Unpublished Disposition, 865 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Anthony Capra appeals the district court's denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (4) and 60(b) (6) motion to vacate a default judgment. Capra contends that the district court improperly denied his motion to vacate because (1) service of process upon his housekeeper did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1) or Cal.Civ.Proc. Sec. 415.20(b) and (2) his special security needs arising out of his connection with the Federal Witness Protection Program justified setting aside the default and vacating the judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 allows service to be made by substituted service. Rule 4 is a flexible rule that should be liberally construed so long as the defendant receives notice of the complaint. Direct Mail Specialist v. Eclat Computerized Technologies, 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988). PaineWebber made substituted service on Capra's housekeeper, and Capra does not dispute actual notice of the summons and complaint. Therefore, the court properly found that service was proper and the judgment was not void. Id.

Relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (6) must be requested within a reasonable time and is available only under extraordinary circumstances. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981). Capra waited almost eighteen months after entry of the default judgment before moving to set aside and did not state facts which showed extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(b) (6). Id.

AFFIRMED.