Field v. Noor/Figueroa

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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE ROBERT JAMES FIELD, a single person, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. NOOR ICE CORPORATION, an Arizona corporation; DANNY FIGUEROA and JANE DOE FIGUEROA, husband and wife, Defendants/Appellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) DIVISION ONE FILED: 08/04/2011 RUTH A. WILLINGHAM, CLERK BY: GH 1 CA-CV 10-0540 DEPARTMENT D MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication - Rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure) Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. CV 2009-026646 The Honorable J. Richard Gama, Judge VACATED AND REMANDED Treon, Aguirre, Newman & Norris, P.A. By Raymond M. Norris Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Phoenix Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C. By John M. DiCaro Russell R. Yurk Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees Phoenix H A L L, Judge ¶1 court s Robert entry James of Field summary (Field) judgment appeals in from favor the of Noor trial Ice Corporation (d/b/a Arctic Ice), Danny Figueroa, and Jane Doe Figueroa (collectively, Noor Ice). For the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The following facts are undisputed. On August 27, 2007, Danny Figueroa, an employee of Noor Ice Corporation, was driving a company driven by Field. truck that struck a 1999 Dodge van being Later that day, Field visited Figueroa s place of business, Arctic Ice, and presented the owner, Naeem Khan, with two repair estimates for the damage done to his vehicle, one for $6,160.44 and the other for $4,993.55. Field requested that Khan reimburse him for the damage to his vehicle and Khan informed Field that the repair estimates were so high that he would submit the claim to his insurance. In response, Field asked that Khan not submit the claim and stated that he was willing to accept immediately. a smaller settlement if he could be paid At that time, Field executed a signed release which stated: I Robert Field settle with Artic Ice for accident on US 60 for 1999 dodge van check # 4459 for 2500.00 no more claim will be taken. 2 ¶3 On August 19, 2009, Field filed a complaint alleging that he had sustained physical injuries during the August 27, 2007 motor vehicle accident expenses as a result. and incurred substantial medical He requested specific damages for his medical expenses, lost wages, and decreased earning capacity, as well as general damages. ¶4 for In its answer, Noor Ice asserted that Field s claim damages is satisfaction barred because under Field the doctrine entered a of accord binding and settlement agreement releasing Noor Ice from any further liability. Noor Ice then filed a motion for summary judgment, again asserting that Field s claims for damages are discharged by accord and satisfaction. As support for its motion, Noor Ice submitted a copy of the signed release and the affidavit of Naeem Khan, in which Kahn stated that the settlement agreement was intended to release Noor Ice Corp. from any and all current and future claims by Mr. Field. ¶5 In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Field countered that the release was intended to resolve only the property damage claim. acknowledged agreement, that, he did at the feel In his attached affidavit, Field time as if he entered [he] was the injured collision, but he felt his injuries were minor. 3 settlement in the Indeed, Field asserted he discussed his back injuries with Kahn and told Kahn that he did not feel his injuries were serious[.] Field nonetheless maintained that Kahn fully understood that the payment he was making that day was just for the damage to [the] truck and that [Field] was reserving the right to make a claim later for bodily injury should that prove to be necessary. ¶6 In its reply, Noor Ice refuted that the parties intended to settle only the property claims in the settlement agreement. Noor Ice also attached a second affidavit of Khan, in which Kahn stated that Field acknowledged that the case would be closed when he executed the release. Khan also stated that he would have submitted the matter to his insurance rather than paying the settlement out-of-pocket if he believed he would still be liable for additional claims. ¶7 On June 4, 2010, the trial court held oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, and then granted the motion. The trial settlement court found agreement that that the no more language claim in will the be parties taken is unambiguous and that Field s proffered interpretation of that language, namely, that no additional claim for property damage would be pursued, is not reasonable and not persuasive. 4 ¶8 to Field timely appealed. Arizona Revised Statutes We have jurisdiction pursuant (A.R.S.) sections 12-2101(B) and -2102(B) (2003). DISCUSSION ¶9 by On appeal, Field contends that the trial court erred granting summary judgment in favor of Noor Ice. Specifically, he argues that the intent of the parties at the time they executed the release is a disputed issue of fact and therefore a matter for a jury to decide. ¶10 Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a trial court shall grant summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled summary issues to judgment judgment, of as we material a matter determine fact exist correctly applied the law. of de and law. novo In whether whether the reviewing any a genuine trial court L. Harvey Concrete, Inc. v. Agro Constr. & Supply Co., 189 Ariz. 178, 180, 939 P.2d 811, 813 (App. 1997). the party We view the facts in the light most favorable to against whom summary judgment was entered, Riley, Hoggatt & Suagee P.C. v. English, 177 Ariz. 10, 12-13, 864 P.2d 1042, 1044-45 (1993), and will affirm judgment if it is correct for any reason. the entry summary Hawkins v. State, 183 Ariz. 100, 103, 900 P.2d 1236, 1239 (App. 1995). 5 of ¶11 The agreements, scope of [c]onstruction including release principles. ¶ 14, 968 and enforcement determinations terms, to governed are as by of the settlement validity general and contract Emmons v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 509, 512, P.2d 582, 585 (App. 1998). When interpreting a contract, parol evidence may be used to explain an ambiguous contract, but in the absence of fraud or mistake, it may not be used to change, alter or vary the express terms in a written agreement. Brand v. Elledge, 101 Ariz. 352, 358, 419 P.2d 531, 537 (1996). If parties submit competing interpretations of a contract s meaning, the court should consider the offered evidence and, if [the court] finds that the contract language is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation asserted by its proponent, the evidence is admissible to determine the meaning intended by the parties. Ins. Co., (internal 175 Ariz. quotation Taylor v. State Farm. Mut. Automobile 148, 154, omitted). 854 P.2d Whether 1134, contract 1140 (1993) language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation so that extrinsic evidence is admissible is a question of law. Id. at 158-59, 854 P.2d at 1144-45. ¶12 Here, Field drafted and signed a release in which he stated: I Robert Field settle with Artic Ice for accident on US 60 for 1999 dodge van check # 4459 for 2500.00 no more claim 6 will be taken. Field contends that the release pertained to property claims only, as reflected in the qualifying language for 1999 dodge van. As set forth in his affidavit, he also asserts that the parties intended and understood, at the time the release was executed, that he retained the right to pursue a personal injury claim in the future. ¶13 Noor Ice, on the other hand, argues that the phrase no more claim will be taken unambiguously reflects that Noor Ice would not be liable for any future claims. this argument, Noor Ice cites Kahn s As support for affidavit in which he states that he would not have paid the settlement monies out-ofpocket if he believed he would remain liable for any personal injury claims and instead would have submitted the entire matter to his insurance company. ¶14 We conclude that the release language is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible to both interpretations put forward by the parties. Had the release stated involving 1999 dodge van rather than for 1999 dodge van, it would be clear that the phrase simply served to further identify the accident at issue, as does the preceding phrase on US 60. unqualified phrase no more claim In such a case, the will unambiguously refer to any and all claims. be taken would Here, however, the for 1999 dodge van phrase can be construed as a limitation on 7 the release, impliedly limiting the scope of the release to damage to the 1999 Dodge van. ¶15 The parties affidavits in support of their competing interpretations do not resolve this ambiguity. The parties agree that personal injuries were not part of the settlement negotiations and did not factor into the calculation. Kahn maintains, however, that he would not have paid the money outof-pocket if he believed he would be exposed to future liability and Field avows that he would not have executed the release if he believed it would limit his ability to seek personal injury damages in the future. Therefore, the trial court erred by finding the release unambiguous and granting summary judgment in favor of Noor Ice. 8 CONCLUSION ¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court s grant of summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision. /s/ PHILIP HALL, Judge CONCURRING: /s/ PATRICK IRVINE, Presiding Judge /s/ JOHN C. GEMMILL, Judge 9

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