Michael A. Sinclair, Inc. v. Riley.

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STA TE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW C ASTLE COUNTY MIC HAE L A. S INCL AIR, I NC., Appe llant, v. DAVID E. RILEY, Appellee, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) C.A. No.: 03A-09-007 JRJ Date Submitted: April 1, 2004 Date Decided: July 30, 2004 ORDER On Appeal from the Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Decision REVERSED. Michael R. Ippoliti, Esquire, 824 Market Street, Suite 412, P.O. Box 2284, Wilmington, DE 19899. Attorney for Appellant Michael A. Sinclair, Inc. David E. Riley, 2 16 Oh io Ave nue, W ilmingto n, DE 19805 . Pro Se Appellee. JURDE N, J. Upon conside ration of the briefs submitte d and th e record in this case , it appears to the Co urt that: Factual and Procedural Background 1. Appellant Michael A. Sinclair, Inc. ( Sinclair or Employer ) appeals from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ( UIAB or Board ) which granted unemployment benefits to David E. Riley ( Riley or Claimant ). 2. Sinclair initially employe d Riley as a comm ercial truck driver in November of 2001.1 Individ uals wh o drive v ehicles w ith a gross weight over 10,000 pounds are requ ired to ha ve a M edical Ex aminer s Certificate ( MEC or Certificate ).2 On A pril 9, 2002, Riley underwent a medical examination for his MEC.3 As a result of this examination, Riley was given a three-m onth temporary certification, rather than the standard two-year certification, and was advised to see a physician to determine whether h e suffered from diabetes. 4 Riley was su bseque ntly diagn osed w ith diabetes in May of 2002,5 and his certification expired on July 9, 2002. Riley applied for a new Certificate, but was denied. On or about July 30, 2002, Riley parked the truck and his 1 See UIAB Record (Docket No 5) at 21. Id. at 12. 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 30. 2 2 employment with S inclair ended.6 After briefly working elsewhere, Riley filed a claim for unemp loymen t benefits w ith the Department of Labor on August 18, 2002.7 On August 30, 2002, Sinclair tried to rehire Riley for the same truck driver position , but Riley refused , allegedly b ecause h e could n ot obtain his MEC an d would be un able to perform the same truck-d riving duties.8 3. In a February 4, 2003 decision, the Claims Deputy determined that the Claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits under 19 Del. C. § 3315(3)9 because the medical documentation provided by the Claimant show ed no m edical restr iction that w ould aff ect the Cla imant s jo b. 10 4. Riley appealed and an A ppeals R eferee affirmed. The Referee s decision states, in pe rtinent pa rt: The issue in this case is whether the claimant refused a suitable offer of work. Clearly, there was an offer of work . This w ork w as identica l to what the claima nt had previously done for Sinclair. It is also clear that the claimant refused this job. The question then is whether the work was suitable for the cla imant. A lthough the claima nt testified th at he is 6 Id. at 22-23. Id. at 4. 8 Id. at 23. 9 19 Del. C. § 3315(3) provides in pertinent part: An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (3) If the individual has refused to accept an offer of work for which the individual is reasonably fitted . . . and the disqualification shall begin with the week in which the refusal occurred and shall continue for each week thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount . . . . 10 See Notice of Determination, UIAB Record at 7-8. 7 3 unable to obtain new certif ication due to his diabetes, he provided no medical documentation of this allegation. In the absence of such evidence, this tribunal cannot find that the offer of work was one for which the claimant was not reasonably fitted. Having refused the position, it must be concluded that he is disqualified from benefits by operation of the above-cited statute [19 Del. C. 3315(3) ].11 5. On June 25, 2003, the UIAB held a hearing after the Claimant appealed. Sinclair did not attend this hearing.12 The Board reversed the Referee s decision because the Claimant provided documentation that he was diagnosed with diabetes. The Board found that the offer of another driving position was not a suitable offer of work because Riley s dia betes restr icted his ability to obtain the necessary certification that would permit him to drive.13 The Board decision became final on September 7, 2003.14 6. On September 17, 2003 the Em ployer tim ely filed an initial appeal of the Board decision to this Court. 15 On January 27, 2004 the Employer filed the Appellant s Opening Brief.16 On F ebruary 27, 200 4 a Delin quent Brief Notice was sent to the Claimant, warning that an answering brief needed to be 11 See Referee s Decision, UIAB Record at 13. Sinclair filed a motion for a rehearing, claiming that it never received notice of the first hearing. In an August 13, 2003 decision, the Board denied the Employer s motion for a new hearing because it determined that notice of the first hearing was properly mailed to the Employer s address of record and was not returned. See Board s August 13, 2003 Decision, UIAB Record at 67-68. 13 See Board s Decision, UIAB Record at 41-42. 14 See Board s Refusal of Rehearing (Docket No 1) at Exhibit A. 15 See Notice of Appeal (Docket No 1) at 3. 16 See Appellant s Opening Brief ( Employer s Op. Brief ) (Docket No 8) at 1. 12 4 filed or the Court w ill decide th e issue on the pape rs whic h have b een filed if no further action of record is taken within ten (10) days from the receipt of this notice. 17 Having received no response from the Claimant, on March 25, 2004, the Court o rdered a determin ation of th e issue on th e papers that were filed to that date.18 Standard of R eview 7. In reviewing a decision on appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, this Co urt must determine if the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error.19 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind mig ht accept to s uppor t a conclus ion. 20 Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court must uphold the Board s decision.21 Questions of credibility are exclusively within the province of the Board which heard the evidence. As an appellate court, it [is] not within the province of the Superior Court to weigh the evidence, determine 17 See Final Delinquent Brief Notice (Docket No10) at 1. Id. 19 K-Mart v. Bowles, C.A. No. 94A-10-007, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 175 (Mar. 23, 1995) (citing 29 Del. C § 10142(d); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A..2d 64 (Del. 1965)). 20 Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Services, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972). 21 Id. 18 5 questions of credib ility or mak e its own factual fin dings. 22 The Court will only reverse a decision of the Board if its findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or where the Board has made a legal mistake.23 Discussion 8. Under 19 Del. C. § 3315(8), claimants are disqualified from unemployment benefits [i]f it shall be determined by the Department that total or partial unemployment is due to the individual's inability to work. Such disqualification [is] to termin ate whe n the ind ividual b ecomes able to work and available for work as determined by a doctor's Certificate and meets all other requirem ents under this title. 24 [W]hile the unemployment insurance fund is an emergency fund provided for those individuals who have become unemployed through no fault of their own, the fund w as designed to assist individu als who are unemployed primarily due to economic conditions. The fund and the unemployment insurance system were not intended to be a disability o r illness ins urers. 25 22 Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Div. Of Unemployment Ins., 803 A.2d 931, 937 (Del. 2002). 23 Delgado v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal. Bd., 295 A.2d 585 (Del. Super. 1972). 24 19 Del. C. § 3315(8). 25 O Neill v. Airborne Express, UIAB Hearing No. 135523 at 3 (August, 21 2000). See Employer s Op. Brief at Tab 29. 6 9. Here, the Board found that because the Claim ant was medicall y unable to obtain a ME C, the C laimant w as no lon ger able to work as a licensed truck driver.26 However, the Board erred in concluding that the only effect of this was to prevent the subsequent job offer from being a suitable offer for work. The B oard sh ould ha ve also co ncluded that this disability left the Claimant unable and unavailable to work pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3315(8). Consequently, it was an error of law for the Board to hold that the Claimant was qualified to receive unemployment benefits under the facts in the record. 10. As an alternative grounds for reversal, Delaware Superior Court Rule 107(e) states: If any brief, memorandum, deposition, affidavit, or any other paper which is or should be part of a case pending in this Court, is not served and filed within the time and in the manner required by these Rules or in accordance with any order of the Court or stipulation of counsel, the Court may in its discretion, dismiss the proceeding if the plaintiff is in default, consider the motion as abandoned, or summarily deny or grant the motion, such as the situation may present itself, or take such other action as it deems necessary to expedite the disposition of the case.27 In Hunte r v. First U SA/Bank ONE, this Court found that Rule 107(e) inextricab ly vests in the Court the power to reverse the Board s decision for failure of the Appellee to file its answ ering br ief. 28 Here, th e Cour t is confronted with a factually similar case. As in Hunter, the Ap pellee w as duly 26 See UIAB Record at 42 ( The Claimant has demonstrated that he has Type II Diabetes which restricted his ability to obtain proper certification to permit him to drive. ). 27 Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 107(e). 28 Hunter v. First USA/BANK ONE, C.A. No. 03A-05-005 PLA, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 123 at *13 (April 15, 2004). 7 notified29 and failed to explain his inactio n. Accordin gly, the Court has no other alternative but to re verse the Bo ard s decision d ue to the Ap pellee s failure to d iligently pr osecute a nd file its b rief purs uant to R ule 107 (e). 30 11. For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Board that the Claimant is entitled to benefits is not free from legal error and is therefore REVERSED. IT IS SO ORDERED. ___________________________________ Jan R. Jurden, Judge 29 Although, in the Hunter case, there was a subsequent notification by certified mail, this fails to distinguish these cases because that additional notification was prompted by a concern of a significant clerical error [that] may have been made in the mailing process, potentially resulting in Appellee never receiving any type of notification of appeal. Id at *5. 30 Id at *18. 8

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