Unpublished Disposition, 865 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1987)

No. 87-1307.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Before SCHROEDER and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges, and ALBERT LEE STEPHENS^* , Jr., District Judge.

MEMORANDUM^** 

William Joseph Doyle appeals the district court's determination that Drug Enforcement Administration agent Raymond Huling had probable cause to search the vehicle Doyle was driving. The district court is affirmed. Huling had reason to believe there was a fair probability that contraband was located in the vehicle.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3231 confers jurisdiction on the district court because the indictment charged a violation of the laws of the United States. The Judgment of Conviction was signed on October 1, 1987, and the Notice of Appeal was timely filed on October 1, 1987. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

FACTS

In April of 1986, an informant contacted DEA agent Huling¹  with information about a "stash house" located at 2029 East Greenlee in Tuscon, Arizona. The informant acquired his information in the two-year period prior to his contact with Huling during which time he was living at 2015 East Greenlee, a house next door to the stash house. He had associated with persons who lived in the stash house or frequented the premises. The informant gave the following information to agent Huling: (1) a person by the name of Johnny Drum was maintaining a stash house at 2029 East Greenlee. (2) Johnny Drum maintained a residence in San Ignacio, Mexico. (3) Johnny Drum was involved in smuggling narcotics into the U.S. and bringing marijuana and cocaine via trucks from the border. (4) Prior to 1986 Johnny Drum told him he was expecting a 20 kilo shipment of cocaine. (5) On one occasion, he had seen large wooden crates in the house. He believed that the crates contained marijuana. (6) He has observed many vehicles from out-of-state, on the stash house premises; one, at least, from Montana. (7) He believed that the vehicles were involved in transporting drugs. (8) Someone once was burning a stack of large garbage bags which he believed to have once contained marijuana.

To corroborate the information, Huling ran the name Johnny Drum through the DEA's narcotics and dangerous drug information center computer (NADDIS). The computer printout showed that there was, in fact, an individual by the name of Johnny Drum who lived in San Ignacio and was involved in smuggling and transporting large quantities of marijuana and cocaine into the United States.²  Also in April of 1986, a utility check came back with the name Charles Muir. The informant reported that he met a man named "Charlie" from Phoenix in the stash house. Later DEA investigation confirmed that Charles Muir lived in Phoenix and had a history of drug smuggling. In drive-by surveillance, approximately three to four times a Chevrolet Suburban and a Mercury were observed. The Mercury, which was observed in January 1987, was registered to Johnny Drum.

There were two other sources of corroborating evidence: first, in December 1986, agents, who conducting surveillance upon known drug traffickers located in a hotel room, checked the telephone numbers called. The stash house had been called several times, although it was not known whether anyone answered the telephone. Second, in December 1986 or January 1987, a different person said that Johnny Drum had shown him a quantity of marijuana available for purchase.

On April 14, 1987 a "profile load vehicle", a pickup with a camper shell, was observed at the residence. At 8:00 p.m., agents observed people loading heavy boxes into the camper. After the camper left the residence and was driving down the street, the driver and passenger kept looking back apprehensively in the rear view mirrors. The camper had Montana license plates Huling had the Tuscon police stop the camper. He opened the back of the camper and then detected the aroma of marijuana. William Doyle, the driver, and Mike Clark were then arrested. The camper contained approximately 400 pounds of marijuana.

On May 13, 1987, Doyle was indicted for possession with intent to distribute. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the camper. The district court denied the motion. Doyle then entered a conditional plea of guilty that was accepted. Doyle timely appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.

ISSUE

Did probable cause support the agent's search of the vehicle?

ANALYSIS

Doyle appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the search of the camper on the ground that the agents did not have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search because (1) the government made no showing that the informant was reliable, (2) the informant's information was not corroborated, and (3) the informant's information was stale.³  Doyle's contention is without merit.

Due to an automobile's mobility, a search warrant does not need to be obtained prior to a search of the automobile. However, the search must still be supported by probable cause. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1985); United States v. Miller, 812 F.2d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 1987). Whether a search is supported by probable cause is determined by looking to the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983). Probable cause exists if "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." This court reviews a district court's determination of probable cause de novo. United States v. Moses, 796 F.2d 281, 283 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984)).

In this case, probable cause existed to search the vehicle. The informant's knowledge was acquired through personal observation of, and association with members of, the stash house. See United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1985) (look to informant's basis of knowledge). Specific pieces of information were corroborated by independent sources. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 241 (corroboration of details of an informant's tip through independent police work). Although Doyle contends loading boxes into a camper at night is consistent with innocent behavior, innocent behavior can become suspicious in light of other information. Id. at 243 n. 13.

Although the informant's information was obtained over a considerable period of time, that information alone was not what established probable cause. See United States v. Dozier, 826 F.2d 866, 871 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The mere lapse of substantial amounts of time is not controlling in a question of staleness.") (citing United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984)). Probable cause was established by the informant's information that had been corroborated in conjunction with what the agents observed the night of the arrest. Moreover, an important factor in the staleness analysis is the ongoing nature of the crime. Id. In this instance, the maintenance of a stash house was a continuing project. Therefore, with the knowledge the arresting agent had at the time, there was a "fair probability" that contraband would be found in the camper. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining the agents had probable cause to search the vehicle.

CONCLUSION

The district court judgment is AFFIRMED.