Dyke v. Dyke

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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE In re the Marriage of: ) ) DONALD ALLEN DYKE, ) ) Petitioner/Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) ROBYN KAY DYKE, ) ) Respondent/Appellee. ) ________________________________) DIVISION ONE FILED: 09/29/2011 RUTH A. WILLINGHAM, CLERK BY: DLL No. 1 CA-CV 10-0409 DEPARTMENT D MEMORANDUM DECISION Not for Publication (Rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure) Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. FN2009-003253 The Honorable David J. Palmer, Judge AFFIRMED Donald Allen Dyke In Propria Persona Petitioner/Appellant Robyn Kay Brown-Dyke In Propria Persona Respondent/Appellee Glendale Moberly, MO G E M M I L L, Judge ¶1 Donald Dyke (“Husband”) appeals from portions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Robyn Dyke (“Wife”). Husband challenges the spousal maintenance award and the order for him to pay certain medical costs for Wife. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Husband and Wife married in 1983. In 2003, Wife moved to Missouri after Husband committed domestic violence against her. As a result of this incident, Husband pled guilty to a class 6 undesignated offense. See Maricopa County Super. Ct. Case No. CR2003-009716. ¶3 Husband 2009. a petition for dissolution in August After a trial, the court issued a decree awarding Wife spousal maintenance retroactive ordered to necessary of to per 1, 2009. pay surgery based $300 September Husband reconstruction 2003. filed upon the and the month owed pay domestic Husband timely appealed. thirty Additionally, debt to for any for future violence months the Wife’s court facial medical that costs occurred in We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A), (B) (2003). DISCUSSION ¶4 Husband first challenges Wife’s entitlement to spousal maintenance and the amount and duration of the award. an award of spousal maintenance for an abuse of We review discretion. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 348, ¶ 14, 972 P.2d 676, 681 (App. 1998). We view the 2 evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the award and “will affirm the judgment if there is any reasonable evidence to support it.” Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 354, ¶ 9, 160 P.3d 231, 233 (App. 2007). ¶5 to To qualify for spousal maintenance, Wife was required establish at least one of the following four statutory factors: (1) that she lacks sufficient property, including that awarded to her, to meet her reasonable needs; (2) that she is unable to be self-sufficient through appropriate employment or lacks earning ability in the labor market adequate to be selfsufficient; (3) that she contributed to Husband’s educational opportunities; or (4) that she had a marriage of long duration and is of an age that may preclude her from gaining suitable employment. A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1)-(4) (2007). Once a spouse establishes a statutory basis for spousal maintenance, the court must then consider the relevant factors listed in A.R.S. § 25319(B) in setting the amount and duration of the award. Leathers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 377, ¶ 10, 166 P.3d 929, 932 (App. 2007). Those factors include the standard of living established during the marriage; duration of the marriage; age, employment history, earning ability and physical condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; the supporting spouse's ability to pay and meet his or her own financial needs; the comparative earning power of the spouses; the financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance and time needed to acquire sufficient 3 education damages or from training conduct to that find appropriate results in employment; criminal and conviction either spouse in which the other spouse was the victim. of A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(1)-(5), (9)-(10), (13). ¶6 The because reasonable determined Wife lacks she court sufficient property needs, is unable to qualified be to for maintenance provide for self-sufficient her through appropriate employment, and had a marriage of long duration and is of an age that may preclude gaining employment adequate to be self-sufficient. A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1)-(2), (4). Additionally, the court set forth findings on all of the relevant A.R.S. § 25319(B) factors in setting the amount and duration of the award. For instance, the court found the parties enjoyed a comfortable standard of living during the marriage, Wife occasionally worked at low paying jobs during the marriage and currently needs certification to work as a caregiver, which she has done since separating from Husband in 2003. (10). is A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(1), (3), Husband is in a better financial position than Wife and able to maintenance meet to his Wife. own financial A.R.S. § needs while 25-319(B)(4), however, cannot currently meet her own needs. also (5). paying Wife, A.R.S. § 25- 319(B)(9). ¶7 The record the court’s findings. contains substantial evidence supporting The parties were married 20 years before 4 separating. A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(4), (B)(2). At the time of the hearing, Wife was 47 years old, had completed tenth grade and obtained a GED. A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(4), (B)(3). Wife worked at a convenience store for a couple of years during the marriage, but was primarily a stay at home mother. 1 A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(1). Between 2003 and July 2009 she worked as a caregiver, making $9.00 per hour approximately 30 hours per week, but the company she worked According for to unemployment, certification closed. the is to A.R.S. record, unable work to as 319(A)(2), (B)(9), (10). Wife a pay § 25-319(A)(2), is currently her caregiver bills, again. (B)(4). receiving and A.R.S. needs § 25- Husband has worked as a truck driver throughout the marriage and earns approximately $1,000 per week. A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(4), (5). and may need future Additionally, Wife suffered damages surgeries resulting from violence incident for which Husband was convicted. the domestic A.R.S. § 25- 319(B)(13); see State v. Thompson, 200 Ariz. 439, 441, ¶ 7, 27 1 Without citing to the record, Husband states Wife is able to be gainfully employed because of her customer service and cashier experience and because she attended college classes. Additionally, Husband asserts Wife was self-sufficient for the seven years prior to the petition for dissolution. Because Husband does not cite to the record as required and because these statements are not supported by the record, we disregard them. See Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa County v. Conlin, 148 Ariz. 66, 68, 712 P.2d 979, 981 (App. 1985) (court may disregard facts lacking appropriate references to record and those unsupported by record); see also ARCAP 13(a)(6) (an argument in an opening brief must contain citation to authority and parts of the record relied on). 5 P.3d 796, 798 (2001) (“One is convicted when there has been a determination of guilt by verdict, finding, or the acceptance of a plea.”). ¶8 Wife requested $300 per month for 240 months and the court awarded $300 per month for 30 months. Because the court considered the relevant statutory factors and its findings are supported by the record, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife spousal maintenance in the amount and duration set forth therein. ¶9 Next, Husband argues the court erred by considering evidence of the criminal case stemming from the 2003 domestic violence incident because the court rejected Wife’s pre-trial motion “to include case #CR2003009716 as Respondent’s Exhibits in Divorce”. discretion. We review evidentiary issues for an abuse of Cervantes v. Rijlaarsdam, 190 Ariz. 396, 398, 949 P.2d 56, 58 (App. 1997). ¶10 Although the court rejected Wife’s motion because of her failure to file the motion with the clerk of the court 2 and to send Husband a copy, there was testimony about the criminal case. no error considering the Wife listed the case in her pre-trial statement and Husband did not object. At the hearing, the court questioned Wife about the domestic violence incident 2 The motion is not part of the record. 6 and Wife testified about the criminal case and gave the case number. Husband did not object to Wife’s testimony, and in fact, testified about the matter himself. See Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., 198 Ariz. 283, 286, ¶ 9, 9 P.3d 314, 317 (2000) (“An objection to proffered testimony must be made either prior to or at the time it is given, and failure to do so constitutes a waiver.”). is waived. Accordingly, Husband’s argument Additionally, Husband’s conviction was relevant to the issue of spousal maintenance. generally Ariz. R. Evid. 402 A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(13); see (“All relevant admissible, except as otherwise provided”). evidence is Further, a court may take judicial notice “that a record exists,” “the nature of its content,” and “that a judgment has been rendered.” Scottsdale Mem'l Health Sys., Inc. v. Clark, 157 Ariz. 461, 468, 759 P.2d 607, 614 (1988); see also Reidy v. O'Malley Lumber Co., 92 Ariz. 130, 132, 374 P.2d 882, 884 (1962) (court can take judicial notice of another action in the same court). Based on the information set forth in the decree, it appears the court took judicial notice of the criminal case, and there was no error in so doing. ¶11 Husband also argues the court erred by ordering him to pay for Wife’s medical costs because the restitution issue was adjudicated in the criminal case. Contrary to Husband’s argument, Wife testified there was no restitution ordered in the 7 criminal case. 3 We defer to the family court’s assessment of witness credibility as it is in the best position to make such determination. 680. Further, Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d at in her pre-trial statement, Wife requested payment of her past and future medical bills resulting from the domestic violence and Husband did not object to these issues. Based on the evidence in this record, the court did not err by ordering Husband to pay Wife’s medical costs resulting from the domestic violence. ¶12 Last, Husband argues the court erred by considering Wife’s untimely response to the petition for dissolution. Wife accepted service of the petition on September 14, 2009, but did not file a response until November 2, 2009. Husband filed an application and affidavit for default on October 19, 2009. ¶13 There was no error considering Wife’s response. First, this issue is waived because Husband never requested the court to strike Wife’s response, nor does he cite any legal authority requiring the family court to sua sponte strike Wife’s response. See In re 1996 Nissan Sentra, 201 Ariz. 114, 117, ¶ 7, 32 P.3d 39, 42 (App. 2001) (failing to file a motion to strike waives any objection to deficiencies of a document); and 3 We disregard Husband’s unsupported statements in his reply brief concerning his plea agreement. See Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa County, 148 Ariz. at 68, 712 P.2d at 981. 8 Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62, 211 P.3d 1272, 1289 (App. 2009) (failing to support arguments with legal authority may constitute abandonment or waiver of that claim). ¶14 Moreover, the court never entered a default judgment against Wife. and shortly Nearly two months after Wife filed her response, after Wife failed to appear at a resolution conference, the court set a default hearing for March 31, 2010. At some point, the hearing was apparently converted to a hearing on Wife’s motion for temporary orders, although notification of such change does not appear in the record. At the hearing, the court converted the matter to the dissolution trial and Husband did not object. ¶15 Additionally, Wife actively participated telephonically at the trial and Husband made no objection to Wife’s participation. CONCLUSION ¶16 Finding no error, we affirm the dissolution decree. __/s/____________________________ JOHN C. GEMMILL, Judge CONCURRING: ____/s/____________________________ JON W. THOMPSON, Presiding Judge ____/s/____________________________ MAURICE PORTLEY, Judge 9

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