Unpublished Disposition, 874 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1989)Annotate this Case
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Before HUG, SCHROEDER, and LEAVY Circuit Judges.
James Quinten Anderson, an Oregon state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district court's orders denying him the appointment of counsel and granting summary judgment to the defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against prison officials. We affirm.
Anderson's complaint alleges that he suffered cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the eighth amendment, because prison official failed to treat his serious medical problems. In addition, Anderson moved for the appointment of counsel.
The district court denied Anderson's request for counsel. Defendants then moved for summary judgment and filed affidavits in support of their motion. Anderson also filed a motion for summary judgment which essentially refuted defendants' affidavits. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. Anderson timely appeals.
Appointment of Counsel
Although the record does not indicate that the district court considered the likelihood that Anderson would prevail on the merits of his claim, there is every indication that Anderson is able to articulate his claims clearly. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his request for the appointment of counsel. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986).
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). We will affirm if, viewing the evidence most favorably to the party opposing the motion, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Here, the attachments to the affidavit of nurse Bronson clearly indicate that Anderson was treated for his medical problems. Although this treatment was not what Anderson desired, no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to Anderson's serious medical needs. See Franklin v. Oregon State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (difference of opinion regarding medical treatment does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference). Thus, the district court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment because no genuine issues of material fact exist. See Berg, 794 F.2d at 459; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Therefore, we affirm the district court's orders denying Anderson's request for counsel and granting summary judgment to defendants.