State v. Glover

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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, ) ) Appellee, ) ) v. ) ) RONALD LEIGH GLOVER, ) ) Appellant. ) ) __________________________________) No. 1 CA-CR 09-0777 DIVISION ONE FILED: 01/25/2011 RUTH WILLINGHAM, ACTING CLERK BY: GH DEPARTMENT C MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication Rule 111, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court) Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. No. CR2009-116542-002 DT The Honorable Edward O. Burke, Judge AFFIRMED Thomas Horne, Arizona Attorney General By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section Melissa M. Swearingen, Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for Appellee Phoenix James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender By Spencer D. Heffel, Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for Appellant Phoenix D O W N I E, Judge ¶1 Ronald Leigh Glover denial of his suppression motion. affirm. ( defendant ) challenges the For the following reasons, we FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1 ¶2 On March 5, 2009, Detective Benson and other officers conducted surveillance of a suspected drug stash house. Detective Benson followed a Dodge Charger ( Dodge Charger 1 ) driven by co-defendant Alfonso Saunders from the stash house to a hotel, where Saunders parked across the street. Saunders crossed the street and entered a hotel room that a bunch of people were seen entering leaving. 2 and At one point, two females left the hotel room, crossed the street, and drove away in Dodge Charger 1. Officers followed the vehicle. Saunders then left the hotel room and got into an identical Dodge Charger ( Dodge Charger 2 ) 3; detectives followed the vehicle, but lost it when Saunders made a u-turn. ¶3 Later that day, officers spotted Dodge Charger 2, which was one of three vehicles leaving the same hotel parking The three vehicles followed each other. 4 lot. Officers stopped 1 In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and we view that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court s ruling. State v. May, 210 Ariz. 452, 454, ¶ 4, 112 P.3d 39, 41 (App. 2005). 2 Police observed co-defendant Christopher Thompson at the hotel talking on a cell phone. Detectives also saw defendant at the hotel but did not believe he was involved at the time. 3 Dodge Charger 2 was identical except it had an Arizona license plate. 4 The other two vehicles were a red Pontiac and a Dodge Durango. Officers saw Saunders driving the red Pontiac earlier 2 Dodge Charger 1 for a traffic violation and found eleven bales of marijuana in the trunk (approximately 200 pounds). After receiving this information, Detective Benson ordered officers to stop the Dodge other Charger vehicles. 2, and Co-defendant defendant was the Thompson was passenger. driving Officers handcuffed the two men and had them sit on the curb. Officers searched Dodge Charger 2 and found a FedEx package and two black suitcases in the trunk, one of which contained a large sum of money. The FedEx package contained $25,000 in cash. was addressed to Saunders and All of the stopped vehicles were rental cars. ¶4 Defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit possession of marijuana for sale, a class 2 felony, sale or transportation of marijuana, a class 2 felony, possession of marijuana for sale, a class 2 felony, and money laundering in the second degree, a class 3 felony. Before trial, defendant joined in co-defendant Thompson s motion to suppress. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding the traffic stops and subsequent vehicle searches and the search of the Fed Ex [sic] envelope were lawful. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit possession of marijuana that day from the suspected stash house. At that time, police stopped the Pontiac and found $8000, but no drugs. Saunders and the passenger were released. The police also recognized the Dodge Durango from earlier in the evening. 3 for sale, possession laundering. The of trial marijuana court for sentenced sale, and defendant money to two mitigated 4 year terms of imprisonment on counts 1 and 3 and a mitigated 2.5 year term on count 4, all to run concurrently, with credit for presentence incarceration. ¶5 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes ( A.R.S. ) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, 13-4033(A). DISCUSSION ¶6 his Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying suppression motion because the police did not have reasonable suspicion that Thompson, the driver of the [Dodge Charger 2] had committed a criminal offense. motion to suppress, determinations, conclusions. but we defer to we review the de trial novo its In reviewing a court s factual ultimate legal State v. Box, 205 Ariz. 492, 495, ¶ 7, 73 P.2d 623, 626 (App. 2003). We will not disturb a trial court s ruling on a motion to suppress absent clear and manifest error. State v. (1995). Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 57, 906 P.2d 579, 590 Clear and manifest error is really shorthand for abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 8, 49 P.3d 273, 277 (2002). 4 ¶7 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Fourth Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). Amendment, an investigatory stop is Under the permissible supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. v. Rogers, 186 Ariz. 508, 510, 924 P.2d 1027, 1029 if State (1996). Whether police officers have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is a mixed question of law and fact. derived from an investigatory stop that Id. is Evidence not based on reasonable suspicion is fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed. State v. Richcreek, 187 Ariz. 501, 506, 930 P.3d 1304, 1309 (1997). ¶8 cause Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable and together basis arises with for from objective suspecting specific, and that articulable reasonable the engaged in criminal activity. facts inferences, particular person which, form detained the is United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 53 F.3d 244, 246 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); State v. Ramsey, 223 Ariz. 480, 484, ¶¶ 17-18, 224 P.3d 977, 981 (App. 2010); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances such particularized and wrongdoing ). We suspect s conduct that officers objective consider and basis [s]uch appearance, 5 can for demonstrate suspecting objective location, factors and a legal as the surrounding circumstances, such as the time of day, and taking into account the officer s relevant experience, training, and knowledge. State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, 76, ¶ 6, 179 P.3d 954, 956 (App. 2008). ¶9 In the case at bar, the totality of circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the occupants Charger 2 were involved in illegal drug activity. of Dodge Detective Benson, who had worked in narcotics for roughly seven years, testified that characteristics organizations include with orchestrated various the of out-of-state involvement roles; of they drug multiple typically purchaser individuals drive rental cars; it is common to find these individuals with large amounts of cash. stopped officers The after found detective going $8000 knew co-defendant from the suspected in the red Saunders stash Pontiac. Later been and that that house had day, detectives saw Saunders again at the suspected stash house, but this time in a different rental vehicle, Dodge Charger 1. Detectives followed Saunders from the stash house to the hotel, where they observed more suspicious behavior. Two women left in Dodge Charger 1, and Saunders then left in his third rental vehicle of the day, Dodge Charger 2. See State v. O Meara, 198 Ariz. 294, 296, ¶¶ 11-12, 9 P.3d 325, 327 (2000) (looking at the totality of the circumstances in evaluating reasonable suspicion 6 and determining multiple car switching among other suspicious behavior creates reasonable suspicion). ¶10 After officers found eleven bales of marijuana in Dodge Charger 1, they stopped the three caravanning vehicles, which included the red Pontiac and Dodge Charger 2, both of which had been driven by Saunders that day. The fact that defendant was not identified as being involved earlier does not negate the reasonable suspicion that the car defendant was in was participating in illegal activity. Detective Benson opined that individuals involved in these activities typically do not include non-participants or people just riding along for the fun of it. Dodge Although Detective Benson did not personally stop Charger 2, reasonable suspicion established by the collective knowledge of all law enforcement personnel involved made this a lawful investigatory stop. 171 Ariz. officer 333, may 335, presume 830 P.2d 854, instigating 856 See State v. Peterson, (App. officer 1991) acting on (back-up proper determination of probable cause); see also Box, 205 Ariz. at 496, ¶ 12, 73 P.3d at 627 (holding officer may stop a vehicle for violations observed and reported by another officer); State v. Chavez-Inzunza, 145 Ariz. 362, 364, 701 P.2d 858, 860 (App. 1985) (officers could stop defendants under collective knowledge doctrine even when information was relayed by radio). 7 ¶11 Defendant also contends the evidence found in Dodge Charger 2 s trunk should have been suppressed. 5 We disagree. As a passenger, defendant is entitled to challenge the legality of the stop and the seizure of his person, but not the subsequent search of the common areas of the vehicle. State v. Gomez, 198 Ariz. 61, 62, ¶ 5, 6 P.3d 765, 766 (App. 2000). Both suitcases and the FedEx envelope were found in the common areas of the vehicle. Moreover, defendant has not asserted a proprietary or possessory interest in the rental car or the property seized, which might accord him standing to challenge the vehicle search. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978). CONCLUSION ¶12 The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. /s/ MARGARET H. DOWNIE, Judge CONCURRING: /s/ DANIEL A. BARKER, Presiding Judge /s/ MICHAEL J. BROWN, Judge 5 Defendant also argues his statements to detectives should be suppressed. It is unclear to what statements defendant is referring; he neither cites the record nor develops his argument. Our review of the suppression hearing transcript reveals no statements made by defendant to officers. 8

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