Unpublished Disposition, 865 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^* 

We review de novo a district court's decision denying a petition for habeas corpus relief. Van Pilon v. Reed, 799 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1986). We presume underlying state court findings of historical fact to be correct. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 592-93 (1982). State court legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1962).

Voluntariness of a confession is subject to independent federal court review. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985). The ultimate question of the constitutionality of pre-trial identification procedures is also reviewed de novo. Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982).

I. ADMISSIBILITY OF SHIELDS'S STATEMENTS TO POLICE

Shields contends that the statements he made to police while he was in the hospital should not have been admitted into evidence because police did not give Shields Miranda warnings and because the statements were not voluntarily made.

Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), statements an accused person makes to police while he is in custody are inadmissible unless the police have advised the accused person of his rights to remain silent and to be represented by counsel. Miranda does not apply to all statements made to police, but only to statements made during "custodial interrogations." Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494 (1977). Whether Shields's statements were made in the context of a custodial interrogation depends on whether there was a "restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 334 (1985). The "determination whether a defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." United States v. Crisco, 725 F.2d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1984).

After hearing from the witnesses as to what happened in Shields's hospital room, the state trial court concluded that "there was no need for Miranda warnings." Implicit in the trial court's finding that no Miranda warnings were needed is the factual finding that Shields was not, at the time his statements were made, subject to custodial interrogation. The trial court explicitly stated its understanding that the relevant inquiry was whether the defendant was in custody at the time of his statements. In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 315 (1963), the judicial precursor of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Court held that federal courts may "properly assume that the state trier of fact applied correct standards of federal law to the facts, in the absence of evidence ... that ... an incorrect standard was in fact applied." See also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983) (applying assumption "that the state trier of fact applied correct standards of federal law to the facts"). Nothing in the record supports Shields's contention that the trial court could have applied an incorrect standard in determining this issue.

Asking whether a confession was involuntary is a "convenient shorthand" for the legal inquiry whether "interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 109 (1986). The "ultimate question whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the challenged confession was obtained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the Constitution is a matter for independent federal determination." Id. at 112. Shields contends his incriminating statements to police were involuntary because he was under medication at the time he made them. "Although mental condition is ... relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant's state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry." Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 521 (1986).

Shields does not cite anything in the record which reasonably supports an inference that coercive police activity took place prior to his statements. Shields's sole contention is that in identifying themselves, the police failed to say that they were from Springfield, Oregon. The failure of police to say where they were from was not coercive.

The brief, nonaggressive questioning which elicited Shield's statements is not the sort of coercive behavior which requires exclusion. Compare Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (eight to nine hour sustained interrogation of a mentally unstable suspect in a tiny room which was at times literally filled with police officers supported finding of involuntariness) with Colorado v. Connelly (confession made by person suffering from chronic schizophrenia while in a psychotic state was not involuntary because no police coercion took place).

II. ADMISSIBILITY OF IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY

Shields argues that admitting into evidence testimony identifying him as one of the robbers violated due process. Permitting in-court identification testimony after suggestive pretrial identification procedures violates due process when there is a "very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1973).

The trial court found "any identification ... [the witnesses] may make at trial is not tainted by the 'throw-down'." Under federal law, this finding implies that after hearing the witnesses and assessing their credibility, the trial court concluded that there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification.

AFFIRMED.