State v. Shadle
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOTICE:
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED
EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF ARIZONA
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA,
Appellee,
v.
NATHAN JAREN SHADLE,
Appellant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1 CA-CR 10-0675
DEPARTMENT A
DIVISION ONE
FILED: 09/27/2011
RUTH A. WILLINGHAM,
CLERK
BY: DLL
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication –
Rule 111, Rules of the
Arizona Supreme Court)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Cause No. CR2009-166615-001SE
The Honorable Barbara L. Spencer, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General
by
Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel,
Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section
and Liza-Jane Capatos, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
Phoenix
James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender
by
Karen M. Noble, Deputy Public Defender
Attorneys for Appellant
Phoenix
B A R K E R, Judge
¶1
Nathan Jaren Shadle (“Shadle”) appeals his conviction
for one count of possession or use of marijuana, a Class 1
misdemeanor. 1
He
argues
that
the
trial
court
abused
its
discretion in denying his motion to suppress evidence that was
taken from him after he was illegally detained.
Facts and Procedural Background
¶2
One
Friday
patrolling
downtown
explained,
“Friday
evening
Tempe
in
nights
near
in
August,
Mill
August,
back, are really busy . . . .”
that
evening,
he
observed
Officer
Avenue.
once
the
Stipp
As
he
was
later
students
come
At approximately 12:30 a.m.
“several
bouncers
escorting
subjects outside of the [Mill Avenue Cue Club] bar.”
two
One of the
two subjects being escorted from the bar was Shadle.
Officer
Stipp testified that seeing several people escort an individual
out of a bar was “unusual,” which “led [him] to believe that
something was going on.”
He explained that people who leave
voluntarily normally do not require more than one bouncer.
¶3
Although Officer Stipp could not recall whether the
bouncers
had
called
for
his
attention,
he
testified
at
the
suppression hearing that “when it takes several bouncers [to
escort
a
patron
out],
we
need
1
to
investigate
what
happened
Although this count was originally designated a Class
6 felony in the indictment, the State moved to amend the
indictment to designate count one as a misdemeanor and to
conduct a bench trial, a request which the trial court granted.
2
inside the bar to determine whether or not a crime occurred
inside the bar.”
¶4
Officer
Stipp
and
another
police
officer
handcuffed
Shadle and the other subject, escorted them to the sidewalk, and
sat them on the curb.
Officer Stipp explained that he did this
in order to make sure that the subjects were not injured by
someone walking by because it was “really busy” and the sidewalk
in front of the bar was narrow (approximately 6 to 8 feet wide).
The officers also placed their bikes behind the men to create a
physical
barrier
between
them
and
the
people
walking
by
and
exiting the bar.
¶5
While
one
police
officer
stayed
with
the
two
men,
Officer Stipp went inside to speak with one of the bouncers
inside the bar.
The bouncer told Officer Stipp that Shadle and
the other man had been pushing each other near the bar and
bumping into patrons.
After speaking with the bouncer, Officer
Stipp “determined there was probable cause to arrest [Shadle]”
and
arrested
Shadle.
Shadle
was
then
searched
by
another
officer who found a small package of marijuana in his pants
pocket.
The
entire
interaction
from
the
time
the
officers
arrived until Shadle was placed under arrest took “at most, 10
minutes.”
¶6
The trial court denied Shadle’s motion to suppress,
reasoning that the initial detention was a valid investigative
3
stop because “the officers did have a reasonable suspicion, upon
viewing the security personnel at the bar removing two persons
from the bar, to believe that a crime may have been committed.”
The
court
Officer
noted
Stipp
that
in
it
this
had
case
considered
and
all
“the
of
the
experience
of
circumstances,
including the fact that it was Friday night on a busy street in
Tempe near ASU[,] and the training of the security personnel.”
¶7
The
investigatory
court
further
detention
explained
rather
than
an
that
arrest,
it
even
was
an
though
Shadle was handcuffed and seated behind a small barricade of
bikes in the presence of an officer.
Although it noted that
“this is a closer call,” the court found that:
[T]he actions of the officers, under the
circumstances, were reasonable, given the
fact it was a Friday night, it was a crowded
sidewalk, and it was necessary to remove Mr.
Shadle
and
the
other
person
from
the
immediate area at the entrance of the bar.
The court explained it was basing its decision in part on the
fact that the detention “was reasonably short, no more than 10
minutes,” and “[t]here was enough of a risk, given the crowds
present and the circumstances that the use of handcuffs was a
reasonable precaution.”
¶8
Shadle
filed
a
timely
notice
of
appeal.
We
have
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona
Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections
4
12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), 13-4031 (2001) and 13-4033(A)(1) (Supp.
2008).
Discussion
¶9
Shadle argues the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to suppress.
He contends that the marijuana
found in his pocket should have been excluded because it was
obtained as a result of a police stop that was either a de facto
arrest without probable cause or an investigatory stop without
reasonable suspicion.
¶10
We review a trial court’s ruling on the suppression of
evidence
for
evidence
presented
an
abuse
at
of
discretion,
the
suppression
considering
the
State
hearing.
only
v.
Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, 288, ¶ 2, 100 P.3d 452, 453 (App. 2004).
We
“defer
to
the
trial
court’s
factual
findings
that
supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.”
are
Id.
However, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.
Id.
Thus, “[i]n reviewing investigatory stops we defer to the
trial
court’s
findings
however,
“whether
the
criminal
activity
that
of
fact
police
absent
had
justified
a
abuse
of
reasonable
conducting
an
discretion”;
suspicion
of
investigatory
stop is a mixed question of law and fact which we review de
novo.”
State v. Rogers, 186 Ariz. 508, 510, 924 P.2d 1027, 1029
(1996) (citation omitted).
5
¶11
Before we analyze whether the trial court erred in
denying Shadle’s motion to suppress, we must first consider (1)
whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify an investigative
stop, and (2) whether the stop became a de facto arrest that
required probable cause.
1.
Reasonable Suspicion
¶12
Fourth
“‘An
investigatory
Amendment
if
stop
supported
criminal activity is afoot.”
by
is
permissible
reasonable
under
suspicion’
the
that
Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 510, 924 P.2d
at 1029 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693
(1996)).
“The reasonable suspicion standard is a lower standard
than that required for probable cause to make an arrest and it
requires a showing considerably less than a preponderance of the
evidence.”
977,
981
suspicion
State v. Ramsey, 223 Ariz. 480, 484, ¶ 18, 224 P.3d
(App.
2010).
cannot
be
“The
viewed
facts
in
constituting
isolation,
or
reasonable
subtracted
in
a
piecemeal fashion from the whole, but must be considered in the
context of the totality of all the relevant circumstances.”
Id.
at 485, ¶ 23, 224 P.3d at 982.
¶13
The
“[a]rticulating
Arizona
precisely
mean[s] is not possible.”
Supreme
what
Court
has
‘reasonable
noted
suspicion’
that
.
.
.
Rogers, 186 Ariz. at 511, 924 P.2d at
1030 (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695).
Generally, reasonable
suspicion requires a police officer to be able “to point to
6
specific
and
articulable
facts
which,
taken
together
with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the
stop].”
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
¶14
The United States Supreme Court explained the reason
for permitting such stops as follows:
In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts
the risk that officers may stop innocent
people.
Indeed,
the
Fourth
Amendment
accepts that risk in connection with more
drastic police action; persons arrested and
detained on probable cause to believe they
have committed a crime may turn out to be
innocent.
The Terry stop is a far more
minimal
intrusion,
simply
allowing
the
officer to investigate further.
If the
officer does not learn facts rising to the
level of probable cause, the individual must
be allowed to go on his way.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000).
¶15
Shadle argues that the officers “had nothing but a
hunch
that
However,
something
Officer
Stipp
criminal
was
able
occurred
to
point
inside
to
at
the
bar.”
least
one
“specific and articulable” fact that reasonably warranted the
stop.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
Namely, although there was
some conflicting testimony, Officer Stipp testified that several
bouncers escorted Shadle out.
For example, when responding to
the question: “You saw several of them escorting the defendant
out
of
the
store,”
the
Officer
replied,
“Yes.”
Further
he
testified it was “unusual” for several bouncers to escort an
individual out of a bar.
Officer Stipp testified that this
7
“caught
[their]
attention”
and
“led
[them]
to
believe
that
something was going on.”
¶16
Shadle points out several things that did not occur:
“there was no report of a crime, no waiving [sic] over by the
bouncers,
and
officers.”
have
no
direct
observation
of
any
crime
by
the
While the presence of these things would obviously
increased
the
likelihood
of
criminal
activity,
their
absence did not eliminate the possibility that criminal activity
had occurred.
As discussed above, reasonable suspicion is not a
“preponderance of the evidence” standard (meaning “it is more
likely
than
not
that
criminal
activity
is
afoot”),
but
a
“considerably lower” standard (“criminal activity may be afoot
based on these specific and articulable facts”).
Terry stops
contemplate that on some occasions, innocent individuals will be
stopped even though their suspicious activities turn out not to
be criminal.
See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 (“Terry accepts the
risk that officers may stop innocent people.”).
¶17
It seems self-evident that a reasonable person would
suspect
that
something
happened
in
the
bar.
Whether
this
something was criminal activity is a closer question, as there
are certainly several reasons for being ejected from a bar that
do not involve illegal activity.
be
ejected
possibility
for
that
simply
falling
Shadle
was
For example, individuals may
asleep
being
8
or
passing
ejected
for
out.
The
“innocent”
behavior,
however,
does
not
mean
that
the
unjustified in making their investigatory stop.
not
required
to
rule
out
the
police
“The police are
possibility
explanations for a defendant’s conduct.”
were
of
innocent
Ramsey, 223 Ariz. at
485, ¶ 23, 224 P.3d at 982 (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125-26).
Based on the fact that it took several bouncers to escort Shadle
from the bar, we concur that reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity justified Shadle’s investigatory stop.
¶18
Shadle’s argument that mere presence in an area of
expected
criminal
investigative
stop
activity
is
not
is
but
irrelevant.
true,
enough
to
justify
Shadle
was
an
not
“merely present”; he was being removed from a bar by several
bouncers.
¶19
to
While Shadle is correct that the balancing of factors
determine
whether
the
reasonable
criminal
suspicion
activity
may
is
differ
completed
depending
or
on
ongoing,
investigative stops are in no way limited to ongoing criminal
activity.
See
United
States
v.
Hensley,
469
U.S.
221,
227
(1985) (explicitly rejecting the argument that police should not
be allowed to conduct a Terry stop for past criminal activity:
“We
do
not
agree
with
the
Court
of
Appeals
that
our
prior
opinions contemplate an inflexible rule that precludes police
from stopping persons they suspect of past criminal activity
unless they have probable cause for an arrest.”).
9
¶20
Thus, there was no error in determining the stop was
reasonable.
The
next
question
is
whether
the
officers’
handcuffing and detaining Shadle for ten minutes converted the
stop into a de facto arrest.
2.
De Facto Arrest
¶21
stop
There is no per se rule that converts an investigatory
into
a
de
facto
arrest.
See,
e.g.,
United
States
v.
Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982) (“A brief but
complete
restriction
of
liberty
if
not
excessive
under
the
circumstances, is permissible during a Terry stop and does not
necessarily
convert
the
stop
into
an
arrest.”).
Whether
an
arrest has occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes “turns upon an
evaluation
of
whether
reasonable
a
reasonably
all
believe
the
surrounding
person,
that
he
circumstances
innocent
was
being
of
any
to
determine
crime,
arrested.”
would
State
v.
Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 448, 711 P.2d 579, 587 (1985).
¶22
Shadle argues that the stop became a de facto arrest
when the officers handcuffed him.
He quotes a statement from
Winegar, 147 Ariz. at 447-48, 711 P.2d at 586-87, to support his
argument: “An arrest is complete when the suspect’s liberty of
movement is interrupted and restricted by the police.”
He also
cites A.R.S. § 13-3881(A), which describes how arrests are made:
“An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be
10
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.”
¶23
However, as mentioned above, there is no per se rule
that governs when a Terry stop is transformed into an arrest.
It cannot be the case that all Terry stops are de facto arrests;
otherwise, there would be no reason for an exception to the
probable
cause
requirement.
Yet
in
all
Terry
stops,
the
individual’s liberty of movement is in some way restricted and
interrupted by the police.
See, e.g., State v. Clevidence, 153
Ariz. 295, 299, 736 P.2d 379, 383 (App. 1987) (“The fact that
defendant was not free to leave does not, in and of itself,
transform
a
valid
investigatory
detention
into
a
traditional
arrest with its probable cause requirement.”); State v. Aguirre,
130 Ariz. 54, 56, 633 P.2d 1047, 1049 (App. 1981) (“When an
officer is engaged in an investigation, he may detain a person
under circumstances which would not justify an arrest.”).
These
cases would be legally inconsistent if the rule were, as Shadle
argues, that a Terry stop becomes a de facto arrest as soon as
an individual’s liberty is restrained by police officers.
¶24
Further supporting this conclusion is the fact that at
least two Arizona cases have held that the use of handcuffs did
not automatically transform a Terry stop into a de facto arrest.
See, e.g., State v. Navarro, 201 Ariz. 292, 296, ¶ 17, 34 P.3d
971,
975
(App.
2001)
(“[Defendant]
11
concedes
his
brief
handcuffing
was
part
of
a
valid
Terry
stop.”);
Aguirre,
130
Ariz. at 56, 633 P.2d at 1049 (detaining, frisking, handcuffing,
and placing a suspect in a patrol car did not transform an
investigative stop into an arrest).
Many Ninth Circuit cases
also specifically approve of the use of handcuffs during a Terry
stop. See, e.g., United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d
728,
735
(9th
Cir.
2001)
(Paez,
J.,
concurring)
(“We
have
approved of Terry stops that include handcuffing the suspect
during questioning . . . .”); United States v. Meza-Corrales,
183 F.3d 1116, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Under such conditions,
the
agents’
initial
actions,
including
temporarily
detaining
[the defendant] with the use of handcuffs while questioning him,
were reasonable responses, and the encounter did not escalate
into
a
full-blown
(explaining
that
arrest.”);
“[w]e
Bautista,
specifically
684
F.2d
approved
at
the
1289-90
use
handcuffs” in another case while analyzing a Terry stop).
of
Thus,
the fact that Shadle was handcuffed during the stop does not
automatically turn the stop into a de facto arrest.
Instead,
the analysis turns on a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances,
including
the
duration
of
the
detention,
the
reason for the detention, and the manner of the detention.
¶25
“rigid
examine
The
time
United
States
limitation
“whether
the
on
Supreme
Terry
police
Court
stops,”
diligently
12
rejected
directing
pursued
a
setting
a
courts
to
means
of
investigation
suspicions
that
was
quickly”
likely
during
to
the
confirm
detention.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-87 (1985).
or
dispel
United
their
States
v.
It held that the twenty-
minute detention at issue in Sharpe was acceptable because it
“[did]
not
involve
any
delay
unnecessary
to
the
[officers’]
legitimate investigation,” and the defendants had “presented no
evidence
that
investigation.”
the
officers
Id. at 687.
were
dilatory
in
their
The Court also noted that “[a]
brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his
identity or maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining
more information, may be the most reasonable [course of action]
in
light
of
the
facts
known
to
the
officer
at
the
time.”
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 146 (1972)).
¶26
Here, the police officers saw the bouncers escorting
two men out of the club.
The officers handcuffed the men and
sat them on a curb no more than ten feet in front of the club
for no more than ten minutes while one of the police officers
went to ask the bouncers what happened.
The crowded nature of
the sidewalks, with many pedestrians walking by, was a factor
justifying the use of handcuffs.
Without the handcuffs, one
police officer would have been left to manage two potentially
unruly and uncooperative individuals by himself in the midst of
13
a large crowd of moving people. 2
frisked,
the
police
officers
had
either man was carrying a weapon. 3
Because neither man had been
no
way
of
knowing
whether
As in Sharpe, there is no
allegation that the police caused any unnecessary delay because
the stop lasted no longer than ten minutes before Officer Stipp
returned with information from the bouncer that the men had been
assaulting each other and other patrons.
were placed under arrest.
At that point, they
We find that in such circumstances it
was reasonable for the police officers to handcuff the men for
safety purposes in order to prevent them from fleeing or being
injured by the crowd.
See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235 (Police
officers “were authorized to take such steps as were reasonably
necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the
status quo during the course of the stop.”).
¶27
need
Given our finding that no de facto arrest occurred, we
not
decide
whether
probable
questioning of the bouncer.
cause
existed
prior
to
the
Shadle does not argue that his
arrest subsequent to the questioning of the bouncer violated his
2
While it is true that the officers called for
reinforcements and that a third officer had arrived by the time
Officer Stipp returned from speaking with the bouncer, Officer
Stipp testified that when he arrived on the scene, only one
other officer was available to help him with the suspects.
3
Here, we are careful to note that there was no
evidence that police officers suspected that the individuals had
a weapon; we merely state the obvious, that the police officers
had no knowledge on this subject.
14
constitutional rights.
Because Shadle’s constitutional rights
were not violated by the Terry stop, the trial court did not err
in denying Shadle’s motion to suppress evidence of the marijuana
found in his pants pocket after he was arrested.
Conclusion
¶28
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
we
affirm
Shadle’s
conviction and sentence.
/s/
____________________________
DANIEL A. BARKER, Judge
CONCURRING:
/s/
____________________________________
ANN A.SCOTT TIMMER, Presiding Judge
/s/
____________________________________
PATRICK IRVINE, Judge
15
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
