Unpublished Disposition, 874 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1989)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Willie Ray Finley, an inmate in an Arizona state prison, appeals pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a number of correctional officers and prison officials. Finley's appeal focuses essentially on three claims: that he was denied due process when he was placed in segregation units and on suicide watch; that he was unconstitutionally denied access to legal materials and legal assistance; and that the removal of a religious chain from his neck denied his right to the free exercise of his religion. We believe the district court properly entered summary judgment on each claim and affirm.

Due Process Claims

Finley claims that his right to due process was violated in the course of his placement in administrative segregation following a disciplinary hearing and in his transfer to a protective segregation unit. Finley received notice of the alleged disciplinary violation, was afforded a hearing at which he was allowed to contest the charges, and was provided with a written statement of the evidence relied upon to justify his placement in administrative segregation. Similarly, prior to his transfer to the protective segregation unit, he was given a hearing and an opportunity to be heard. In so doing, the prison officials satisfied the requirements of due process. See McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1986).

Finley also alleges that his right to due process was violated when he was twice placed on suicide watch by prison officials other than a psychiatrist. (In both instances, a psychiatrist approved his placement on watch status shortly afterwards.) The essence of his claim is that the "Post Orders" of his cell block required that a psychiatrist actually place an inmate on suicide watch in the first place. We note first that prison-wide regulations appear to authorize other staff members to place inmates on suicide watch, and that prison officials are under an affirmative "obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety" of prison inmates. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). Given this obligation, the procedure envisioned by the prison's general regulations--the procedure apparently followed in Finley's case--would appear both sensible and satisfactory, allowing correctional staff to place an inmate on watch status immediately after potentially suicidal behavior is observed and requiring a psychiatrist to make a more comprehensive and dispositive evaluation thereafter. In any case, we doubt seriously that the Post Order upon which Finley relies speaks in the sort of "explicitly mandatory language" or requires sufficiently "specific substantive predicates" to have created a liberty interest cognizable under the due process clause. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983). Accordingly, we conclude that the none of the challenged actions violated Finley's right to procedural due process.

Access to Legal Materials and Legal Assistance

Finley alleges that he was unconstitutionally denied access to legal materials and the assistance of a particular "writ writer" while he was in the segregated units. An inmate has an unquestioned right to adequate legal materials and legal assistance. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). It is, however, clear from the record before us that, after complying with the prison's procedures, he was provided with the legal materials he requested. As to the other aspect of his legal access claim, it is clearly established that a prisoner does not have a right to a particular writ writer. Storseth v. Spellman 654 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, especially since Finley made no allegation that his inability to retain the services of his chosen legal assistant prejudiced his legal efforts in any way, the district court appropriately entered summary judgment against him on this claim. See, e.g., Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987).

Removal of the Religious Chain

Finally, Finley alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated when correctional officers removed a chain which he kept around his neck in accordance with a personal religious vow. The chain was removed twice, once when Finley was placed on suicide watch and once when he was strip searched before his transfer to a maximum security unit within the prison. Actions or regulations which allegedly infringe on the constitutional rights of prison inmates are valid if they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, --- U.S. ----, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987). Removal of the chain when Finley was placed on suicide watch was reasonable in light of the prison officials' valid interest in preventing a potentially suicidal inmate from possessing the means through which he might harm himself. While the correctional officers might have demonstrated more understanding when Finley asked to keep the chain around his neck when he was strip searched, preservation of prison security is a valid penological interest, and we cannot conclude, therefore, that the removal and inspection of the chain in this case violated Finley's constitutional rights. On this claim as well, therefore, summary judgment was appropriate.

AFFIRMED.