Green v. Delaware
Annotate this CaseTodd Green appealed the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Green was arrested during the first week of June 2014 after his girlfriend’s thirteen-year old daughter reported to her sister, a sexual abuse nurse examiner and a Child Advocacy Center forensic interviewer, that Green had raped her on the evening of May 28, 2014 and that “it wasn’t the first time.” A grand jury returned a twenty-two count indictment against Green, and after a five-day trial, he was convicted by jury on three of those counts: attempted rape in the second degree, attempted sexual abuse of a child, and unlawful sexual contact in the second degree. After a pre-sentence investigation, the Superior Court sentenced Green to a cumulative period of Level V incarceration of 50 years and nine months. To the Delaware Supreme Court, Green appealed his convictions. arguing that the jury’s exposure to several instances of inadmissible testimony had a “cumulative prejudicial effect” and deprived him of a fair trial. The Supreme Court rejected that argument and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, concluding that “[a]ny prejudicial effect of the testimony relied upon by Green [was] . . . far outweighed by the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.” Green then filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, alleging his trial counsel was ineffective throughout the trial in violation of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and under Article I, sections 4, 7, and 11 of the Delaware Constitution. Several of the issues at the heart of Green’s ineffective-assistance claims were touched upon in the Supreme Court's earlier order denying Green’s direct appeal, but a few were not. So Green also alleged in his motion that his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for not raising those issues. A Superior Court Commissioner “recommend[ed] that Green’s motion be denied as procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3) and (4) for failure to prove cause and prejudice and as previously adjudicated.” The trial judge, without addressing the commissioner’s procedural-bar analysis, adopted the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation and denied Green’s motion. In this appeal, Green dropped his claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective, but challenged the Superior Court’s determination that his claims were procedurally barred and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally effective representation. Although the Supreme Court agreed with Green that his claims were not procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) and (4), the Supreme Court concluded nonetheless that Green’s trial counsel’s performance, viewed as a whole, did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Therefore, the Court affirmed.
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