Watson v. Cozad

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DIVISION ONE FILED: 09/08/2011 RUTH A. WILLINGHAM, CLERK BY: DLL IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE In re the Matter of: ) ) CRAIG WATSON, ) ) Petitioner/Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) JENNIFER COZAD, ) ) Respondent/Appellee. ) ) __________________________________) No. 1 CA-CV 10-0567 DEPARTMENT C Maricopa County Superior Court No. FC2008-052188 DECISION ORDER The court, Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown, Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Philip Hall, has concluded that we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal; however, in our discretion we accept special action jurisdiction and deny relief. We have an independent obligation jurisdiction in every appeal. to ensure we have Sorenson v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 191 Ariz. 464, 465, 957 P.2d 1007, 1008 (App. 1997). Craig Watson (“Father”) challenges a May 2010 order reappointing a parenting pursuant to coordinator, Arizona asserting Revised Statutes 2101(C) (2003), 1 which permits order 1 made after final that we have (“A.R.S.”) jurisdiction section 12- an appeal “[f]rom any special judgment.” We disagree. An order Subsequently renumbered as A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2) (2011). appointing a parenting coordinator is substantially equivalent to an order appealable. appointing a special master, which is not See ChartOne, Inc. v. Bernini, 207 Ariz. 162, 165, ¶ 7, 83 P.3d 1103, 1106 (App. 2004); Bolon v. Pennington, 3 Ariz. App. 433, 435, 415 P.2d 148, 150 (App. 1966). Thus, the order Father seeks to challenge is not appealable. Although we lack appellate jurisdiction, nevertheless accept special action jurisdiction. we may See Grand v. Nacchio, 214 Ariz. 9, 17, ¶ 20, 147 P.3d 763, 771 (App. 2006). As Father has “no equally plain, speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal,” in the exercise of our discretion, we accept special action jurisdiction. See ChartOne, 207 Ariz at 165-66, ¶¶ 7-9, 83 P.3d at 1106-07. We review a family “court’s decision custody for an abuse of discretion.” regarding child Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 420, ¶ 7, 79 P.3d 667, 669 (App. 2004) (citation omitted). [is] A trial court abuses its discretion when “the record devoid of competent evidence to support the decision.” Platt v. Platt, 17 Ariz. 458, 459, 498 P.2d 532, 533 (App. 1972). Father contends that reappointment of a parenting coordinator was an abuse of discretion because none of the five enumerated grounds Specifically, he for asserts appointment that the 2 in Rule record 74(A) fails to were met. support a finding that “the parents are persistently in conflict with one another” under Rule 74(A)(1). However, the trial court’s order is not actually based on 74(A)(1), but instead references the child’s best interests. Rule 74(A)(5) permits the appointment of a parenting coordinator if the court finds that “it would otherwise be in the children’s best interests to do so.” R. Fam. L. P. 74(A)(5). Ariz. Based on the record, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that reappointing a parenting coordinator was in the child’s best interests. Father also argues that reappointment of a parenting coordinator unconstitutionally denies him access to the court because he is unable to pay the parenting coordinator’s hourly fee. However, allocates half we of find the nothing parenting in the court’s coordinator’s order, hourly which fee to Father, as precluding Father from exercising his constitutional rights. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED affirming the trial court’s order reappointing a parenting coordinator. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED vacating the conference and oral argument currently scheduled for September 21, 2011. /s/ MICHAEL J. BROWN, Presiding Judge 3

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