Smith v. Christiana Care Health Services, et al.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
CRYSTAL SMITH,
Appellant,
v.
CHRISTIANA CARE HEALTH
SERVICES and UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD,
Appellees.
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) C.A. No. N12A-04-003 CLS
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Date Submitted: November 15, 2012
Date Decided: February 20, 2013
On Appeal from the Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
AFFIRMED.
ORDER
Crystal Smith, Pro Se, Bear, Delaware. Appellant.
James H. McMackin, III, Esquire, Allyson Britton DiRocco, Esquire, Morris
James, LLP, 500 Delaware Avenue, Ste. 500, P.O. Box 2306, Wilmington,
Delaware 19899-2306. Attorneys for Appellee, Christiana Care Health Services.
Scott, J.
Introduction
Before this Court is the Appellant Crystal Smith’s (“Appellant”) appeal from
the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (“Board”). The Court
has reviewed the parties’ submissions. For the reasons that follow, the decision of
the Board is AFFIRMED.
Background
Appellant, Crystal Smith, was employed by Christiana Care Health Services
(“Appellee”) as a full time patient escort employee from February 12, 2007
through July 20, 2011. Appellant was terminated on July 20, 2011 for excessive
lateness, idleness and inappropriate conduct. Appellee has an attendance policy
that permits six absences and five occurrences of lateness in a 12 month period and
a discipline policy that provides for progressive discipline; both policies were
communicated to and acknowledged by Appellant throughout her employment.
Appellant received a reminder on April 11, 2011, after she was late six times
in violation of the attendance policy, that stated that any future absences would
bring her outside of the guidelines and may result in termination. This action was
consistent with Appellee’s discipline policy. Appellant was late three more times
on July 3, 10 and 11th in violation of the attendance policy. Appellant claims that
her tardiness on these days was due to her suffering from morning sickness brought
on by her pregnancy.
Appellant, however, did not provide Appellee with a
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medical reason for her lateness, but instead stated that she was “moving slowly.”
Appellant was terminated on July 20, 2011 as a result of these violations.
Appellant filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Delaware
Department of Labor on July 24, 2012. The Claims Deputy determined, on August
10, 2011, that Appellant was terminated for just cause and would thus not be
eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Appellant appealed the decision to the
Appeals Referee and a hearing was held on October 10, 2011. At this hearing,
Plaintiff claimed that her excessive lateness should have been covered under
FMLA. Witnesses on behalf of Appellee stated that Appellant did not cite any
medical excuse for her lateness and stated that she was late because she was
“moving slowly.” The Appeals Referee affirmed that Claims Deputy’s denial of
benefits, finding that just cause existed for Appellant’s termination.
Appellant then appealed this decision to the Board and a hearing was held
December 7, 2011. The Board affirmed the Referee’s denial of unemployment
benefits and found that Appellee met its burden of proving sufficient evidence to
support a finding of just cause for Appellant’s termination.
Appellant
subsequently filed this appeal.
Issues on Appeal
Appellant argues that Appellee terminated her for six instances of tardiness
that were approved and covered under the Family Medical and Leave Act
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(“FMLA”). Appellee argues that Appellant was properly discharged for just cause
in connection with her absences from work under 19 Del C. §3314. Moreover,
Appellee argues that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence
that Appellant was discharged in violation of Appellee’s attendance policy.
Standard of Review
The scope of review of an appeal from the Board is limited to errors of law
and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. 1 This standard
requires more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance of
evidence. 2 This Court will not weigh evidence, determine the credibility of the
witnesses, or make its own factual findings and conclusions. 3
Discussion
I.
The Board Did Not Commit Legal Error in Affirming the Decision of the
Appeals Referee Who Found Appellant was Terminated With Just Cause.
The Board did not commit legal error in affirming the decision of the
Appeals Referee, who determined Appellant was terminated from his employment
with just cause. Pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(2), an individual is disqualified
from benefits:
[f]or the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual’s
work for just cause in connection with the individual’s work and for each
week thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4
1
Chester v. Adecco USA, 2011 WL 1344740, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2011).
Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981).
3
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965).
2
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subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in
covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit
amount. 4
To terminate an employee for just cause requires notice that further behavior or
performance may lead to termination. 5 An employer may terminate an employee for
violating a reasonable company policy. 6 An employee must be made aware of the
policy’s existence. 7 A two-step analysis is used when determining just cause: “1)
whether a policy existed, and if so, what conduct was prohibited and 2) whether the
employee was apprised of the policy and if so, how was he made aware.” 8
Knowledge of a company policy can occur through a written policy or where an
employee was previously warned. 9
The Board correctly applied the correct legal standard to the facts of this case.
The Board reviewed the company’s policy and Appellee indicated that she was aware
of, and acknowledged, the policy throughout her employment. In their decision, the
Board set forth the proper standard for just cause. The Board additionally noted that
just cause exists where there is a “willful or wanton act or pattern of conduct despite
warnings about chronic lateness and absences in violation of the employer’s
4
19 Del. C. § 3114(2).
Barton, 2004 WL 1284203, at *1.
6
McCoy v. Occidental Chem., Corp., 1996 WL 111126, *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1996).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
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attendance policy.” 10 It was not an error of law for the Board to conclude based on
the decision of the Referee and its own hearing that Appellant was terminated with
just cause and not eligible to collect unemployment benefits under 19 Del. C. §
3314(2).
II.
The Decision of the Board is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
The decision of the Board is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Evidence is substantial when a reasonable person would think the evidence
presented was adequate to support the conclusion. 11 In determining whether
substantial evidence exists to support the Board’s decision, this Court must view
the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. 12 A reasonable
person would believe that the evidence set forth and relied on by the Board was
adequate to support the Board’s denial of benefits. Appellee acknowledged that
she was aware of Appellant’s attendance policy. She received a warning, pursuant
to the established policy, indicating that if she was late again, action would be
taken against her that may include termination. However, Appellant was late three
additional times after this warning. Appellant claimed that her employer was
aware of her intent to use FMLA to excuse her tardiness, however, at the time of
each absence, she merely told her employer that she was “moving slowly” and did
10
R. at 89.
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994).
12
Brommel v. Chrysler, LLC, 2001 WL 4513086, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2010) (citing
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Fanpel, 859 A.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Del. Super. Jan. 30, 2004).
11
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not cite to a medical reason. Moreover, she did not find out that she was pregnant
until after these three instances of tardiness. This substantial evidence supports a
denial of unemployment benefits by the Board, a conclusion which a reasonable
person reviewing the facts would deem adequate to support the Board’s decision.
For these reasons, the decision of the board is AFFIRMED.
Conclusion
Based on the forgoing, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/calvin l. scott
Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.
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