CACH, LLC v. Eastern Savings Bank, FSB.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
CACH, LLC,
)
)
Appellant, Plaintiff-Below,
)
)
v.
) C.A. No. N10A-08-015 WCC
)
EASTERN SAVINGS BANK, FSB )
)
Appellee, Defendant-Below. )
Submitted: October 24, 2011
Decided: January 31, 2012
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Reargument. DENIED
ORDER
David E. Matlusky, Esquire, and Brett Bendistis, Esquire. The Matlusky Firm,
LLC, 1423 North Harrison Street, Wilmington, DE 19806. Counsel for Plaintiff.
Patrick Scanlon, Esquire. Law Offices of Patrick Scanlon, P.A., 203 NE Front
Street, Suite 101, Milford, DE 19963. Counsel for Defendant.
CARPENTER, J.
Upon considering Defendant Eastern Savings Bank’s Motion for
Reargument, Plaintiff CACH, LLC’s response, and the record of this case, it
appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant has moved for reargument of this Court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law as set forth in an Opinion dated September 30, 2011.1 In
that Opinion, the Court reversed the Court of Common Pleas’ decision to
grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant.2 The issue before both
courts was whether the holder of a judgment lien—here, Plaintiff—is
entitled to have its judgment satisfied out of the proceeds of a foreclosure
sale on the affected property where the judgment lien predates the
foreclosing mortgage.3 On review, this Court determined that the lower
court misinterpreted the admittedly esoteric statutes and case law relevant to
the instant case.4 This Court held that Delaware law requires the discharge
of all non-mortgage liens on land sold at foreclosure sale when those liens
have priority relative to the foreclosing party.5 Defendant now moves for
reargument on the grounds that the Court ignored binding case law, did not
strictly construe applicable law, and overlooked relevant facts.
1
CACH, LLC v. Eastern Savings Bank, FSB, 2011 W L 4730 525 (D el. Super. Sept. 30, 2011).
Id.
3
Defendant is the foreclosing party.
4
CACH, LLC, 2011 WL 4730525, at *1.
5
Id.
2
2
2. A motion for reargument will usually be denied unless the Court has
“overlooked a controlling precedent or legal principles, or the court has
misapprehended the law or facts such as would have changed the outcome
of the underlying decision.”6 A motion for reargument should not be used
merely to rehash the arguments already decided by the Court, nor will the
Court consider new arguments that the movant could have previously
raised.7 The movant “has the burden of demonstrating newly discovered
evidence, a change in the law, or manifest injustice.”8
3. Defendant has not met this burden. Defendant first contends that the Court
should have addressed Reybold v. Herdman.9 In fact, the Court considered
Reybold, even if it did not cite the case in its Opinion, because Defendant
referenced Reybold in its Answering Brief. Reybold is no more or less
binding on the Court than Farmers’ Bank v. Wallace10 or Sharpe v.
Tatnall,11 and the Court noted in its Opinion that it was resolving
antiquated, contradictory laws dissonant with today’s financial practices.12
If the Court’s resolutions are dissatisfactory to Defendant, the Court
6
Defillipo v. Quarles, 2010 W L 2636 855, at *2 (Del. Super. June 30, 2010) (citing Lamourine v. Mazda Motor of
Am., 2007 W L 3379 048, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 24, 2007)).
7
Brenner v. Village Green, Inc., 2000 W L 9726 49, at *1 (Del. Super. May 23, 200 0).
8
Id. (citing E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 45 , 55 (Del. 1995)).
9
2 Del.Ch. 34 (183 7).
10
3 Harr. 370 (D el. Super. 1841).
11
5 Del. Ch. 302 (18 80).
12
CACH, LLC, 2011 WL 4730525, at *5, n.20.
3
encourages Defendant to ask the Supreme Court of Delaware to clarify this
issue.
4. Defendant also argues that the outcome of the case would have been
different if the Court strictly construed case law and Judge Woolley’s
treatise. This may have been the case if there existed clearly written and
factually relevant cases, statutes, and treatises for the Court to construe. As
it was, obscure verbiage and fact patterns only tenuously related to this
case’s made strict construction impossible. The Court does not agree that it
misapprehended the law, but, again, the Court would welcome the Supreme
Court’s guidance if Defendant chooses to appeal.
5. Next, Defendant alleges that the Court’s decision is unenforceable because
Plaintiff cannot bring a claim against Defendant to disburse the proceeds of
the sheriff’s sale. Even if this is true, it is a problem for Plaintiff and not
Defendant. Plaintiff has not brought any such complaints before the Court.
6. The balance of Defendant’s motion advances policy arguments against the
Court’s decision and alleges the Court misapprehended certain facts. Those
facts, even if misunderstood by the Court, would not change the outcome of
the case, and policy arguments will not support a motion for reargument.13
13
See supra notes 6-8 and ac com panying text.
4
7. The Court concedes that it is difficult to divine the legislative intent of
centuries-old statutes and to compare fact patterns for financial transactions
in cases predating the automobile, much less digital title searches.
However, the Court is confident that it did not overlook controlling
precedent or material facts in deciding this case. If by mistake it did,
Defendant is welcome to argue these mistakes on appeal. For the foregoing
reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Reargument is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ William C. Carpenter, Jr.
Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.
5
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