State of Delaware v. Brooks.
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IN THE S UPERIO R COUR T OF TH E SATE OF DEL AWA RE IN AND FOR THE NEW CASTLE COUNTY STATE OF DELAWARE, v. ALVIN BROOKS, Defen dant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CR.A.NOS.: IN06-06-0052R1; IN06-0035-RI DEF. I.D.: 0605017836 Date Submitted: December 7, 2007 Date Decided: March 10, 2008 Upon Consideration of Defendant s Pro Se Motio n for Po stconvictio n Relief. DENIED. ORDER This 10th day of March, 2008, upon consideration of the Motion for Postconviction Relief brought by Alvin Brooks ( Defendant ), it appears to the Court that: 1. On June 12 , 2006, D efendan t was ind icted on f ifteen felony counts, including three counts of Murder First Degree and one count of Attempted Murder First D egree. 2. The State time ly indicated its intent to seek the death penalty against Defen dant. On A pril 2, 20 07, Defendant plead guilty to one count of M urder First 1 Degree and one count of Attempted Murder Fir st Degr ee and th e State w ithdrew its request for capital punishment. On June 8, 2007, Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without probation or parole. Defendant did not seek to withdraw his plea at any time p rior to or after sente ncing. 3. Defendant filed this pro se motion for postconviction relief on June 29, 2007. He raises four grounds for relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) his counse l coerced him into accepting the guilty plea and co erced his sister into encouraging Defendant to accept the plea; (2) his counsel never filed certain pre-trial motions he had requested, never sent him paperwork regarding his representation, and told Defendant that his grounds for defense were without merit; and (3) his counsel advised him to accept a guilty plea even though the evidence used to connect Defendant to the crimes was dismissed at the preliminary hearing. 4. On September 19, 2007, Defendant filed a supplemental motion for postconviction relief asserting three additional grounds, also based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In his supplemental motion, Defendant argues: (1) he requested a suppre ssion he aring sev eral times b ut his cou nsel nev er mov ed for o ne; (2) h is will was overborne while he was being interrogated by the police because he was never given food, water or clothing and his counsel was ineffective for failing to mo ve to suppress his statements;1 and (3) his counsel never ch ecked h is alibi. Th is order w ill 1 Docket Item ( D.I. ) 45, Defendant s Motion for Postconviction Relief, at 3 (Sept. 16, 2007). 2 address both motions. 5. Rule 61(g)(2) permits the court to direct counsel to supplement the record in response to a defendant s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In light of Defenda nt s claims here, the Court requested Defendant s counsel to supply an affidavit as contemplated by Rule 61(g)(2 ). Counsel submitted affidavits on A ugust 31, 2007 2 and September 4, 20073 in response to Defendant s initial motion and filed an addition al affidav it in response to Defendant s supplemental motion on December 7, 2007.4 A. 6. Standard O f Review Before addressing the merits of any Postconviction claim, the Court m ust first determine whether the claims pass through the procedural filters of Rule 61.5 To protect the integrity of the procedural rules, this Court will not address the substantive aspects of the claims if Defendant s claims are procedurally barred.6 Rule 61 imposes four procedural imperatives on Defendant s motion: (1) the motion must be filed 2 Aff. of Defense Counsel 1. 3 Aff. of Defense Counsel 2 . 4 Aff. of Defense Counsel 3. 5 See Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) ( This Court applies the rules governing procedural requirements before giving consideration to the merits of the underlying claim for postconviction relief. ). 6 Id. 3 within three years of a final order of con viction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceedings; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and (4) any basis for relief m ust not h ave been former ly adjudicated in any proceeding. Under Rule 61(i)(5), a defendant may avoid the first three procedural imperatives if the claim is jurisdictional or is a colorable claim that there was a miscarria ge of jus tice becau se of a co nstitution al violation . 7 7. A judgment of conviction is final for the purposes of postconvicti on review under the follow ing circumstances: (1) if the defe ndant d oes not f ile a direct ap peal, 30 d ays after the Super ior Court imposes sentence; (2) if the defendant files a direct appeal or there is an autom atic statutory r eview o f a death penalty, when the Supreme Court is sues a m andate or order finally determining the case on direct rev iew; or ( iii) if the def endant f iles a petition for certiorari seeking review of the Supreme Court s mandate or order, when the U.S. Supreme Court issues a mandate or order finally disposing of the case on direct review.8 Defenda nt s motion is timely and is not barred by any other procedural safeguards. 8. Challenges to the validity of guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.9 7 SUPER. CT . CRIM . R. 61(i)(5). 8 SUPER. CT . CRIM . R. 61(m). 9 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988). 4 That test requires the defen dant to prove that counsel s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reason able probab ility that, but for counsel s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differen t. 10 Evaluating counsel s conduct b egins with a strong presumption that the representation was reasonable. This presumption is meant to avoid the the distorting effects of hindsig ht. 11 To prevail on the prejudice prong of Strickland when challeng ing the ac ceptance of a guilty plea, the defendant must prove that he would have insisted on going to trial rather than pleading guilty had counsel not made the errors alleged.12 B. 9. Counsel s Representation of Defendant Did Not Fall Below an Objective Stan dard Of R easonableness. Defendant has failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test. Defenda nt s counsel acted within an objective standard of reasonableness in advising their client to acce pt the Sta te s offer o f life in pris on to av oid the p ossibility of a death sentence . The C ourt w ill not address the second prong of the Strickland test because Defen dant mu st prove both pr ongs to prevail o n an inef fective ass istance 10 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 11 Albury, 551 A.2d at 59. 12 Id. at 60. 5 claim, and the failure to prove the first prong is fatal to the entire claim.13 1. 10. Coerced Plea Defendant argues th at he wa s coerced by his counsel into accepting the plea offered by the State. He claims that he repeatedly told his defense counsel that he did not w ant to plead guilty. Defense counsel states by affidavit that counsel explained to Defe ndant th eir strategy o f seeking a plea agr eement th at wou ld avoid the impositio n of the d eath pen alty early in the representation and that Defendant was in agreement with this strategy. 14 Defense counsel also stated that they wanted Defendant to begin considering a plea for a life sentence early in the process in the event defense counsel was able to secure such an offer from the State. Defendant never in dicated h is disagre ement w ith this strategy to his def ense cou nsel. 15 Counsel was very concerned that the State had persuasive, admissible evid ence of D efendant s guilt and that the death penalty would be recommended by the jury.16 When the State formally extended the offer of life in prison without probation, defense counsel arranged for a videophone conference between cou nsel, De fendan t and his s ister to discuss the plea offer.17 Defendant s sister supported acceptance of the plea and stated 13 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 14 Aff. of Defense Counsel 1, at 4. 15 Id. 16 See Aff. of Defense Counsel 1, at 5-6. 17 Id. at 5 6 to Defen dant that [ w]e do n t need to bury an other bo dy. 18 According to defense counse l, Defendant know ingly, intelligently and vo luntarily accepted the State s plea offer.19 11. Additionally, the Court engaged Defendant in a lengthy plea colloquy to confirm that he understood the consequences of his plea, that he understood the constitutional trial rights he would forfeit by accepting the plea, and also that he was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering the plea: The C ourt: There are two docum ents that I need to discuss with you today. The first is your plea agreement, and the second is a truth in sentencin g guilty p lea form . The C ourt: The D efendan t: And were you able to understand everything that was on these forms? The D efendan t: Yes, sir. The C ourt: Did you understand what you were agreeing to by signing these documents? The D efendan t: Yes, sir. The C ourt: And did you h ave an o pportu nity to review them Id. 19 Yes, sir. The Court: 18 *** Did you read them both carefully before you signed them? Id. 7 both carefully with your attorneys? The D efendan t: Yes, sir. The C ourt: And did they answer any ques tions you might have had about these documents to your satisfaction? The D efendan t: Yes, sir. *** The C ourt: By entering these pleas of guilty, you give u p all of these constitutio nal trial righ ts. Do you understand that? 20 The D efendan t: Yes, sir. *** The Court: Has anyone threatened you or coerced you in any way to accept these pleas of guilty? The D efendan t: No, sir. The Court: Are you entering these pleas of guilty of your own free will because you believe it s in your best intere st to do so? The D efendan t: Yes, sir. The C ourt: *** And you re satisfied that [your attorneys] have explained to you all of the benefits and the consequences of making this decision to enter these pleas of guilty? 20 The Court had previously reviewed each Constitutional trial right individually with Defendant to confirm that he understood each right. 8 The D efendan t: Yes, sir. The C ourt: At the end of the day, though, do you understand that only you can make this decision? The D efendan t: Yes, sir. The C ourt: And is this decision to enter these pleas of guilty your decision? The D efendan t: Yes, sir. *** The C ourt: What is you r plea to that charg e [murder f irst degree]? The D efendan t: Guilty. The C ourt: And did you, in fact, commit that offense? The D efendan t: Yes, sir. This plea collo quy, in ad dition to th e Truth -In-Se ntencing Guilty Plea Form signed by Defendant, indicate that Defendant voluntarily waived his constitutional trial rights and was not coer ced to do so by his trial coun sel or any one else. Further, Defendant has failed to provide the Court with any evidence of coercion that was exerted against D efendan t or his sister by anyone, much less his ow n attorneys. Defense counse l have un equivo cally denie d that they coerced Defen dant to accept the plea agreem ent. 21 Given the amo unt of tim e Defen dant w as given to contem plate his 21 Aff. of Defense Counsel 1, at 6, Aff. of Defense Counsel 2, at 1. 9 plea, his agreement with the plea negotiation strategy at the outset, and the discussions with counsel leading up to accepting the plea, the Court is satisfied that Defendant has failed to meet his burden under Strickland to establish that his counsel was ineffective in recom mendin g that he a ccept the p lea offere d by the S tate. 2. 12. Lack of Pre-Trial Motions Defendant alleges that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to supp ress with this Cou rt. He do es not ind icate specific ally in his motion papers what evidence he wished to suppress. In their affidavit, defense counsel surmised that Defendant may be referring to a remorseful statement he made to a police detective following his arrest. 22 Defense counsel declined to move for suppression of this statement because there were no meritorious grounds to support suppression. Moreover, the statement indicated Defendant s remorse, which counsel believed, and Defendant agreed, may assist Defendant in procuring an offer of life without probation or probation, or in making a stronger case in mitigation at the penalty phase of the trial. 23 Further, in the plea colloquy referenced above, Defendant volunta rily and knowingly waived his constitutional right to challenge the evidence against h im. 22 Aff. of Defense Counsel 3, at 2-3. 23 Id. at 3. 10 13. Additionally, Defendant alleges that his will was overborne because he was not given food, water or clothing during the initial police interrogation and the air conditioner in the interrogation room was set on fu ll blast. H e argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the product of this coercive interrogation.24 Defense counsel investigated the circumstances surroundin g Defenda nt s statement and did not uncover evidence that would support a suppression motion. Defendant also never indicated to his def ense cou nsel that h e was p hysically or mentally abused, or deprived of food or water during the interrogation. Nor did he offer any additional grounds that would support such a suppression motion.25 3. 14. Illegal Search, Seizure and Detention Defendant next arg ues that h is counsel was ineffective for advising him to accept the guilty plea because the facts th at they use d in cou rt to connect [Defen dant] to this case were dismissed in [the] preli minary h earing. 26 The Court assumes Defendant means that the evidence used to link Defendant to charges that were dismissed in the Court of Common Pleas preliminary hearing could not later be used to support charges against him in the Superior Cou rt. Defen dant s ass ertion is misplaced because dismissal of certain charges at the prelim inary hea ring in the Court 24 D.I. 45, at 3. 25 Aff. of Defense Counsel 1, at 4. 26 D.I. 42, at 3. 11 of Common Pleas did not guarantee that Defendant wo uld not later be indicted on those same charges by the Grand Jury. 27 Additionally, dismissal of these charges does not bar the introduction of e vidence relating to those ch arges at a s ubsequ ent trial. 28 Defense counse l explaine d these p ossibilities to Defen dant. 29 Given the faulty legal premise upon which Defendant s assertion of ineffective assistance is based, Defendant s claim fails as a matter of law. 4. 15. Defendant s Alibi Finally, Defendant alleges that his counsel was ineffectiv e for failin g to investiga te his alibi. This claims is not substantiated by the record. Defendant failed to provide defense counsel with an y inform ation reg arding a n alibi. In f act, Defendant initially informed defense counsel that he had been staying in a vacant building on East 13 th Street in W ilmingto n, Delaw are and r epeated th is information in subsequent interviews. 30 The address provided by Defendant was the location of the murder for which Defendant plead guilty. Additionally, no other witnesses interviewed by defense counsel provided information regarding an alibi. 27 Defendant has not Del.Com.Pl. R. 5.1(b)( The discharge of the defendant shall not preclude the State from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offence. ). 28 See Del.Com.Pl. R. 5.1(b) 29 Aff. of Defense Counsel 1, at 7. 30 Aff. of Defense Counsel 3, at 5. 12 demonstrated that his defense counsel s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and therefore has not satisfied the standard set forth in Strickland.31 16. Based upon the foregoing, Defendant s motion for postconviction relief is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. _________________________ Judge Joseph R. Slights, III Original to Prothonotary 31 See State v. Jordan, 1994 WL 637299, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Jun.23, 1994)( This Court need not address Postconviction Relief claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated. ). 13
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