Unpublished Disposition, 867 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1989)

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 867 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1989)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.John Fred PARRISH, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 87-5350, 87-5357.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted*  Jan. 26, 1989.Decided Jan. 30, 1989.

Before HUG, SCHROEDER and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.


In these consolidated appeals, John Fred Parrish appeals the sentence imposed in appeal No. 87-5350 (district court No. CR-86-1132). In that case, Parrish pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud and two counts of conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1962(c) and 1963. Parrish, the former President of the Barclays Mortgage Company participated in a fraudulent scheme by which he obtained millions of dollars from pension funds for investment in a Barclays bonded mortgage fund. In appeal No. 87-5357 (district court No. CR-86-109), Parrish was charged and pleaded guilty to using extortionate means to collect extensions of credit 18 U.S.C. § 894.

The district court sentenced Parrish to the maximum term--20 years--on count 3 for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1963, and to two years in the related action for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894 to be served concurrently with the 20 years. The court suspended sentence on counts 1 and 2 and imposed five years probation to begin upon the appellant's release from custody. The court also ordered that Parrish pay $4.4 million restitution.

Parrish now contends that his sentence is illegal because the district court failed to sentence him as an individual, and because the district court relied on a societal policy of general deterrence.

We review the district court's sentence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Stewart, 820 F.2d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 192 (1987). A sentence within statutory limits is subject only to limited review, including review to ensure the trial court did not fail to individualize sentences. United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985). Parrish's assertion that the trial court failed to sentence him as an individual is meritless. The district court commented at length on the evidence presented regarding appellant Parrish. The court was aware of appellant's lack of prior record, his business abilities, his cooperation with the government, and his family. Nevertheless, the court found those factors outweighed by the magnitude of appellant's racketeering enterprise, the injury to the victims, and the need for general deterrence of so-called white-collar criminals. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing appellant to an aggregate term which was less than he could have received on all counts.1 



The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for disposition without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4


This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3


Appellant's reliance on United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, is misplaced. In Barker, we reversed a sentence where it was plain on the record that the district court had sentenced each offender based solely on the nature of the crime and had not considered the particular characteristics of each defendant. Barker 771 F.2d at 1365. In contrast, here, the district court specifically mentioned appellant's remorse, the nature of the offenses, and effect of the crimes on the victims (RT at 34)