Ramiro G. v. ADES/Reyna R.

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE RAMIRO G., ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC ) SECURITY, REYNA R., DAMIEN S., ) ) Appellees. ) ) __________________________________) DIVISION ONE FILED: 07/21/2011 RUTH A. WILLINGHAM, CLERK BY: DLL 1 CA-JV 11-0027 DEPARTMENT D MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication 103(G) Ariz.R.P. Juv. Ct.; Rule 28 ARCAP) Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. JS11643 The Honorable Dawn M. Bergin, Judge AFFIRMED Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General Phoenix By Jamie R. Katelman, Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for Appellee Arizona Department of Economic Security David W. Bell Attorney for Appellant Mesa O R O Z C O, Judge ¶1 Ramiro G. (Father) appeals the juvenile court order terminating his (collectively, affirm. parental the rights Children). to For Damien the S. and following Reyna R. reasons, we FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The Children are the biological offspring of Father. Reyna was born in December 2005. Father, Reyna, and her mother (Mother) lived together until December 2006 and during this time, Father cared for supervision. the child by providing food, shelter, and When Father moved out he continued to see Reyna about two or three times a week until his arrest in November 2007. Damien was born in July 2007 and Father has never met him. ¶3 Father was arrested in November 2007, pled guilty to one count of possession of dangerous drugs for sale, and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. Father is scheduled for deportation to Mexico upon conclusion of his sentence. ¶4 Father testified that since his incarceration, his contact with the Children has been limited to sending them about three letters and $200; however, Father is not sure whether the Children received the letters or the money because Mother kept moving. The Children were placed in the custody of the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) in November 2008 due to Mother s substance abuse.1 ¶5 ADES petitioned to sever Father s parental rights to the Children. based upon At the severance hearing, Dr. M. testified that his discussion with Reyna figures, there was no mention of Father. 1 Mother is not a party to this appeal. 2 regarding her father Dr. M. characterized Reyna s relationship with Father as minimal stating, Even if there had been some relationship evolve[ing] during that initial year and a half, obviously, [this] child now is 5 years of age and has gone on to other caretakers. . . . [S]he has no memory of her biological father at this point. ¶6 Dr. M. further testified, in the case of Damien, the relationship would have been obviously non-existent in the sense the child was incarceration. suffice in born Dr. fostering at M. or about opined the that maintaining time prison an of [Father s] visits appropriate could not parental relationship between Father and the Children, with the Children of such young ages. Dr. M. also stated that both children are very adoptable and would be able to . . . fit in nicely into prospective adoptive homes. ¶7 The juvenile court, upon balancing the Children s best interests, severed Father s parental rights based on, inter alia, the length of his five year prison sentence and its effect on the Children. Father timely appealed and we have jurisdiction in accordance with Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 8-235 (2007). DISCUSSION ¶8 In reviewing a juvenile court s termination order, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the [juvenile] court s decision. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep t of Econ. 3 Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 95, ¶ 10, 210 P.3d 1263, 1266 (App. 2009). Using this standard of review, we will affirm the order unless we must say as a matter of law that no one could reasonably find the evidence [supporting statutory grounds for termination] to be clear and convincing. Id. (quoting Murillo v. Hernandez, 79 Ariz. 1, 9, 281 P.2d 786, 791 (1955)). Evidence is clear and convincing when it makes the proposition to be proved highly probable or reasonably certain. 279, 284-85, ¶ 25, 110 P.3d Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 1013, 1018-19 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ¶9 On appeal, Father argues that the juvenile court erred by finding clear and convincing evidence in support of severing Father s parental rights to Reyna under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.4 (Supp. 2010). Specifically, Father posits that he can and will be in a position to be a minimally adequate parent in the foreseeable and near future given his assertions that he did have a bonded relationship at one point with Reyna; he does not have much longer to serve in prison; and [Reyna was] not yet in an adoptive placement at the time of trial. ¶10 Under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.4, the parent-child relationship may be severed if the sentence of that parent is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years. A.R.S. § 8-533.B.4. In severance: 4 finding this ground for [the juvenile] court . . . should consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: (1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the relationship between the child's age and the likelihood that incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251-52, ¶ 29, 995 P.2d 682, 687-88 (2000). With regard to the length of the incarceration, we view the time in prison as a whole and do not limit our inquiry to the amount of time remaining to be served by the parent on the sentence. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 281, ¶ 8, 53 P.3d 203, 206 (App. 2002) ( [w]hat matters to a dependent child is the total length of time the parent is absent from the family ). After considering those and other relevant factors, the trial court can determine whether the sentence is of such a length as to deprive a child of a normal home for a period of years. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 252, ¶ 29, 995 P.2d at 688. ¶11 In this case, upon Father s relationship with Reyna was minimal. incarceration, his At the severance hearing, testimony indicated that prison visits would be insufficient to 5 cultivate or maintain a parent-child relationship between Father and Reyna given her young age. Reyna has no memory of Father, and his incarceration has prevented her from having a normal home since ADES assumed custody from Mother. In view of her young age, and the necessity of a stable parental figure as described by Dr. M., the juvenile court did not err in concluding that the Michael J. factors clearly and convincingly weigh in favor of severing Father s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.4. ¶12 Father also argues on appeal that the juvenile court erred in finding that severance of Father s parental rights will serve the Children s best interests. Specifically, Father posits that the juvenile court erred in its finding as to Reyna under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.4, and therefore erred in its finding as to the Children s best interest, because their best interests demand that Reyna and Damien remain together. Despite conceding that the juvenile court s finding was correct under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.4 as to Damien, according to Father, because his parental rights to Reyna should not be severed; so, too, his parental rights to Damien should remain intact. ¶13 The State argues that Father has abandoned his claim that the juvenile court erred in finding that termination is in the best interests of the Children, because he failed to provide any citation to legal authorities on this issue. Father did abandon this claim, 6 we Assuming that nevertheless, in our discretion, chose regarding the [p]reservation to address Children s of the the best family juvenile court s interests. findings Given relationship is of that prime importance to all parties involved, including the court, parent, and child, Ariz. St. Dep t of Econ. Sec. v. Mahoney, 24 Ariz. App. 534, 537, 540 P.2d 153, 156 (1975), Father is entitled to have this issue addressed. ¶14 Always underlying a court s inquiry examine the best interests of the children. is the duty to A.R.S. § 8-533.B. [A] determination of the [children's] best interest must include a finding as to how the [children] would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5, 804 P.2d 730, 734 (1990). Factors considered are whether: 1) an adoptive placement is immediately available; 2) the existing placement is meeting the needs of the child[ren]; and 3) the children are adoptable. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 380, ¶ 30, 231 P.3d 377, 384 (App. 2010) (internal citations omitted). That termination is in the children s best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 585, 587, ¶ 7, 177 P.3d 327, 329 (App. 2008). ¶15 In this case, Dr. M. testified that both children are very adoptable. Dr. M. opined that Father s relationship with 7 the Children was minimal or non-existent, and that it would benefit them to build substantial and lasting relationships with parental figures. At the severance hearing, an ADES caseworker testified that the Children were currently placed together in a licensed foster identified. home and that an adoptive home had been Because the preponderance of evidence indicates that the Children are adoptable and that their interests would be better-served through the opportunity to cultivate more substantial and permanent relationships with parental figures an opportunity that is immediately available through placement in an adoptive home it is in the Children s best interests to sever Father s parental rights. CONCLUSION ¶16 For the foregoing reasons, the juvenile court order terminating Father s parental rights to the Children is affirmed. /S/ ___________________________________ PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Presiding Judge CONCURRING: /S/ ____________________________________ PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Judge /S/ ____________________________________ PHILIP HALL, Judge 8

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.