and Richard Reid. Rigsby was arrested on April 25, 1981 for stealing a semi-transporter containing eight vehicles. Upon the advice of counsel, Rigsby pled guilty to the charge. After entering the plea, the state filed three counts of trafficking in stolen property against Rigsby. Thereafter, Rigsby claims he first learned that he had been the target of an undercover police operation, involving both the semi-transporter and trafficking in stolen property cases, and the same officers, Detectives Rotsteen and Reid. Rigsby claims he agreed to accept the state's plea bargain because his attorney promised to set forth the alleged police misconduct in writing for the judge. Rigsby's attorney prepared a memorandum in support of mitigation of sentence, setting forth the instances of alleged misconduct. Rigsby pled guilty to all charges and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.

Thereafter, Rigsby filed this Sec. 1983 action, alleging that the state violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses, to a fair trial, to due process, and to equal protection. Specifically, Rigsby argues that detectives Rotsteen and Reid submitted false reports, played an integral role in recruiting and encouraging Rigsby to participate in the offenses without revealing their true identities, and withheld information vital to his defense, namely, denying any involvement with the theft of the semi-transporter.

The appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that Rigsby's guilty plea to the criminal charges collaterally estopped him from relitigating the issue of constitutional rights violations. The district court granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Rigsby's claim. We conclude that the appellees were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and therefore reverse.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986). This court must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Ashton v. Cory, 780 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1986).

In this case, the appellees contend that Rigsby's guilty plea collaterally estops him from now claiming that the police violated his constitutional rights. We disagree. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 103 S. Ct. 2368, 76 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1982) directs our inquiry to Arizona's collateral estoppel rules to determine whether a defendant's judgment of conviction based on his guilty plea forecloses the defendant in a later civil action from challenging alleged unconstitutional police conduct. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires this court "to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S. Ct. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980). In Arizona, collateral estoppel "is applicable when the issue or fact to be litigated was actually litigated in a previous suit, a final judgment was entered, and the party against whom the doctrine is to be invoked had a full opportunity to litigate the matter and actually did litigate it, provided such issue or fact was essential to the prior judgment. Chaney Building Co. v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 716 P.2d 28, 30 (Ariz.1986). Arizona applies this principle in both civil and criminal cases. State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756, 762 (Ariz.1960). Accordingly, we must determine what issues or facts, if any, were actually litigated and were necessary to the prior judgment of conviction, based on Rigsby's plea of guilty.

The facts of our case clearly demonstrate the Supreme Court's observation that "when a court accepts a defendant's guilty plea, there is no adjudication whatsoever of any issues that may subsequently be the basis of a Sec. 1983 action." Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. at 322, n. 11. Although Rigsby arguably presented the issue of the constitutionality of the police conduct to the lower court, there is absolutely no indication that the court made any findings of fact in this area or in any way "decided" the issue. Whether or not the police violated Rigsby's constitutional rights is in no way necessary to the prior judgment of conviction. Under Arizona law, a judgment of conviction may be entered after a guilty plea once the court determines that a factual basis exists for each element of the crime to which the guilty plea is made. Rule 17.3, Ariz.R.Crim.Proc., 17 A.R.S., State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 728 P.2d 232, 235 (Ariz.1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3243 (1987). No issues in a section 1983 action are necessarily determined when the court accepts a guilty plea.

Additionally, Rigsby's guilty plea does not amount to an admission that the police acted lawfully. The Supreme Court has recognized that because a guilty plea can be based on any number of different motivations, it is impermissible for a court to assume that the guilty plea is based on the defendant's determination that he could not have been acquitted. See Haring v. Prosise, 426 U.S. at 318-319. Although Rigsby's guilty plea waives his opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the police conduct in the context of the constitutionality of his conviction, the guilty plea is not a waiver of his right to challenge alleged police misconduct outside the confines of the criminal proceeding itself. Rigsby's rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not among the trial rights he necessarily waived when he pled guilty. Any section 1983 claim is simply irrelevant to the validity of Rigsby's conviction because the conviction is based solely on his guilty plea. See Haring v. Prosise, 426 U.S. at 320-321.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Rigsby's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because the appellees are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¹ 

REVERSED.