California v. Clements
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In 1989, after appellant Jody Ann Clements solicited her ex-husband and her boyfriend to assault her 16-year-old brother, the two killed the brother by stabbing him and bludgeoning him with a rock and then buried his body in the desert. A jury convicted Clements of second degree murder in 1990 after the trial judge instructed them on both natural and probable consequences and implied malice theories of murder.
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the definition of murder to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The Legislature also added a new provision to the Penal Code, which established a procedure for vacating murder convictions predating the amendment if they could not be sustained under the amended definition of murder. Clements petitioned for relief under SB 1437, arguing she could not be convicted under the current law. After a hearing, at which the parties agreed to limit the evidence to the record of conviction, the trial judge looked to the Court of Appeal's decision in Clements’ original appeal and made two alternative determinations: (1) substantial evidence supported the determination that Clements could have been convicted of second degree murder under an implied malice theory; and (2) Clements in fact committed implied malice second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge therefore denied her petition on each of these independent, adequate grounds. Clements argued the trial court erred (1) by considering the Court of Appeal's opinion in her original appeal; (2) by misconstruing the nature of the eligibility determination it was required to make under the new statute; and (3) by denying her petition in the absence of substantial evidence supporting a finding of implied malice. The Court held an appellate opinion was part of the record of conviction and could be relied on in deciding a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition on the merits, so the trial judge did not err in doing so in this case. Furthermore, the Court held the trial judge sat as a fact finder at a hearing under section 1170.95 (d), and that substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements committed implied malice second degree murder. The trial judge correctly denied Clements’ petition for resentencing for that reason.
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