Vincent v. New Haven (concurring)
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****************************************************** The officially released date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the officially released date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the officially released date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** VINCENT v. NEW HAVEN CONCURRENCE BORDEN, J., concurring. I agree with the result reached by the majority, and with much of its reasoning. I depart from its analysis only with respect to whether the statutory language at issue is ambiguous. Contrary to the majority, I would conclude that the interpretation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 31306 that was adopted by the compensation review board and offered by the plaintiff, Martha Vincent, on appeal, namely, that an employee is required to provide health insurance coverage to the surviving dependent of a deceased employee, is plausible. Therefore, the statutory language is ambiguous. Viera v. Cohen, 283 Conn. 412, 421, 927 A.2d 843 (2007) ( [t]he test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Genesky v. East Lyme, 275 Conn. 246, 278, 881 A.2d 114 (2005) (Borden, J., concurring) ( if the text of the statute at issue, considering its relationship to other statutes, as applied to the facts of the case, would permit more than one likely or plausible meaning, its meaning cannot be said to be plain and unambiguous ). Nonetheless, I would also conclude that, despite this ambiguity, the extratextual source of the meaning of the language on which the plaintiff relies, namely, the statutory scheme s remedial purpose, is not enough to overcome the strong suggestion of the text that, as the majority opinion aptly demonstrates, health benefits are not included in § 31-306. I therefore agree that the decision of the compensation review board should be reversed.
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