State of Delaware v. Collins.
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE WILLIAM C. CARPENTER, JR. JUDGE NEW CASTLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 10400 WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3733 TELEPHONE (302) 255-0670 September 25, 2003 David Favata, E squire Department of Justice 820 N. French Street Wilmington, DE 19801 Joseph Bernstein, E squire 800 King Street, Suite 302 Wilmington, DE 19801 RE: State v. Curtis Collins Criminal ID No. 0206019341 Submitted: August 26, 2003 Decided: September 25, 2003 On Defendant Curtis Collins Motion for New Trial. Denied. Dear C ounsel: The Court has before it Defendant s Motion for New Trial pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 33. This is the Court s decision regarding said Motion. During the course of the trial, Juror #10 advised the bailiff that she believed she recognized a witness that was testifying. The Court, outside the presence of the other jurors, questioned the juror concerning her recollection of the interaction she may have had with this witness. The following colloquy on the subject occurred: The Court: If m y recollection is rig ht, is that you have some -perhaps now th at you saw Mr. C orbin, you have some recollection of him? Juro r #10 : It s a poss ibility. The Court: Can you tell me what you think you know or remember seeing M r. Corbin and when you would have seen him, what circumstances you would have seen him? Juror #10: Well, if by any chance, he is possibly living in Seaford, Delaware, and has a son by the name of Wayne Jones, and if he used to own or do, like, medical transportation, there was a gentlem an that my co mpany w orked w ith and he was - his face just looks familiar to me. The Court: Okay. Let s assume, and I m not sure it is the person, but let s assume for a moment it is. Is there anything about your interaction with Mr. Corbin that you believe would interfere with your ab ility to fairly consider th e evidenc e in this case? Juror #10: I don t think so. The Court: Okay. Did you have interactions with him there wer e neg ative in an y way? Juror #10 : No, not at a ll. The Court: Did you have interactions that could have particularly made him a friend? Was he a friend? Juror #10: I can t honestly say that, that he was a friend. Just by chance, we just happened to meet through, you k now, his employment, as well as m y employer. The Cou rt: Okay. Juror #10: And I maybe socialized with him briefly, but not anything extensive. The Court: So cialize in the se nse of w hen he ca me into the office, you would say hi to him or something? Juror #10 : Hi, right. The Court: Okay. Now, can you give me a time frame about how long that would have been? Juror #10: Well, I left that place of emplo yment abou t six to eight m onths a go. The juror further indicated that if the witness was the same individual she also had further contact with the witness son. Subsequently, after excusing the juror, the Court questioned the witness concerning his employment and the name of his son and it became apparent that the individual described by the juror was in fact this w itness. Thereafter, Juror #10 was again brought into the courtroom and questioned further about her interaction with the witness an d also her re lationship with the witness son. The juror appeared to have known the son wh ile in high school and was aware from conversations with other classmates since graduating that the witness s son had gotten into trouble. After thor oughly reviewing these matters with the juror, the following colloquy occurred. The Court: Okay. Now, do you believe that your knowledge of Mr. Jones and the know ledge that tha t is Mr. Corbin s son, do you think that incident - - those facts would influence your decisions in regards to this particular case or your assessment of the credibility of Mr. Corbin? Juror #10 : No, not at a ll. The Cou rt: Okay. W ould you be willing to listen to all of the evidence in the case and render a fair and impartial verdict based solely upon what you hear in the courtroom? Juror #10: Yes. The Court: Okay. Anything else you need that you think is - need to tell me that you think is relevant to your familiarity with Mr. Corbin? Juror #10: No, nothing I can think of at this time. The Court: Okay. And I m - - what I m hearing is that you know him to see him, because you recognized him, you were introduced to him as a driver who would take some of your clients from the company you were working for at the time, and that you may have, although you don t particularly recall, on a few occasions may have talk ed to him in relation to that client transportation? Juror #10: Yes. The Court: Okay. I take it, however, he is not someone who came in the offic e and kind of leaned on the desk and kind of chatted with you for a half hour about what was happening in his life? Juror #10 : No, not at a ll. The Court: All right. Thank you, ma am. The defendant subsequently requested that the juror be excused. After considering the matter, the Court ruled: The Court: Okay. I admit it s a relatively unusual circumstance. And but she doesn t know Mr. Collins, doesn t appear to recogniz e him, doe sn t appear to recognize anyone, doesn t make a conn ection between M r. Collins, anyone in Mr. Collins fam ily, and that - - and her recollectio n of M r. Corbin is - - appears to be isolated to either, one, his son, who was in trouble, or two, the little bit of contact she may have had w ith him when she was employed, and Mr. Corbin did some transpo rtation o f patien ts for tha t comp any. I find her to b e very candid , very honest. I don t believe that the circumstances, as she highlighted to the Court, would justify excusing her, at least at this juncture of the case. Now, things may change as the trial progresses. And - - but I m going to bring her back in an d tell her that I m going to not excuse her at this time, and I will allow her to continue, but if, as the trial proceeds, there are other things that come to light that causes her to refr esh addition al informa tion, she nee ds to let us kn ow so that we can ad dress th em. At the conclusion of closing arguments and jury instructions, the C ourt decided that in fairness to the defenda nt, and in spite of the C ourt s contin ued belief that the juror w ould be fair, it would excuse Ju ror #10 an d substituted an alternate that was available in her place. The Court advised counsel at sidebar of its intent and then proceeded to excuse the juror in open court while the other jurors were present. The Court stated: The Court: I am going to su bstitute - - M s. Stancell, you talked to us yesterday, and I have given som e more thought about the discussion we had. And since we still have an alternate who has remained with us today, that I thought it would be - having thought ab out it some more, it would be best perhaps that you not deliberate in regards to the guilt or innocence of Mr. Collins. I believe you could be a f air and impartial juror, but having had som e contact w ith Mr. Co rbin, perhap s it would be best, giving it further thought, that you not deliberate any further in regards to it, so I m going to substitute the alternate. And thank you very much for your service, but you are free to go. It is this innocuous reference to some contact with Mr. Corbin (the witness) that the defen dant now asserts justifies a new trial. It is truly an ironic twist when the Court takes action in an attempt to be fair to the defendant and to remove any potential appellate issue concerning the service of a juror and grants the request that has been made by the defenda nt, that that action now forms the basis of the defendant s argument for a new trial. The Court finds that the com ments set forth above made to the jurors were appropriate; provided a non-prejudicial justification for a juror s excusal; and was a polite and courteous action taken by the Court when a citizen had given her time and effort in the performance of her jury duty responsibility. Nothing said by the Court could in any way have influenced the decisio n of the remain ing juro rs, and the comments specifically indicated that any contac t by the juro r had no relation ship to th e defe ndant. Further, the Court finds that the factual situation of the Banther1 case is so different to the incident at issue here that it is not applicable. To argue that the defe ndant s righ t to a fair trial has been placed in jeopardy by the Court s action is simply ridiculou s. If anything, the action tak en insured the guilt or inn ocence o f the defend ant was decided by a jury, not influence by any extraneous influences. As a result, the Defendant s Motion for New Trial is hereby DENIED, and sentencing will occur on September 26, 2003 at 9:30 a.m. Sincerely yours, Judge William C . Carpenter, Jr. WCCjr:twp cc: Prothonotary 1 Banther v. State, 823 A.2d 467 (Del. 2003).
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