Unpublished Disposition, 875 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1989)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Plaintiff Lewis Coleman appeals the grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA") and two pendent state claims. Our jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982), and our review is de novo. Ashton v. Cory, 780 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1986). We affirm.

* Title I, section 101(a) (1) of the LMRDA requires that all union members have equal rights to nominate candidates, to vote in union referendums, and to attend and participate in membership meetings subject to reasonable rules and regulations. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1) (1982). Section 101(a) (2) guarantees members the right to meet freely with other members and express any views and speak upon any business at union meetings subject to established and reasonable rules. Id. Sec. 411(a) (2). Coleman claims the reduction in his employment status was a constructive discharge that violated these rights; he seeks injunctive relief and damages under section 102. See Id. Sec. 412.

Proving that a union rule, decision, or activity has deprived a union member of a right protected under section 101(a) is the first step in establishing a title I claim. See Zamora v. Local 11, 817 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir. 1987); Turner v. Dempster, 743 F.2d 1301, 1302 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985). Coleman principally complains that the change in his employment status violated title I by diminishing both his effectiveness as the District's chief financial officer and his influence on District decisions and activities. But the ability to perform duties and exercise powers in an elected union office is not a right protected by section 101(a). See Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 1989) (no violation of section 101(a) because the membership rights of a disciplined union official were unaffected). Rather, title I inures for the protection of membership rights held by the rank and file in union affairs. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 437 (1982); see Zamora, 817 F.2d at 569. In this circuit, the loss of leadership or employment rights by an elected official has formed the basis for title I liability, but only when the loss qualified as retaliation for the official's exercise of membership rights. See Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l, 804 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 639 (1989) (union violated title I by discharging elected official because he spoke out against union proposal to raise dues at a meeting of union members); Brett v. Hotel, Motel, Restaurant, Const. Camp Employees and Bartenders Union, Local 879, 828 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987).

Coleman stipulated that he suffered no direct restraint of the rights of free speech and assembly or equal voting, nominating, and participation as a rank and file union member. Furthermore, the record contains no evidence indicating that his change in employment status constituted retaliation for the exercise of any of those rights. Although Coleman submits that he was the only black to be elected to a management position in District 115 and that his advocacy of financial restraint was unpopular with some in District management, he has offered no evidence to support a finding that the District delegates voted to amend the bylaws and reduce his employment status because of his race or his rhetoric. Consequently, we conclude there was no genuine issue of material fact as to a deprivation of title I rights and the district court properly dismissed the title I claim.

II

Title IV, sections 301 to 303 of the LMRDA regulate the purposes and procedures for lawful implementation of trusteeships over local labor organizations. 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-463 (1982); Benda v. Grand Lodge of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 584 F.2d 308, 312 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 937 (1979). Coleman claims his reduction in employment status resulted from an unlawful trusteeship imposed on the District; he seeks damages and injunctive relief under section 304. See 29 U.S.C. § 464.

To succeed under section 304, a claimant must first establish the existence of a trusteeship. See Kinney v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 669 F.2d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1981). A trusteeship includes any "method of supervision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body under its constitution or bylaws." 29 U.S.C. § 402(h) (1982). Coleman argued to the district court that the International's approval of the May 1986 bylaw change effected a trusteeship over the District. This argument is unpersuasive. First, the proposal to amend the bylaws originated from within the District not the International. The district delegates approved the proposal before it reached the International for review. Second, the record fails to show how the bylaw change had any effect on District 115's control of its local activities. Thus, Coleman failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a trusteeship, and the district court properly granted defendants summary judgment on the title IV claim.

III

When state and federal claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts so that all claims together constitute one constitutional case, a federal district court may, in its discretion, exercise jurisdiction over the state claims as well. Mackey v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1989). As a rule, the district court should dismiss pendent state law claims when all federal claims are dismissed early in the litigation. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see also National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 569 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 362 (1987). The LMRDA claims were the only federal claims in Coleman's complaint. Having dismissed those claims by summary judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.

IV

For the reasons expressed above, the order granting defendants summary judgment on all of Coleman's claims is

AFFIRMED.