State v. Lindquist
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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 DIVISION ONE FILED: 06/07/2011 RUTH A. WILLINGHAM, CLERK BY: DLL IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER LEO LINDQUIST, Appellant. 1 CA-CR 10-0549 DEPARTMENT B MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication Rule 111, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court) Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. CR 2009-165628-001 DT The Honorable F. Pendleton Gaines, Judge (Deceased) AFFIRMED Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General Phoenix By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section and Aaron J. Moskowitz, Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for Appellee James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender By Stephen R. Collins, Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for Appellant Phoenix N O R R I S, Judge ¶1 Christopher conviction dangerous and Leo sentence felony. He for Lindquist aggravated argues the timely appeals assault, superior a court class his two committed reversible error by instructing the jury, over his objection, on flight. We disagree. characterized instruction, as and Lindquist s actions could reasonably be eluding thus the behavior superior that court supported did the not its abuse discretion in instructing the jury on flight. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 On October 11, 2009, Lindquist drove his Jeep erratically and at high speeds on his way home from a birthday party. A Phoenix police officer attempted to make a traffic stop, but Lindquist did not stop until he had pulled into the garage of what turned out to be his parents home. got out of the Jeep with a knife in his hand. Lindquist The officer moved away from Lindquist, drew his firearm, and told Lindquist to drop the knife. ¶3 Lindquist continued advancing toward the officer with the knife in his hand in a stance that showed, according to the officer s testimony, Lindquist was preparing to fight. The officer described the situation as a stand-off in which one further move by Lindquist would have led to the officer shooting him. The officer again told Lindquist to drop the knife, and Lindquist tossed the knife away, turned, and ran into the home. Only a minute or so later, after at least one more police officer had arrived, Lindquist came out through the garage with his parents. After initially resisting, police arrested him. 2 ¶4 The superior court instructed the jury on flight as follows: In determining whether the State has proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, you may consider any evidence of the defendant s running away, hiding, or concealing evidence, together with all of the other evidence in the case. You may also consider the defendant s reasons for running away, hiding or concealing evidence. Running away, hiding, or concealing evidence after a crime has been committed does not by itself prove guilt. The jury convicted Lindquist of aggravated assault, finding the offense dangerous. The court sentenced Lindquist to a presumptive term of 10.5 years in prison. DISCUSSION1 ¶5 Whether a court should instruct the jury on flight depends on the facts in the case. State v. Cutright, 196 Ariz. 567, 570, ¶ 12, 2 P.3d 657, 660 (App. 1999), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Miranda, 200 Ariz. 67, 22 P.3d 506 (2001). Merely leaving the scene of a crime may not constitute flight, and thus the court must determine whether the defendant engaged in conduct intended to postpone or prevent apprehension. Id. type The key inquiry is whether the defendant engaged in some of eluding behavior designed 1 to camouflage his We review a superior court s decision to give or refuse to give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hurley, 197 Ariz. 400, 402, ¶ 9, 4 P.3d 455, 457 (App. 2000). 3 participation in a crime, thus manifesting a consciousness of guilt. Id. ¶6 Here, Lindquist advanced on the officer with the knife even after being told to drop it. Then, after obeying the command, rather he Lindquist s into retreat characterized arrested ran as the into eluding immediately home the home behavior otherwise -- than could -- and he surrender. reasonably would thus have be been demonstrated his consciousness of his guilt. ¶7 That Lindquist s retreat could reasonably be viewed as eluding behavior is further supported by the officer s actions after the stand-off and Lindquist s statements to police. officer, broadcast believing Lindquist Lindquist s was attempting description to to other avoid The arrest, officers and requested a perimeter around the home in order to catch him if he tried to escape. Even Lindquist himself suggested his retreat was eluding behavior by stating that, although he was not trying to avoid arrest, he thought it would be safer in the home. ¶8 Because characterized as Lindquist s eluding retreat into behavior the that home could be manifested a consciousness of guilt, the superior court reasonably concluded the facts supported a flight instruction. It did not, thus, abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on flight. 4 CONCLUSION ¶9 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Lindquist s conviction and sentence. __/s/________________________________ PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Judge CONCURRING: __/s/__________________________________ PETER B. SWANN, Presiding Judge _/s/__________________________________ DANIEL A. BARKER, Judge 5
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