Unpublished Disposition, 865 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Andrew John Walker ("Walker" or "appellant") appeals the district court's dismissal of his civil rights action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). We review de novo, see Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (CA9 1987), and affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

The district court properly dismissed Walker's section 1985 claim as frivolous because of the appellant's failure to allege facts (1) indicating membership in a race or class suffering from invidious discrimination, see Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1028 (CA9 1985) (in banc), or (2) supporting his conclusory allegations concerning the existence of a conspiracy directed against him. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (CA9 1988). Because Walker's section 1985 claim fails, his section 1986 claim must also fail. See id.

The district court also properly dismissed the appellant's section 1983 claim concerning the deprivation of $0.76 from his prison account. Because this loss was caused not by an established state procedure but was simply the result of a random and unauthorized act or pair of acts; and in light of the fact that Nevada's tort claims act provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy, see Nev.Rev.Stat. Secs. 41.031 et seq., the appellant was not deprived of due process. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984). For the same reasons, negligence on the part of state officials resulting in the above loss would not give rise to a section 1983 claim, either. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-32 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986).

The district court erred, however, in dismissing Walker's action. The appellant's allegation that $8.88 was debited from his prison account as the result of a state policy, unauthorized by law because of his status as a federal prisoner, and that he was not afforded a pre- or post-deprivation hearing with respect to that loss, states a claim under section 1983. See Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523-24 (CA9 1985).

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with the above.