State v. Schimanski
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The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the appellate court upholding the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension, holding that that the State could not lawfully charge Defendant pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-215(c).
On appeal, Defendant argued that the forty-five-day license suspension period imposed on persons who refuse to submit to a chemical analysis of their breath, blood, or urine, as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-227b(b), does not continue indefinitely until a time that the persons subject to the suspension install an ignition interlock device (IID) on their vehicle, but instead, terminates upon the expiration of the forty-five days. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license pursuant to section 14-227b(I)(1) does not continue until the operator has installed an IID but, rather, is limited to the forty-five days specified in the statute; and (2) because Defendant's license suspension period expired on December 2, she was not operating a motor vehicle while her operator's license was under suspension on December 4.
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