AMANDA B. v. ADES, et al.

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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE AMANDA B., ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC ) SECURITY, JESSE M., ELIZABETH M., ) ALEXANDER B., LILLIAN E., ) ) Appellees. ) ) __________________________________) No. 1 CA-JV 12-0261 DEPARTMENT E MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication 103(G) Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.; Rule 28 ARCAP) FILED 4/23/2013 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause Nos. JD21434 & JS12075 The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge Pro Tem AFFIRMED Christina Phillis, Maricopa County Public Advocate By Suzanne W. Sanchez, Deputy Public Advocate Attorneys for Appellant Mesa Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General By Michael Valenzuela, Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for ADES Phoenix D O W N I E, Judge ¶1 Amanda B. ( Mother ) challenges the juvenile court s order terminating her parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1 ¶2 Child Protective Services ( CPS ) removed J.M., E.M., A.B., and L.E. from Mother s custody after a car accident. The accident occurred while Mother was chasing her boyfriend, who was driving a separate vehicle. She attempted an abrupt exit from the freeway to continue following him, but collided with a guardrail at highway speed. The car was totaled. The two younger children were in car seats; J.M. and E.M. were sharing the only remaining seatbelt in the back seat. J.M. had fastened the seatbelt after he became frightened at how fast Mother was driving. E.M. told a paramedic that Mother stated, I want us all to die right before the crash. L.E. suffered a skull fracture as a result of the accident. ¶3 The Arizona Department of Economic Security ( ADES ) moved to terminate Mother s parental rights on the grounds that she willfully abused a child or failed to protect a child from willful abuse so as to cause a substantial risk of harm to the child s health or welfare. See 1 Ariz. Rev. Stat. ( A.R.S. ) We view the evidence in the light most favorable to affirming the juvenile court s order. Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-8490, 179 Ariz. 102, 106, 876 P.2d 1137, 1141 (1994) (citation omitted). 2 § 8-533 (B)(2). additional ADES later amended its motion to allege an ground: inability to discharge parental responsibilities due to chronic substance abuse. See A.R.S. § 8-533 (B)(3). ¶4 In October 2012, the juvenile court held a three-day consolidated hearing. 2 dependency, contested severance, and evidentiary Mother admitted placing the children in danger the day of the accident and being in an altered state of mind. 3 She acknowledged that her substance abuse affected her ability to parent. throughout She the testified juvenile about court her continuing proceedings long-standing substance abuse problem. and drug admitted use a Mother also had no place to live and had been unemployed since 2005. ¶5 A clinical psychologist evaluated Mother and testified that Mother admitted being incapable of emotionally connecting to her children; she gave Mother a poor prognosis for being able to adequately parent in the foreseeable future. The CPS case specialist testified that the children were adoptable. He further testified that Mother had not adequately participated in services offered by CPS and that 2 The evidentiary hearing terminate Mother s visitation. her related 3 drug use to ADES affected her request to Mother claimed a bad reaction to prescription medication caused her actions the day of the accident but presented no medical evidence to support this claim. 3 ability to parent. The paramedic responding to the car accident testified that the children could have died in the accident. ¶6 The juvenile court found that ADES had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother s parental rights should be severed based on chronic substance abuse and willful abuse of a child. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), (B)(3). The court further ruled it was in the best interests of the children to terminate Mother s parental rights. Mother timely appealed. We have Mother argues ADES failed to prove willful abuse. She jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-235(A). DISCUSSION ¶7 further contends severance based on substance abuse was improper because ADES failed to provide essential family reunification services. Although the court terminated Mother s rights on two independent grounds, we will affirm the termination order if any one of the statutory grounds was proven. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002) (citations omitted). ¶8 To justify termination of the parent-child relationship, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the statutory grounds set out in section 8-533, and also that termination is in the best interest 4 of the child. 4 Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 682, 685 (2000). Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the parties, observe the parties, and make appropriate factual findings, Pima County Dependency Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546, 744 P.2d 455, 458 (App. 1987), we do not reweigh the evidence, but look only to determine if there is evidence to support the court s ruling, Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JV-132905, 186 Ariz. 607, 609, 925 P.2d 748, 750 (App. 1996) (citation omitted). We will not disturb an the juvenile court s disposition absent abuse of discretion or unless the court s findings of fact were clearly erroneous, them. i.e., there is no reasonable evidence to support JV-132905, 186 Ariz. at 609, 925 P.2d at 750; accord Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep t of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 2, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998) (citations omitted). ¶9 The record amply supports the severance order based on chronic substance abuse. when she was 14. 23. had Mother began smoking marijuana daily She began using methamphetamine at the age of J.M. and A.B. were both born substance-exposed. participated in substance times, beginning in 1999. abuse treatment four Mother previous Mother admitted smoking marijuana the 4 Mother has not challenged the best-interest finding, so we do not address it. 5 night before her psychological evaluation, as well as on the morning of trial. 5 ¶10 Mother began drug testing at TASC in February 2012 but stopped without explanation in May. TASC was positive for marijuana. Every drug test she took at When she tested at TERROS in June, July, and September, each test was positive for marijuana and methamphetamine. ¶11 The juvenile court stated: Mother has by her own admission a history of chronic substance abuse of marijuana and methamphetamine. and continues continue for She has been in and out of treatment for years to a use. prolonged The Court believes indeterminate that period. this The will record supports these findings. ¶12 Mother was provided numerous services to address her substance abuse problem, including random testing, assessments, treatment, psychological psychiatric evaluation. consultation Despite and these evaluation, services, and Mother continued abusing drugs and tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine a month before the severance trial. Mother argues she should have been offered Ph.D-level counseling, as recommended by master s-level the evaluating counselor psychologist, certified 5 in rather addiction than counseling the to Mother testified she had recently obtained a medical marijuana card but did not introduce any corroborating evidence. 6 whom she was referred. every conceivable ADES, though, is not required to provide service, Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 P.2d 234, 239 (App. 1994) (citations omitted), or to provide futile services, Pima County Severance Action No. S-2397, 161 Ariz. 574, 577, 780 P.2d 407, 410 (App. 1989) (citation omitted). Nothing in the record suggests the counselor Mother saw was unqualified or inadequate. Moreover, Mother attended only two of nine therapy sessions, and she was disruptive when she did attend. ¶13 severance Reasonable order and based sufficient on evidence substance abuse. supports See the A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) (court may sever rights based on an inability to discharge abuse). parental responsibilities due to chronic substance We therefore need not address the additional ground for termination found by the juvenile court. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 27, 995 P.2d at 687 (because court affirmed one ground for termination, it need not determine whether severance was justified on additional grounds found by juvenile court). 7 CONCLUSION ¶14 We affirm the termination of Mother s parental rights. /s/ MARGARET H. DOWNIE, Presiding Judge CONCURRING: /s/ MAURICE PORTLEY, Judge /s/ PHILIP HALL, Judge 8

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