State of Delaware v. Outten.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY STATE OF DELAWARE v. JACK OUTTEN ) ) ) ) ) ) CRIMINAL ACTION NUMBERS IN-92-01-1144-R1 thru IN-92-01-1148-R1 ID NO. 92000786DI Submitted: February 1, 2008 Decided: February 29, 2008 MEMORANDUM OPINION Upon Motion of the State Reargument - DENIED Appearances: James B. Ropp, Esquire, and Ipek K. Medford, Esquire, Deputys Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for State of Delaware Jennifer-Kate Aaronson, Esquire, and Natalie S. Woloshin, Esquire, of Woloshin Lynch Natalie & Gagne, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for defendant HERLIHY, Judge The State moves for reargument of the Court s decision granting defendant Jack Outten s motion to vacate his felony murde r convictio n. In its Jan uary 9, 2 008 op inion, the Court held tha t Outten s conviction must be vacated in light of the Delaware Supreme Court decision in William s v. State 1 and its progeny . Applicable Standard Under this Court s Criminal Rules, there is no provision regulating motions for reargum ent. In that instance, therefore, the approp riate Civil Rule applies. 2 Neces sarily that means that the standards for motions for rearguments also apply. Under Civil Ru le 59(e) motions for reargument, the only issue is whether the court overlooked something that would have changed the outcome of the underlying decision 3 or made an error of law.4 Generally, reargument will be denied unless the underlying decision involved an abuse of discretion.5 Finally, [a] motion for reargument is not intended to rehash the arguments already decided by the c ourt.6 1 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 20 03). 2 Superior Court Criminal Rule 57(d). That means that Civil Rule 59(e) applies 3 McElroy v. Shell Petroleum, Inc., 1992 W L 397468 (Del.). 4 Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 1999 W L 743982 (Del. Super.). 5 McElroy, 1992 W L 397468 (Del.). 6 Id. also. 1 Parties Contentions The State contends th at Outten s felony murder conviction was proper under the law as set forth in Williams. First, the S tate takes iss ue with the Cou rt s reliance on the fac ts as set forth in its 1993 S entencin g Decis ion. Spe cifically, the State argu es that if permitted to expand the record with specific transcript references the facts in this case would clearly support the felony murder conviction. Second, the State contends that the Court applied a standard of proof that was contrary to the standard set forth in Williams. The State alleges that in its opinion, the C ourt requires p roof, that the murder was a necessa ry part of o r a step ne eded by the three y oung m en to rob an older in toxicate d person. 7 This language, according to the State, w as used in Hassa n El v. Sta te 8 in the section of the opinion discussing the attempted robbery charge and, therefore, does not apply to felony murder. The State goes on to describe the correct standard in reviewing a felony murder conviction as whether considering the evidence in the light most favorab le to the prosecution, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasona ble doubt. 9 The State po ints out that this standard is n ot mentioned in the Court s prior opinion. Finally, upon review of the facts surroun ding M annon s death as recalled 7 Motion ¶ 2 quoting State v. Outten, 2008 W L 100117 at *3. 8 911 A.2d 385 (Del. 20 06). 9 Motion ¶ 4 citing, inter alia, Williams, 818 A.2d at 910. 2 by the State, it subm its that under the abo ve standard O utten s conviction sh ould stand. Outten responds by asserting that the Court s decision was appropriate in light of the Williams decision. First, he points out that the Court found the facts in its previous Sentencing Decision to be instructive, that does not mean, as suggested by the State, that was the only portion of the factual record that the Court relied upon in making its decision. Second, Outten cites portions of the re cord which , he contends, su pports the Co urt s finding that there was insufficient evidence to support a felony murder convictio n in this case. Third, he contends that the State misread the Court s opinion with regards to whether the Court applied the correct legal stand ard and th at, therefore, the legal standard applied was correct. Discussion A The State initially takes issue with the Co urt s recitation a nd relianc e upon th e facts contained in its April 30, 1993 S entencin g Decis ion. The State contends that [w]hile the facts recited in the Sentencing Order are accurate, the Order does no t relate all the f acts and circumstances in the voluminous re cord which were elicited over the multi-week trial. 10 It appears that the State is arguing that the Court overlooked relevant facts and circumstances which w ould have changed the outcome o f the underlying d ecision. Without actually providing any relevant portions o f the recor d in supp ort of this ar gume nt, 10 State s motion ¶ 1. 3 the State conclusively states that the facts show an intent to commit Robbery, and that the Murder was comm itted in the course of, and in furtherance of, the Robbery First Degree. 11 The State do es not request the o pportunity to ex pand the reco rd. The Court d eems it u nnecess ary to allow the State to expand the record for two reasons. First, it is unclear to the Court why the State would not indicate in its Motion what portions of the record, if considered, would have changed the Court s decision. Second, the State, nevertheless, does provide facts in the portion of their Motion arguing that the Court applied the wrong legal standard.12 Those facts, it alleges, support the jury s felony murder conviction and, in turn, negate the Co urt s prior decision. Therefore, those facts will be considered with regard to the State s argument that the Court overlooked relevant facts and c ircums tances in r endering its initial decisio n, whic h, if considered, would have changed that decision. The relevant facts, which the State alleges would have changed the outcome of the underlying decision, are: (1) evidence that Outten and the others discussed committing a robbery earlier in the day of Mannon s murder, (2) evidence that Outten had committed a robbery earlier in the day, (3) evidence that Mannon was openly wearing jewelry on the night of the murder that Outten must have seen, (3) ev idence th at Man non s po ckets had been turned out, that his wallet was found some distance from the body, and that 11 State s Motion ¶ 1. 12 State s Motion ¶ 4-5. 4 contents of the wallet were found some distance from the wallet, (4) no evidence, as recalled by the State, of any othe r motive to kill Outten besides to facilitate robbing him, and (5) eviden ce of Gibbo n s statement that Mannon did not have money can be negated by the fact that he was wearing jewelry which presents a motive to rob. It is important to point ou t that the on ly evidence now argued by the State which the Court did not expressly consider is the fact that Mannon was openly wearing jew elry on the night of the murder. As the State should have read in the underlying opinion, the Court considered the robbery committed earlier on the day of Mannon s murder to cut against a finding of felony murder. This is because Outten d id not kill or h arm the victim of the previo us robbe ry, whic h negate s that he w ould hav e neede d to kill Man non to rob him. It appears that the ess ence of th e State s ar gume nt is that it simply d oes not a gree w ith the inference s drawn by the C ourt from the evide nce in the recor d. That, h oweve r, is not an appro priate con sideration in a mo tion for rea rgume nt. 13 Therefore, the Court will not upset its underlying decision on that b asis. As mentioned above, the only fact asserted by the State not specifically addressed in the Court s opinion is that Mannon was wearing jew elry. This fa ct, even if overlooke d, would not change the Court s decision. This is because the other evidence in the recor d, as the S tate urges the Cou rt must co nsider, su ggests a lack of intent to rob 13 See Kennedy v. Invacare C orp., 2006 W L 488590 (Del. Super.). 5 Mannon. 14 The simple fact that he was wearing jewelry does not outweigh the other facts considered dispositive by this C ourt in makin g its decision. The refore, the Court is not compelled by that fact to chan ge its decision. B The State s next argument is that the Court fa iled to app ly the correct legal standard in its consideration of Outten s mo tion. The correct sta ndard, a ccording to the State , is whether considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a re asonable dou bt. 15 The State contends that the standard applied b y the Co urt was contrary to the co rrect stand ard as set fo rth above. To support its argument the State points to language in the opinion in which the Court allegedly requires that the m urder be a nec essary part or step... 16 in the process of committing the felony. The Court wa s not, as alleged by the State, applying a contrary legal standard when it used the above quoted language. In using that language, the Court was simply applying the analysis of Hassan El to the uniq ue facts pr esented b y this case . As the S tate is most likely aware, a case like this one, an afterthought robbery, is one which the 14 The lack of intent to rob is discussed more fully in Section B of this opinion. 15 State s motion ¶ 4. 16 State s Motion ¶ 2 quoting State v. Outten, 2008 W L 100117 (Del. Super.). 6 Court has not been confronted until now . Based o n that, the C ourt mu st do its bes t to extend the reasoning as used in previous cases, cases which do not p resent a p erfect fit here because of the unique fac ts presented. The Court is compelled to further clarify its application of Hassan El to this case. In that case, defendant was convicted of felony murder and the underlying felony was an attempted robbery. He challenged his conviction based on the holdings in Williams and Chao II.17 The de fendant a rgued th at the killing could not have been in furtherance of a robbery that was not actually ever carried out. In upholding his conviction, the court found dispositive the fact that there was evidence in the record supporting a jury finding of an intent to rob before the killing occurred. Specifically, the Court relied on the fact that the defendant approached an ice cream truck with his face covered, was carrying a handgun, and had fired the weapon im mediately up on reaching th e ice cream tru ck. In finding such evidence of an intent to rob, the Court conclud ed that the killing wa s in furtherance of the intended robbery, even though the defendants had abandoned the scheme before actually co mpleting suc h robbery. In the present case, it is clear from the record that Outten robbed Man non. There was evidence at the scene that Mannon s jewelry had been taken from his body and that his wallet had been gone through. However, the evidence the Court found lacking was that of an intent to rob Mannon before the killing occurred. As was stated in the facts of the 17 Chao v . State, 931 A.2d 1000(Del. 2007)(applied Williams retroactively). 7 1993 Sentencing Order [a]fter Mr. M annon was m urdered, his rings and wallet were removed . 18 The Court found that this, and other evidence in the record, compelled a reversal of the felony murder conviction. This is because, based on the un ique facts o f this case, a rational juror could not have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder of Mannon was to move along th e robber y. The C ourt believ es this resu lt is not ratio nal where, as here, the evidence so clearly compels the conclusion that an intent to rob was not formed until after Mann on was killed. Th erefore, n egating an essential element of felony mu rder, an intent to com mit the underly ing felony. This Court in State v. Outten19 explored a new facet of the felony murder progeny as begun in the Williams decision. The facts presented in this case represent a new situation in which a felon y murder c onviction cann ot stand. Conclusion In conclusion, for the reasons stated he rein, the State s Motion for Reargument of the Court s opinion vacating Outten s felony mu rder conviction is DENIED. J. 18 See Outten v . State, 2008 W L 100117 (Del. Super.). 19 2008 W L 100117 (Del. Super.). 8
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