State v. Wright (concurring)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
****************************************************** The officially released date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the officially released date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the officially released date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** STATE v. WRIGHT CONCURRENCE DiPENTIMA, J., concurring. I agree with my colleagues that the conviction of the defendant, Nicketa Wright, should be affirmed. I respectfully disagree, however, that the defendant adequately has briefed the threshold question of whether this court should review his claims pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239 40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the majority. Our Supreme Court recently stated: It is well established . . . that parties affirmatively seek to prevail under Golding, and bear the burden of establishing that they are entitled to appellate review of their unpreserved constitutional claims. (Emphasis added.) In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 154, 962 A.2d 81 (2009). Moreover, this court repeatedly has observed that the failure to address the four prongs of Golding amounts to an inadequate briefing of the issue . . . . (Internal quotation marks.) State v. Bourguignon, 82 Conn. App. 798, 801, 847 A.2d 1031 (2004); see also State v. DeVivo, 106 Conn. App. 641, 647, 942 A.2d 1066 (2008); State v. David P., 70 Conn. App. 462, 474, 800 A.2d 541, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 907, 810 A.2d 275 (2002). I am persuaded by the majority s reasoning that there is no necessity for a talismanic incantation1 of the Golding citation or the rote recitation of its four prongs. I agree that to demonstrate that appellate review of an unpreserved claim of a constitutional deprivation is warranted, a defendant is required to employ the methodology of Golding by providing an adequate record for review and alleging that a constitutional violation occurred at the trial court. To accomplish this, a defendant must present this court with a coherent, logical argument for review with authoritative citations to precedent. I depart from the majority in its conclusion that the defendant has satisfied that latter requirement. The defendant s appellate brief sets forth a claim of a constitutional violation. It fails, however, to address his entitlement to review, much less the adequacy of the record. As a result, I reluctantly depart from the opinion of the majority and conclude that the defendant has failed to brief adequately the issue of whether he is entitled to Golding review. I respectfully concur. 1 Connecticut courts have refused to attach talismanic significance to the presence or absence of particular words or phrases. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 731, 631 A.2d 288 (1993) (failure to use talismanic words does not indicate failure to make necessary determination); State v. Onofrio, 179 Conn. 23, 45, 425 A.2d 560 (1979) ([t]here is no talismanic ritual of words that must be spoken by a dying declarant to render statements admissible); State v. Peters, 89 Conn. App. 141, 146, 872 A.2d 532 (the fact that the court did not use the specific words psychiatric disabilities does not warrant reversal under the plain error doctrine), cert. denied, 274 Conn. 918, 879 A.2d 895 (2005); State v. Peters, 40 Conn. App. 805, 823, 673 A.2d 1158 (jury charge not improper for failure to recite talismanic words), cert. denied, 237 Conn. 925, 677 A.2d 949 (1996). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, 100 Conn. App. 565, 578 79 n.6, 918 A.2d 1008, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 928, 929, 926 A.2d 666, 667 (2007).
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
