Unpublished Disposition, 844 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1988)

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US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 844 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1988)

Percy Lee HORTON, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Michael CHERNETSKY, Classification and Parole Supervisor atASPC-F, also in his individual and official capacity; ANDRESALIS, CPO, in his individual and official capacity; WendelEngland, CPS, in his individual and official capacity;Louis Hubner, CSS, in his individual and official capacity:Balkema, CSS, in his individual and official capacity; G.Melburn, CSO, in his individual and official capacity; A.Fuentas, CSO, in his individual and official capacity; D.Thurman, Lt., in his individual and official capacity,Defendants-Appellees.

No. 87-1710.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 19, 1988.* Decided April 7, 1988.

Before CHOY, TANG and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

Percy Horton, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against various prison officials. Horton contends that the officials violated his constitutional rights by reclassifying him to a higher prison status and by causing him to lose his prison job assignment. Horton also contends that the district court erred in not appointing counsel for him. We affirm.

An inmate has no constitutionally-based liberty interest in being assigned to or remaining in a minimum-security prison facility. See Oil v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976).

State law may confer a liberty interest in prison assignment. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-472 (1983); see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978). However, Arizona state law does not create a liberty interest in remaining within the general prison population. McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1986). Although Horton was transferred from minimum to medium security, he does not allege loss of good time credits or placement in solitary confinement or administrative segregation. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that prison officials did not deprive Horton of due process by reclassifying him from minimum to medium custody.

Moreover, there is no constitutional right to receive and retain a particular prison job assignment. See Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 486 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983). Hence, the district court did not err in determining that Horton did not show that the loss of his prison job assignment violated any federal constitutional right.

Horton also contends that the district court erred in not appointing counsel to represent him. This contention lacks merit.

Horton did not request appointed counsel in the district court. As a general rule, this court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, except when review is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity of the judicial process, a change in law raised a new issue while an appeal is pending, or the issue is purely one of law. See Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985). We find none of these exceptions to be applicable here. Hence, we do not exercise our discretion to consider the appointment of counsel issue.

AFFIRMED.

 *

The panel unanimously finds this case appropriate for submission without oral argument pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3