DeZerega v. Meggs (2000)

DAVID DEZEREGA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. JASON MEGGS, Defendant and Respondent.

[Modification of Opinion (83 Cal.App.4th 28) on denial of petition for rehearing.]

HANLON, P. J.-

Plaintiffs' petition for rehearing is denied.

The opinion heretofore filed is modified as follows:

1. Insert the following new footnote number 9 at the end of the third paragraph preceding heading number III [83 Cal. App. 4th 42, advance report, 3d par., line 11-12] (after the sentence, "We hold only that they may not do so consistent with the terms of the Ordinance."):

9 In an acerbic if not intemperate petition for rehearing, counsel for plaintiffs accuses the court (directly or by pointed implication) of (1) ruling against plaintiffs "without considering" their contention that defendant had no contractual relationship with them; (2) not "bothering to cite any case law"; (3) deciding the case "without, apparently, the benefit of consulting the common law"; (4) rendering "a mere expression of personal opinion, [which] does not constitute a reasoned decision illuminated and informed by precedent [and which] is fundamentally political, rather than legal, in nature"; (5) failing "to review and consider legal precedent"; (6) "ignor[ing]" statutory language cited by plaintiffs (i.e., § 1954.53, subd. (d)); and (7) "rul[ing] against the plaintiffs without hearing their arguments, and [doing] so in a decision that cites virtually no law." Counsel asserts, "The plaintiffs, as citizens of this state and as taxpayers in this state who pay for judicial salaries, deserve better."

Our opinion directly reflects the manner in which the case was presented to us. We emphasize again that plaintiffs' key contention--that defendant was a "subtenant"--is contradicted by the express language of plaintiffs' own lease. Plaintiffs took themselves outside the black-letter common law--or at least, outside the doctrines they have invoked here--by explicitly [83 Cal. App. 4th 935d] authorizing defendant's occupancy while flatly prohibiting subleasing. In any event it needs no citation or extended discussion to establish that common law doctrines must yield to positive legislative enactments not shown to possess any constitutional infirmity. Finally, the statute we are accused of failing to consider (§ 1954.53, subdivision (d)) scarcely warrants extended discussion because, by its plain terms, it operates only to disclaim any new diminution in a landlord's preexisting rights.

Counsel's vituperation aside, we remain satisfied that our analysis flows logically, and indeed inevitably, from the facts and issues as presented to us. If the result is less than plaintiffs deserve, the fault lies elsewhere than in this court.

2. Renumber the existing footnote 9 to footnote 10 [83 Cal. App. 4th 44, advance report].

3. Strike the entire first paragraph appearing on page 14 of the typed opinion [83 Cal. App. 4th 40, advance report, last par. and p. 41, lines 1-23], from "The Act explicitly disclaims" through the citation to Cabinda, and replace the stricken language with the following full paragraph:

The Act explicitly disclaims any effect on the power of local governments to regulate evictions. (Civ. Code, § 1954.52, subd. (c) ["Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any authority of a public entity that may otherwise exist to regulate or monitor the basis for eviction."]; id., § 1954.53, subd. (e) [same].) Its overall effect is to preempt local rent control ordinances in two respects. First it permits owners of certain types of property to adjust the rent on such property at will, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." (Civ. Code, § 1954.52, subd, (a).) Second it adopts a statewide system of what is known among landlord-tenant specialists as "vacancy decontrol," declaring that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law," all residential landlords may, except in specified situations, "establish the initial rental rate for a dwelling or unit." (Civ. Code, § 1954.53, subd. (a).)

4. In the second paragraph commencing on page 14 of the typed opinion [83 Cal. App. 4th 41, advance report]:

a. Strike the entire first sentence and the first two words of the second sentence [83 Cal. App. 4th 41, advance report, 1st par., lines 1-5] ("As applicable" through "Significantly, its") and replace the stricken language with "The Act's."

b.Strike the third (now second) sentence [83 Cal. App. 4th 41, advance report, 1st par., lines 8-11], from "Thus Civil Code section 1954.53" through "authorized sublessee," and insert in its place the following sentence: [83 Cal. App. 4th 935e]

Thus Civil Code section 1954.53, subdivision (b), though seriously muddled, seems intended to express the idea that the rent level established upon an "initial hiring" applies to a "tenant, lessee, authorized subtenant, or authorized sublessee for the entire period of his or her occupancy . . . ."

5. In the third paragraph on page 15 of the typed opinion [83 Cal. App. 4th 42, advance report, 3d par., lines 1-2], beginning "We emphasize, however, the narrowness of our holding," strike from the second sentence the words "Despite the entreaties of amicus City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board, we" and insert in their place the word "We."

The above modification does not effect any change in the judgment.