Unpublished Disposition, 876 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1989)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Raul Saravia (Saravia) appeals his sentence, imposed following a guilty plea, for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in contravention of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 846. The sole issue presented is whether the district court abused its discretion by sentencing Saravia to imprisonment for a term of 15 years for a crime which carries a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment and a $1 million fine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (C). We affirm.

Saravia contends that his sentence is illegal because the district court (1) failed to impose an individualized sentence by focusing on the nature of the crime while ignoring entirely the minimal extent of appellant's involvement, and (2) placed undue influence on appellant's four-year Nicaraguan college education and his failure to express concern, in a letter to the court, for potential victims of his cocaine distribution scheme.

A sentence which falls within statutory limits is generally not subject to appellate review absent an abuse or abdication of discretion by the district court. United States v. Rachels, 820 F.2d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Chiago, 699 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 854 (1983). "Whether sound discretion has been exercised must be answered in each case through a thorough review of the record." United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1985). The relevant inquiry is whether the "four corners of the record" reflect that the district court properly considered those factors necessary to insure an individualized sentence. Id. at 1365-66. An abuse of discretion will be found where the district court imposes sentences purely on a mechanical basis. Id. at 1364; see also United States v. Potts, 813 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1987).

That the sentence here contested by Saravia does not reflect an adherence to a rigid mechanical standard but rather the consideration of factors peculiar to appellant is amply borne out by the record. At the sentencing hearing, the judge made references to Saravia's education, background, and family. In addition, he noted Saravia's lack of concern for the effect appellant's actions would have on potential cocaine users, as well as the fact that appellant was an active participant in such a serious offense.

While Saravia's sentence may be harsh, it is not necessarily an indication that the court meted out punishment based only on the category of the crime without taking into account the magnitude of appellant's participation. On the contrary, the record reveals that the same judge sentenced three of appellant's codefendants to varying terms of imprisonment--each term different than that of appellant--for their participation in the same scheme, thus demonstrating that the district court actually took each defendant's individual circumstances into consideration.

Finally, we dismiss Saravia's assertion that the court improperly ascribed undue significance to his education and his alleged lack of concern for cocaine victims as meritless. The district court plainly stated that it considered all the materials that were before it, and that the sentence imposed reflected the gravity of the offense, the quantity and quality of the cocaine, and Saravia's active involvement. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination.

AFFIRMED.