Unpublished Disposition, 874 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1986)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Jose Reuter ("Reuter") appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Santa Clara County and the Santa Clara County Traffic Court (collectively referred to as the "Traffic Court"). Reuter sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights had been violated because his case was heard before a traffic commissioner rather than a municipal court judge. Reuter also claimed that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, due to the four month delay between the date he received the ticket and the date of his court trial. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

FACTS

On December 18, 1985, Reuter was issued a traffic citation for failing to stop at a stop sign in violation of California Vehicle Code Sec. 22450. This offense is an infraction. The citation stated that Reuter was to appear "when notified by the court."

On January 13, the Traffic Court sent Reuter a "courtesy notice." The notice stated the violation Reuter was charged with and the amount of the fine. The notice informed Reuter that he had 30 days either to pay the fine or to appear in court. On January 30, 1986, Reuter wrote to the Traffic Court, posting $35.00 and requesting a court date. On March 21, 1986, the Traffic Court sent Reuter a "Notice of Trial Date," which set trial for April 28, 1986. On this form, a court clerk had checked the boxes "I hereby waive formal arraignment," "I waive my right to a speedy trial," and "I consent to have my case tried by the Court Commissioner (Misc.)."

On April 1, Reuter came in and contested the waiver of his right to speedy trial. He crossed out the marked box in front of a clerk and wrote on the form that he did not waive that right.

On April 28, 1986, Reuter appeared before a traffic commissioner. He made a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The motion was denied. Reuter was found guilty and was fined $19.00. Reuter did not appeal this conviction within the California state court system. Instead he filed this action in federal court alleging constitutional violations.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Traffic Court. The court determined that the hearing before a traffic commissioner presented no constitutional violation. The district court further found that Reuter was informally arraigned by virtue of the Notice of Trial Date, dated March 21. Thus, the court concluded that Reuter was afforded trial within 45 days of his arraignment as required by Cal.Penal Code Sec. 1382(3) and there was no speedy trial violation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lundy v. Union Carbide Corp., 695 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1982).

ANALYSIS

One of the rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment is the right to establish their own judicial system. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 388 (1798). Implicitly, this right includes the right to determine the qualifications of a state's judicial officers.

The California Constitution states that the legislature may provide for officers such as commissioners to perform "subordinate judicial functions." Cal. Const. art. VI, Sec. 22. Pursuant to this provision, the legislature authorized municipal courts to allow commissioners to "have the same jurisdiction and exercise the same powers and duties as the judges of the court with respect to any infraction or small claims case." Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 72190. Section 72190 also requires that any commissioner appointed by the municipal court possess "the same qualifications the law requires of a judge."

Section 72190 has been found to be valid under the California Constitution. California courts have determined that the hearing of infractions is within the scope of "subordinate judicial duties" envisioned by Cal. Const. art. VI, Sec. 22. In re Kathy P., 25 Cal. 3d 91, 157 Cal. Rptr. 874, 599 P.2d 65 (Cal.1979); People v. Lucas, 82 Cal. App. 3d 47, 147 Cal. Rptr. 235 (Cal.App.1978).

Reuter has failed to demonstrate how this California statutory scheme violates any right granted by the United States Constitution. He claims that his due process rights were violated. However, there is no constitutional provision which gives traffic offenders a due process interest in having their cases heard by a judge, rather than a traffic commissioner. In addition, Reuter has not demonstrated any way in which he was harmed by having his case heard by a traffic commissioner rather than a judge. Since a traffic commissioner is required by state law to possess all of the qualifications of a judge and since Reuter has not shown any special harm resulted from having his case heard by a traffic commissioner, no constitutional violation occurred.

Reuter contends that the delay in bringing him to trial violated California Penal Code Sec. 1382(3). Although he may be correct, we need not decide whether that is the case, because Reuter's remedy for violation of California law was to appeal within the California state court system. Instead, he chose to bring an action in federal court. Thus, Reuter must show that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Supreme Court expressly refused to set any fixed time period for determining when the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial would be violated. Id. at 529. Instead, the Court adopted a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed. The court identified four factors to be considered under this analysis: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the defendant had asserted the right, and whether there was actual prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530.

The Court held that unless there is a delay which is "presumptively prejudicial," there is no need to consider the other factors. In this case, only four months elapsed from the time that Reuter was given the ticket and the date of the hearing. In addition, only three weeks passed from the time that Reuter asserted his right to a speedy trial and the date the hearing was held. This delay cannot be said to be "presumptively prejudicial" in a traffic infraction case. Therefore, we need not address the other Barker factors. Reuter has failed to show that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly concluded that the County did not violate the constitution by assigning a traffic commissioner to Reuter's case, rather than a judge. The grant of summary judgment on Reuter's speedy trial claim was proper because his allegation of a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial was without merit.

AFFIRMED.