Unpublished Disposition, 872 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1987)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Woodfield appeals the summary judgment holding that his action is barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm.

Woodfield filed suit against Rule, the author of The I-5 Killer, and the publisher, New American Library, for defamation and invasion of privacy. Woodfield filed his action on April 29, 1987, more than three years after first publication of the work. The Oregon statute of limitations for libel is one year, Or.Rev.Stat. Sec. 12.120(2) (Supp.1987), and the applicable limitation for invasion of privacy is two years. Id. at Sec. 12.110. Woodfield argued that Oregon's tolling statute, Or.Rev.Stat. Sec. 12.160, extended the time in which he had to file his claims. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the tolling statute did not apply, and the statute of limitations thus barred his claims.

Woodfield argues that Oregon's tolling statute violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, and its equivalent in the Oregon Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 20. The statute provides a tolling period of the statute of limitations for persons serving prison sentences for terms "less than the person's natural life." Or.Rev.Stat. Sec. 12.160(3). Woodfield, who is presently serving a life sentence of imprisonment, argues that the exclusion of "lifers" from the benefits of the tolling statute violates the equal protection clause.

The tolling statute does not create or deny a prisoner's right to commence legal action, it merely extends the time in which to file, so a fundamental right of access to the courts is not involved. Harris v. Craig, 299 Or. 12, 697 P.2d 189, 190 (1985). In addition, Woodfield is not a member of a protected class. As a result, the statute must be analyzed under a rational basis standard. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979). Under this standard, the statute must be upheld unless it bears no reasonable relationship to the furtherance of a legitimate state interest and is irrational. Vance, 440 U.S. at 97; United States v. Alexander, 673 F.2d 287, 288 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 876 (1982). The same standard applies to Woodfield's arguments under the Oregon Constitution. City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or. 757, 619 P.2d 217, 224 n. 10 (1980). The classification need only be plausible, arguable or conceivable. Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 793 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987). If the legislature could rationally have concluded that the statute might promote its goals, the classification is reasonable and constitutional. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).

The legislature could reasonably decide that a tolling statute providing additional time for persons imprisoned for a period of years, as opposed to those serving a life sentence, serves several state interests. Statutes of limitation and tolling statutes represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate, and are subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). Imprisonment is treated as a temporary disability in the statute, as are infancy and insanity. See Or.Rev.Stat. Sec. 12.160. Those serving a fixed term are granted additional time, and may be able to pursue their claims without the stigma of being an inmate, and perhaps after being able to marshal resources to bring their claims. The state also has an interest in allowing an inmate to wait until after release to initiate litigation in that it spares the prison system the logistical problems of prisoners conducting litigation from within. It is rational to exclude persons serving life sentences from the benefits of the tolling statute because these interests will not be served.

We cannot say the exclusion of persons serving life sentences from the benefits of the tolling statute is arbitrary or irrational. The classification bears a rational relationship to state interests, and must be upheld.

AFFIRMED.¹