State v. Trella

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, ) ) Appellee, ) ) v. ) ) JOSEPH HENRY TRELLA, ) ) Appellant. ) ) __________________________________) DIVISION ONE FILED: 06/16/2011 RUTH A. WILLINGHAM, CLERK BY: DLL No. 1 CA-CR 10-0375 DEPARTMENT C MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication Rule 111, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court) Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. CR2008-119685-001 DT The Honorable Stephen P. Lynch, Judge Pro Tempore The Honorable Carolyn K. Passamonte, Judge Pro Tempore AFFIRMED Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General Phoenix By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section And Adriana M. Rosenblum, Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for Appellee James Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender By Paul J. Prato, Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for Appellant B R O W N, Judge Phoenix ¶1 Joseph Henry Trella appeals from his convictions and sentences for influence. counts of aggravated driving under the Trella asserts that the trial court s admission of out-of-state Clause two motor rights vehicle under the records Sixth violated Amendment. his For Confrontation the following reasons, we affirm. BACKGROUND ¶2 Trella was involved in an automobile accident in Phoenix when his vehicle collided with the vehicle ahead of him. Officers investigating bloodshot, watery the eyes, scene smelled observed that Trella had strongly of alcohol, was slurring his speech, and had trouble with his balance. After officers conducted a field sobriety test, they observed several more cues indicating impairment due to alcohol consumption and placed Trella under arrest. ¶3 At the police precinct, Trella admitted to drinking earlier that day and, when officers requested Trella s license, he produced a Colorado identification card. police that cancelled. suspended his license was not Trella informed suspended, revoked, or However, when asked what state his license might be in, he responded, Massachusetts. After officers administered a breath test, results indicated that Trella had a blood alcohol concentration of approximately .24. The State later charged Trella with two counts of aggravated driving under 2 the influence of alcohol pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ( A.R.S. ) sections 28-1381(A)(1)-(A)(2) (Supp. 2010), and - 1383(A)(1) (Supp. 2010). ¶4 Prior testimony, to trial, arguing that Trella his filed Colorado a and motion to preclude Massachusetts motor vehicle division ( MVD ) records were inadmissible hearsay. In addition, he asserted the records were testimonial and therefore violated the Sixth Amendment s Confrontation Clause. In response, the State argued that the MVD records were admissible as public records and nontestimonial because they were not motion to created for use in a criminal prosecution. ¶5 At preclude, the Trella evidentiary hearing introduced on testimony Trella s from an Arizona MVD custodian of records to explain the nature and substance of the out-of-state MVD records. After both parties discussed the admissibility of the records, the trial court found that both the Colorado and Massachusetts records were admissible, at a minimum, as public records. Confrontation Clause But, Trella declined to address the argument, stating, It s not really a confrontation issue any more because it s not testimonial. ¶6 Trella However, at trial, outside the presence of the jury, argued records, were that certain testimonial anticipation of litigation. documents, because they attached were to the generated MVD in More specifically, Trella objected 3 to the following documents: (1) an affidavit attached to the Massachusetts record, signed by the Massachusetts MVD registrar; and (2) a printout confirming that Trella suspension notice from the Colorado MVD. was mailed a With respect to the Colorado verification of mailing, the State asserted that it was nontestimonial because the MVD has an interest in maintaining records of license suspensions. the Massachusetts properly neither part affidavit The State similarly argued that was non-testimonial of [a] public record. document was testimonial and The the court State and . ruled . . that subsequently relied on these records to prove that Trella had a suspended license at the time of the offense, and that he knew, or should have known, that he had a suspended license. ¶7 Trella voluntarily absented himself from trial and was tried in absentia. After a three-day trial, a jury found Trella guilty of both counts. The trial court sentenced Trella to two concurrent terms, eight-month incarceration credit. with 209 days of presentence Trella timely appealed. DISCUSSION ¶8 Trella asserts that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by admitting into evidence the Colorado and Massachusetts MVD records license was suspended in those states. MVD records are testimonial 4 hearsay showing that his Trella argues that the that violated his Confrontation Clause rights because he had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the author of the MVD records. 1 Although we generally review a trial court s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion, we conduct a de novo review of challenges to admissibility under the Confrontation Clause. State v. King, 213 Ariz. 632, 636, ¶ 15, 146 P.3d 1274, 1278 (App. 2006) (citation omitted). ¶9 Under the doctrine of invited error, however, Trella is precluded from arguing on appeal that the trial court erred by allowing the State to offer the MVD records from Colorado and Massachusetts. See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 453, ¶ 111, 94 P.3d 1119, 1148 (2004) ( This court has long held that a defendant who invited error at trial may not then assign the same as error on appeal. ) (citation omitted). If an alleged error the is invited, we do not consider whether error is fundamental, for doing so would run counter to the purposes of the invited error doctrine[,] which is to prevent a party from inject(ing) error in the record and then profit(ing) from it on appeal. State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 565-66, ¶¶ 9, 11, 30 P.3d 631, 632-33 (2001) (quotations and citations omitted). 1 Even though an Arizona MVD custodian of records testified, Trella asserts that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated because he did not have the ability to cross-examine the persons who actually prepared the out-of-state MVD records. 5 ¶10 Here, Trella conceded at the evidentiary hearing that the MVD records were not testimonial. inquired as Confrontation coming whether Clause under eviscerates trial, to the the Trella argument, hearsay Trella wished Trella C]lause objected to address responded, exception, [Confrontation although When the trial court I Since it s believe issue. to his that Moreover, the affidavit it at and verification of mailing attached to the MVD records, he did not object to the records themselves. When the trial court clarified whether Trella was objecting to the last page of the Colorado [MVD record] Massachusetts and . document[,] . . Trella the first responded, page of the Correct[.] Accordingly, we address only whether admission of the affidavit and the verification of mailing violated the Confrontation Clause. A. ¶11 Colorado Verification of Mailing The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2551 (2009) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court found that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant s right to confront those who provide testimonial statements against a defendant. 6 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). Thus, the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial evidence from a declarant who does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ¶12 Id. The Crawford court defined testimony as a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. Id. at 51 (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). the court declined to provide a comprehensive Although definition of testimonial, the court stated that it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a prior hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. Id. at 68. However, the court made clear that nontestimonial hearsay did not violate the Confrontation Clause, noting that [M]ost of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. ¶13 Id. at 56. In State v. King, this court addressed whether Arizona MVD records are testimonial under Crawford. 2, 146 P.3d at 1276. 213 Ariz. at 634, ¶ We found that such records are required to be kept by statute and exist independently of any criminal prosecution. Id. at 638, ¶ 25, 146 P.3d at 1280; see A.R.S. § 41-1346(A)(2) (2011) (requiring the director of the department of transportation to [m]ake and 7 maintain records containing adequate and proper documentation of the . . . essential transactions of the agency designed to furnish information to protect the rights of the state and of persons directly affected by the agency s activities ); see also A.R.S. § 28-3004 (Supp. 2010) (department required driver s licenses). to keep records pertaining to Moreover, we found that MVD records are prepared in the regular course of business by individuals who are not proxies of police investigators. King, 213 Ariz. at 638, ¶ 25, 146 P.3d at 1280 (quotation and citation omitted). As a result, we concluded that Arizona MVD records are not testimonial and therefore do not implicate the Sixth Amendment s Confrontation Clause. ¶14 Here, the Id. at ¶ 26. verification of mailing, which confirmed that Trella was informed by mail of his suspended license, was attached to Trella s Colorado MVD records. Colorado MVD records, like Arizona MVD records, are required to be kept by statute and See Colo. Rev. (department licenses, exist independently Stat. required including Ann. to any ( C.R.S. ) keep records of records of § criminal prosecution. 42-2-121 (West pertaining suspension); see to 2011) driver s also C.R.S. § 42-2-119(2) (West 2011) (requiring notices of suspension to be mailed to licensees and providing that such notices create[] a presumption for administrative purposes that such notice or order was received if the department maintains a copy of the 8 notice or order and maintains a certification that the notice or order was deposited in the United States mail by an employee of the department. ) Moreover, the verification of mailing was created well before the instant case was initiated and therefore was not produced Accordingly, for the introduction of purpose these of prosecuting records at trial Trella. did not verification was violate Trella s Confrontation Clause rights. ¶15 Trella argues, however, that the prepared and maintained for use in court. proposition, Trella cites C.R.S. § In support of this 42-2-121(2)(c)(II), which states that official MVD records are admissible in all . . . courts within the state of Colorado without further foundation if the records specify the number of pages, bear the official seal of the department and are signed by the director of the department. Although it is clear from this statute that MVD records are available for use at trial, this does not override the primary purpose of the motor vehicle statutes to provide records for identification and licensing purposes. See C.R.S. § 42-2-121. records Therefore, the fact that these may subsequently be used in criminal prosecutions does not preclude them from qualifying as nontestimonial public records. King, 213 Ariz. at 637, ¶ 22, 146 P.3d at 1279. See Furthermore, Arizona s motor vehicle statutes similarly provide that motor vehicle records are admissible 9 in evidence without further foundation in certified. all A.R.S. courts § or 28-442 administrative (2004). agencies Accordingly, if the verification is not testimonial, and thus does not violate the Confrontation Clause. 2 B. ¶16 Massachusetts Affidavit Relying on Melendez-Diaz, Trella also argues that any affidavits attached to the MVD records are testimonial because [t]he Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits[.] at 2542. Here, an affidavit was attached to the Massachusetts MVD records. stated See 129 S. Ct. that It was signed by the motor vehicle registrar and the notice of suspensions were MAILED ON THE DATE(S) APPEARING ON THE NOTICE TO THE LAST ADDRESS ON FILE AS APPEARING IN THE REGISTRAR S RECORDS[,] and that THERE HAS SINCE BEEN NO REINSTATEMENT OF [TRELLA S] LICENSE OR RIGHT TO OPERATE MOTOR VEHICLES IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. ¶17 However, we need not resolve whether this affidavit violated Trella s confrontation rights because Confrontation Clause and hearsay rule violations are subject to harmless error 2 Trella also asserts that the Colorado verification of mailing is testimonial because it was not vetted through the judicial process, as required by King. Although King found that statements contained in public records were not testimonial in part because the records merely document facts already established through the judicial process, the court there was referring to records of prior convictions, which are not at issue here. King, 213 Ariz. at 638, ¶ 24, 146 P.3d at 1280. 10 analysis. State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 486, ¶ 38, 189 P.3d 413 403, (2008). Error, be it constitutional or otherwise, is harmless if we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict. State v. Anthony, 218 Ariz. 439, 446, ¶ 39, 189 P.3d 366, 373 (2008) (citation omitted). The inquiry . . . is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. Id. (citation omitted). ¶18 Here, the affidavit merely summarized the contents of the MVD records. The Massachusetts MVD records supporting the registrar s affidavit indicate that in 2002, Trella was notified that within ninety days of the date of the letter, his license/right to operate a motor vehicle [would] be suspended for an indefinite period. Moreover, the records reveal that Trella had numerous other suspensions and revocations of his record that occurred prior to the indefinite suspension in 2002. Because the affidavit contained information that was contained in the MVD records, which were admissible and nontestimonial, we find the registrar s affidavit 3 to be harmless error. 3 Trella does not argue on appeal that these records were inadmissible, and has waived any argument that the MVD records themselves were testimonial. See supra ¶¶ 9-10. We also note that, notwithstanding the Massachusetts records, the Colorado 11 Accordingly, the trial court did not violate Trella s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. 4 CONCLUSION ¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Trella s convictions and sentences. /s/ _________________________________ MICHAEL J. BROWN, Judge CONCURRING: /s/ ___________________________________ PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Presiding Judge /s/ ___________________________________ DONN KESSLER, Judge MVD records showed that Trella s license was suspended in Colorado at the time of the accident and that he was informed by letter of that fact. 4 Because we decide the case on this basis, we do not address Trella s argument that, assuming the MVD records violate the Confrontation Clause, the verdicts are against the weight of the evidence. 12

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.