Unpublished Disposition, 846 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1988)

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US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 846 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1988)

Howard Lee VAUGHN, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Howard WAX, Director of Alameda County Jail, MedicalDepartment, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 87-1957.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 11, 1987.* Decided May 3, 1988.

Before ALARCON, BEEZER and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

I "Deliberate Indifference"

While a pretrial detainee at the Santa Rita Correctional Facility, Vaughn complained of rectal bleeding and stomach pain. He initiated this Sec. 1983 action, claiming Dr. Wax's treatment amounted to "deliberate indifference" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). We disagree.

Vaughn was seen the morning following his initial complaint of discomfort. Dr. Wax ordered a complete blood count and SMAC-20 tests. After learning that Vaughn had had numerous tests performed for the same condition only six months earlier, Wax decided to delay actual treatment until he studied the test results. Due to some confusion over the proper consent and release form, the X-rays and other test results were not received until one month later.1  All results were normal.

Vaughn's only real complaint is that Dr. Wax shouldn't have delayed his treatment while waiting for the test results. Vaughn makes no showing that he was damaged by the delay. To the contrary, uncontradicted evidence shows that he was seen twice during the interim between his first visit and receipt of the X-rays; his medical chart shows that he appeared to be getting healthier. Perhaps more importantly, Dr. Wax, taking reasonable precautions, did schedule a gastrointestinal consult before he actually received Vaughn's test results.

Dr. Wax's decision to withhold treatment until he reviewed the tests was a reasonable exercise of his medical judgment and did not result in "deliberate indifference" to Vaughn's "serious medical needs."

II Pretrial Management

No error appears from the court's failure to rule on Vaughn's motions to compel discovery before granting Dr. Wax's motion for summary judgment. The motions sought discovery of information which was irrelevant to Vaughn's action.2 

We have considered Vaughn's challenges to the court's grant of a sixty-day continuance and its issuance of other pretrial management orders. We reject them; the court did not abuse its discretion.

AFFIRMED.

 *

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

 1

The treatment received at the other prison medical facility was the subject of a separate Sec. 1983 action. This court recently affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against him in that matter. See Vaughn v. Tremain, No. 87-1955 (Jan. 20, 1988) (memorandum disposition)

 2

The motions sought the production of the names of other pretrial detainees who had received medical attention and of a copy of reports concerning the condition of the prison facility. Although we recognize that systemic deficiencies of a prison's medical facilities can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, see, e.g., Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977), Vaughn complained only of the treatment which he received. Vaughn does not allege that the conditions or procedures, unlike the delay in treatment, caused him any harm. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (specific allegations of harm required to state section 1983 claim)

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