Unpublished Disposition, 842 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1987)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Brenda Taylor appeals pro se the district court's denial of her motion for a preliminary injunction in her Title VII case. The district court denied her motion because Taylor failed to make a showing sufficient to warrant injunctive relief, and because she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and should have dismissed Taylor's suit. "Congress expressly premised federal court jurisdiction on prior exhaustion of administrative remedies by providing that a federal employee could bring an employment discrimination suit within thirty days of receiving notice of final administrative action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976)." Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1213 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).

Prior to filing her district court Title VII action on March 6, 1987, Taylor had filed at least two informal EEOC complaints. After she filed her last informal complaint, the EEOC sent Taylor a notice of no discrimination, dated September 19, 1986. Taylor did not appeal this decision administratively by filing a formal complaint. Taylor apparently misunderstood the language of section 2000e-16(c) as authorizing an aggrieved employee to file a district court action 180 days after filing an informal EEOC complaint. However, the statute authorizes an employee to file in district court only after she has appealed an EEOC order or decision and thus has exhausted administrative remedies. The employee can file in district court 180 days after filing an appeal of an EEOC decision if the agency has failed to take final action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).

The district court's order denying Taylor's motion for a preliminary injunction is vacated. The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

VACATED and REMANDED.