STATE v. HAMPTON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. DARRYL HAMPTON, Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 1 CA-CR 11-0074 DIVISION ONE FILED: 07/19/2012 RUTH A. WILLINGHAM, CLERK BY: sls DEPARTMENT A MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication Rule 111, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court) Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. CR2010-125256-001 DT The Honorable Sherry K. Stephens, Judge CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section Attorneys for Appellee Phoenix James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender By Stephen R. Collins, Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for Appellant Phoenix N O R R I S, Judge ¶1 Darryl Hampton timely appeals his convictions and sentences for one count of burglary in the first degree, five counts of armed robbery, and eight counts of kidnapping, all class 2 dangerous felonies. 1 After searching the record on appeal and finding no arguable question of law that was not frivolous, Hampton s counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), asking this court to search the record for fundamental error. This court granted counsel s motion to allow Hampton to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, but Hampton did not do so. State did Nevertheless, through counsel, Hampton argues the not present sufficient evidence to support his convictions, the State relied on tainted identifications of him by various witnesses, and his trial counsel was ineffective. We reject record, these find no arguments, and fundamental after error. reviewing the entire Therefore, we affirm Hampton s convictions and sentences as corrected. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 ¶2 At 12:30 in the morning on April 10, 2010, Hampton and two accomplices walked uninvited into the apartment of S.R., who had seven friends visiting him at the time, and closed and 1 Although the State charged Hampton with other crimes, the superior court acquitted him of three charges and the jury found him not guilty of another. 2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury s verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Hampton. State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989). 2 locked the door behind them. S.R. and several of the other victims testified they knew and recognized Hampton. The victims testified at least one of the intruders had a gun, but their testimony was inconsistent as to whether Hampton had a gun. The victims testified Hampton and his accomplices threatened them, ordered them not to move, and robbed them, taking their phones, money, computers, and video games. After Hampton and his accomplices left, the victims called the police and identified Hampton as one of the intruders. That night at the crime scene, police showed some of the witnesses a photograph of Hampton on a police cell phone and one officer testified [e]verybody that [was shown] the photograph . . . said that s [Hampton] ( cell phone identification ). Although the officer testified he was unsure whether all of the victims had seen the photograph on the cell phone, at least three of the victims remembered the cell phone identification. testified they S.R. also testified he later exchanged text messages and phone calls with Hampton about the intrusion. Approximately two weeks later, detectives showed some of the victims a photo lineup and the victims again identified Hampton as one of the intruders. ¶3 At trial, seven of Hampton s identified him in the courtroom. victims testified and As described in more detail below, after the first day of trial, Hampton s counsel moved for a mistrial based on the fact that two witnesses started 3 talking about the cell phone identification. The superior court denied his motion. ¶4 After the jury returned its guilty verdicts, it also found the State had proven two aggravating circumstances: the presence of an accomplice, and the motive of pecuniary gain. At sentencing, the superior court found the State had presented clear and convincing evidence Hampton had three convictions, two of which were historical priors. prior The court sentenced Hampton as a category three repetitive offender to a [s]lightly [a]ggravated term of 22 years in prison, concurrent on all counts, and gave Hampton 251 days of pre-sentence incarceration credit. DISCUSSION I. Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶5 whether We review the sufficiency of the evidence to determine evidence the State presented reasonable persons substantial could accept evidence, as that sufficient support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. is, to State v. Hughes, 189 Ariz. 62, 73, 938 P.2d 457, 468 (1997) (citation omitted). evidence Our review reflects the State presented substantial to support Hampton s convictions, victims testimony, as discussed above. argument the State did not present support his convictions. 4 including the We therefore reject his sufficient evidence to II. The Cell Phone Identification ¶6 of On appeal, Hampton raises the [u]nduly suggestive use a photograph by the police prior to [his] arrest. We interpret this argument to incorporate the arguments his counsel made at trial: first, admitting testimony regarding the cell phone identification was unduly prejudicial and, second, the cell phone identification tainted the formal photo lineup and the victims in-court identifications. See State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 382-84, 453 P.2d 951, 953-55 (1969). ¶7 First, regarding the we cell disagree phone the admission identification of testimony prejudiced Hampton because it [told] the jury that the police had some reason to have his photo. At trial, the court read to the jury the parties stipulation Hampton was a prohibited possessor, based on the fact he had a prior felony conviction. court noted, based on this stipulation, the As the superior jury would have known Hampton had been convicted of a felony and, thus, the suggestion the police had some reason to have his photo was not prejudicial. ¶8 tainted Assuming unduly Second, the later without we disagree photo lineup deciding suggestive, the and the the cell phone in-court pretrial question identification identifications. identifications is whether were the identification[s were] reliable in spite of any suggestiveness. 5 State v. Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, 520, ¶ 46, 38 P.3d 1172, 1183 (2002) (quotations and citations omitted). Further, due process is not violated so long as there is no substantial likelihood that [the defendant] would be misidentified. We use the so-called Biggers test to determine reliability. [T]he factors to be considered [in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification] include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. Id. at 521, ¶ 48, 38 P.3d at 1184 (quotations and citations omitted). Here, approximately the two police weeks conducted after the a formal crimes, and photo three lineup of the victims who testified they saw the cell phone identification also testified they knew Hampton before the recognized him when he entered S.R. s apartment. crimes and Applying the Biggers factors to these facts, we determine the photo lineup was reliable and did not create misidentification, regardless identification unduly pretrial was identification a of substantial whether suggestive. comports with due likelihood the cell Moreover, process, if of phone the subsequent identification at trial does not violate a defendant s rights 6 merely by following on the heels of the earlier confrontation. Id. at ¶ 52, considering discretion 38 P.3d these in at 1184 factors, finding the (citations the cell court phone omitted). did not Thus, abuse identification its did not taint the later photo lineup or in-court identifications. Id. at 520, ¶ 46, 38 P.3d at 1183 (citation omitted) (appellate court reviews fairness and reliability of a challenged identification for clear abuse of discretion ). 3 III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ¶9 Hampton ineffective. further asserts his trial counsel was We do not review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; any such claim must be brought pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002). IV. Anders Review A. Jury Instructions on Hampton s Presumption of Innocence ¶10 final Our review instructions, reveals did presumption of innocence. not the superior instruct the court, jury during on its Hampton s See generally Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 479, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 1931, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1978) (quotation and citation omitted) 3 ( [T]he presumption of We also note the superior court instructed the jury the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the in court identification of the defendant at this trial [was] reliable, and further instructed the jury to consider the Biggers factors quoted above. 7 innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. ). error in Because Hampton did not object, we evaluate this light of the totality of the circumstances -- including all the instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and other relevant factors, and determine the error was not fundamental. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31, 770 P.2d 328, 335 (1989) (citation omitted). ¶11 First, during voir dire of the potential jury pool, the court told the jury pool the defendant is presumed by law to be innocent. This means the defendant is not required to prove innocence or produce any evidence, and no juror indicated he or she disagree[d] with those princip[les]. Later in voir dire, Hampton s counsel emphasized to the jury pool: if the Judge asked you to render a decision right now, your first choice would be, well, we haven t heard any evidence, yet I m going to find him not guilty. The . . . second choice would be, well, he s charged with these crimes, where there s smoke there s fire, I m going to find him guilty. And the third choice is, well, we haven t heard anything yet. I d like to wait and hear more. So I can t make a decision. . . . The correct answer is number one. ¶12 Second, once the jury members were selected, the court preliminarily instructed them verbally 8 and in writing that Hampton was presumed innocent, the charges were not evidence against him, and the State was required to prove every element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. statements, their Hampton s written counsel copies of directed the Then, during opening the jurors preliminary to review instructions, emphasizing Hampton s presumption of innocence and the State s burden of proof. ¶13 Third, although the court did not re-instruct the jury on Hampton s presumption of innocence in its final instructions, it nevertheless re-instructed the jury the State had the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt, Hampton was not required to testify or present evidence, and the charges were not evidence against him. Hampton was overwhelming. Finally, the evidence against Viewing these facts as a whole, we see no fundamental, prejudicial error. B. Other Matters ¶14 We have reviewed error and find none. 881. the entire record for reversible See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at Hampton received a fair trial. He was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and was present at all critical stages. ¶15 court The jury was properly comprised of 12 members and the properly instructed the jury on the elements of the charges, the State s burden of proof, and the necessity of a 9 unanimous verdict. presentence The superior court received and considered a report, Hampton spoke at sentencing, and his sentences were within the range of acceptable sentences for his offenses. ¶16 We Hampton s note, however, offenses were that although dangerous, the the jury superior found court s sentencing minute entry described them as non-dangerous. We hereby correct the sentencing minute entry to state Hampton s offenses were dangerous but he was sentenced as a repetitive offender. 37, 257 See State v. Trujillo, 227 Ariz. 314, 321-22, ¶¶ 30P.3d 1194, 1201-02 (App. 2011) (citations omitted) ( [T]he law allows a trial court to select between the dangerous and repetitive sentencing options. ). CONCLUSION ¶17 We decline to order briefing and affirm Hampton s convictions and sentences as corrected. ¶18 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel s obligations pertaining appeal have ended. to Hampton s representation in this Defense counsel need do no more than inform Hampton of the outcome of this appeal and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984). 10 ¶19 Hampton has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. days On the court s own motion, we also grant Hampton 30 from the date of this decision to file an in persona motion for reconsideration. /s/ PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Judge CONCURRING: /s/ ANN A. SCOTT TIMMER, Presiding Judge /s/ DONN KESSLER, Judge 11 propria
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
