Unpublished Disposition, 855 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1988)

No. 86-1327.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Before JAMES R. BROWNING and HUG, Circuit Judges, and JESSE W. CURTIS, Senior District Judge.^*** 

MEMORANDUM^** 

Tae Im Cobb Beane argues because the indictment charged tax evasion, a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, she was deprived of notice and hence of due process when convicted under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) for filing false returns. Since filing a false return is a lesser included offense of tax evasion, United States v. Pulawa, 532 F.2d 1301, 1302 (9th Cir. 1976), Beane had ample notice that she faced the charge for which she was convicted. See United States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 1977).¹ 

Beane's reliance on Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), is unavailing. Blockburger's test applies to Fifth Amendment double jeopardy claims and claims of illegally cumulated sentences. Appellant's due process claims are governed by the "inherent relationship" test. See United States v. Martin, 783 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 1980). United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 (1985), which Beane cites, is a cumulative sentencing case.

There was sufficient evidence to permit rational jurors to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Beane signed the 1979-81 returns. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Beane admitted she filed these returns. She also admitted she signed the 1975-78 returns which were admitted into evidence, and provided handwriting exemplars which the trier of fact could readily find matched the signatures on the 1979-81 returns.

Since there is sufficient evidence appellant signed the returns, we need not decide whether Sec. 7206(1) requires proof a defendant signed the forms or whether it would have been permissible to rely on the presumption provided by 26 U.S.C. § 6064.

AFFIRMED.