California v. Valdez
Annotate this CaseJohn Valdez appealed an order denying his petition for recall of his indeterminate life sentence and resentencing in accordance with the Three Strikes Reform Act. Although the trial court determined appellant was eligible for resentencing, it denied his petition based on a discretionary determination that “resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” Appellant argued the court erred because: (1) Proposition 36 established a presumption in favor of resentencing eligible inmates, and authorized denial of a resentencing petition on the basis of dangerousness only in extraordinary circumstances; (2) the definition of what constituted “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” that was adopted by the electorate in the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47) must also be applied to resentencing petitions filed pursuant to Proposition 36; (3) if the Proposition 47 definition was not applied, then the “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” standard used in Proposition 36 must be deemed void for vagueness. Appellant also contends he was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of his dangerousness and that the factual findings underlying the court’s determination he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety were unsupported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant’s contention that the more specific definition of “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” contained in Proposition 47 was the appropriate standard to apply to resentencing petitions under Proposition 36. Having concluded the appropriate standard for assessing appellant’s dangerousness the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to reconsider the issue in accordance with that standard. "[A]n inmate has no constitutional right to have a jury determine whether the sentence properly imposed upon him in accordance with the law should be reduced. Because that is the remedy offered by section 1170.126, appellant had no right to a jury determination of any factual issue, and no right to have adverse factual finding subjected to proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
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