Piper v. Dept. Motor Vehicles
Annotate this CaseThe Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed the grant of a writ of ordinary mandate compelling it to set aside its calculation of the period of postconviction suspension of licensee Charles James Piper, arguing the trial court misconstrued the statutes governing the interplay of suspensions due to administrative actions by the DMV and criminal actions in drunk driving (DUI) cases. After Piper was arrested for DUI, he was issued an administrative per se suspension notice, alleging his blood alcohol reading exceeded .08 percent. After a hearing, DMV suspended his driver’s license for four months. After 51 days, Piper applied for and received a restricted license that allowed him to drive to and from work and his mandatory first DUI offender class. DMV thereafter reinstated his full, unrestricted, driving privileges. However, one day before the reinstatement, Piper was convicted of DUI based on the same incident. DMV again suspended his license. He could again apply for a restricted license, but his license could not be reinstated until six months after his conviction. Piper sought a writ of mandate compelling the DMV to credit him for the first suspension, so that the total suspension would not exceed the longer of the two suspension periods. DMV credited Piper with only the 51 days his license was suspended before he asked for and received a restricted license based on his first (administrative) suspension. Piper received a restricted license after his second (postconviction) suspension, which again allowed him to drive to and from DUI classes and work. Based on these facts, the trial court found Piper was “treated in an arbitrary and capricious fashion simply because of the unusually lengthy time lapse between his arrest and administrative suspension pursuant to [] 13353.2, and his eventual conviction and resultant suspension pursuant to [] 13352.” The court issued a writ of mandate compelling DMV to reinstate Piper’s driving privileges.The DMV appealed. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court's conclusion and its judgment granting the writ. Section 13352.4 (relied upon by the trial court), which allowed for postconviction restricted licenses in lieu of suspensions, defined when the postconviction suspension restriction begins and provided that it “shall remain in effect until the final day of the original suspension imposed” under section 13352 “and may include credit for any suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3.” But by its terms, the reference to “the final day of the original suspension imposed” merely marked the end of the period of restriction, and did not mean that a restricted license is a type of suspended license. Piper conceded he was given 51 days credit towards his postconviction suspension for the preconviction period during which his license was suspended, before he asked for and received a restricted license. He was entitled to no additional credit. Based on the statutory scheme, the Court of Appeal saw no mandatory duty that DMV failed to carry out. Accordingly, Piper was not entitled to writ relief.
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