State v. Brigham

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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE ) ) Appellee, ) ) v. ) ) SHELTON WILLIAM BRIGHAM, JR., ) ) Appellant. ) ) DIVISION ONE FILED: 02/08/2011 RUTH WILLINGHAM, ACTING CLERK BY: GH STATE OF ARIZONA, No. 1 CA-CR 09-0727 DEPARTMENT D MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication Rule 111, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court) Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. CR2007-181289-001 DT The Honorable Sally S. Duncan, Judge The Honorable Janet E. Barton, Judge The Honorable F. Pendleton Gaines, Judge AFFIRMED Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section Liza-Jane Capatos, Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for Appellee Phoenix James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender By Stephen R. Collins, Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for Appellant Phoenix W I N T H R O P, Presiding Judge ¶1 Shelton William Brigham, Jr. ( Appellant ) appeals his convictions for one count of armed robbery, two counts of attempted first degree burglary, and three counts of misconduct involving weapons. Appellant maintains the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements he made during interrogation based on a detective s failure to comply with his request for an attorney. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1 ¶2 On December 20, 2007, Appellant, wearing a cloth over his face and armed with a black handgun, approached the door of Advance America, a payday loan business located at 67th Avenue and Peoria in Peoria, Arizona. He tried to open the door, but because it was locked, he was unable to enter. The store s manager watched him walk to his car and saw his face when he pulled the cloth off and looked back toward the store. The manager she called 9-1-1. Approximately one week later, identified two photographs in a photographic lineup, Appellant s and another person s, as similar to the man she had seen. ¶3 That same day, Appellant went to another payday loan/check cashing business, Loan Mart, located near 91st Avenue and West Olive in Peoria. This time he entered the store wearing something black on his face and holding a small black 1 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions and resolve all reasonable inferences against Appellant. See State v. Manzanedo, 210 Ariz. 292, 293, ¶ 3, 110 P.3d 1026, 1027 (App. 2005). 2 handgun. He pointed the handgun at a loan processor and told her to stay calm and give him the money in her cash drawer. She gave Appellant approximately $600, and he asked her about the safe in the back. When she explained that it was a time safe and they would have to wait fifteen minutes to open it with two sets of codes, Appellant decided to leave. The loan processor immediately called 9-1-1 and described Appellant as an African American wearing black clothing, approximately 5 11 or 6 tall, and weighing approximately 170-180 pounds. store videotape taken at the time of the A grainy incident showed a subject approaching the counter with a plastic bag and pointing an object at the employees, and the loan processor transferring money from the cash register to the subject, who then left. Police searched the area for Appellant but did not find him. ¶4 On December 21, 2007, Peoria Police Sergeant Smith visited several other Peoria check cashing businesses, including a Check n Go store located near 75th Avenue and Peoria, to forewarn them about a rash of robberies at similar businesses. As a result, the manager of the Check n Go decided to keep the front door of her store locked. ¶5 to At approximately 10:15 a.m., Sergeant Smith responded a call from the Check n Go. The manager and another employee had observed a dark-colored car with tinted windows drive slowly by the store, with 3 the driver leaning out the window and looking into the store. They next saw Appellant walk past the store with his hand up by his face, turn around, and come back. The manager called 9-1-1, and while on the phone, she saw Appellant pull a stocking or ski mask over his face and put what manager appeared described skin tone. to be a Appellant Muscular. black as gun under his shirt. The African-American medium tone Probably around six foot tall. She told the dispatcher Appellant was pulling on the door but could not get in. ¶6 spotted When Sergeant Smith arrived at the Check n Go, he Appellant, who matched the radio description of suspect, walking in a parking lot aisle east of the store. the The sergeant arrested Appellant, who had a nine millimeter handgun tucked in the front of his pants, a plastic Hi-Health bag and latex gloves in his pockets, and panty hose on his head. ¶7 That same day, Appellant was interviewed at the Peoria Police Department by Detective Hickman, and he confessed to the three offenses. 2 He acknowledged going to the site of his arrest that morning with the intent to rob the Check n Go. He further admitted having a handgun and the plastic bag to put the money in, using female stockings as a mask, and walking by the store to see who was inside before trying to enter. 2 The interview was videotaped and later played for the jury at trial. 4 ¶8 Appellant also described his activities America and Loan Mart the previous day. at Advance He admitted finding himself in the same situation at 67th Avenue and Peoria when he walked up, the door was locked, and [he] turned around and walked away. He also admitted obtaining slightly more than six hundred dollars by doing one other near 91st Avenue and Olive, in which he wore the same mask and used and displayed the same gun. ¶9 A grand jury issued an indictment, charging Appellant with one count of armed robbery, a class two dangerous felony; two counts of attempted first degree burglary, each a class four dangerous felony; and three counts of misconduct involving a weapon, 3 each a class four felony. A jury found Appellant guilty of all charged offenses and, in a separate proceeding, found the armed robbery and attempted burglaries were committed for pecuniary gain. ¶10 After finding that Appellant had two prior felony convictions, including one prior dangerous conviction, the trial court 15.75 sentenced years him to presumptive, imprisonment in the concurrent Arizona sentences Department of of Corrections for the armed robbery and 10 years imprisonment for the remaining offenses. Appellant timely appealed. 3 We have At trial, the State presented evidence indicating that Appellant was a prohibited possessor whose civil rights had not been restored when he committed the charged offenses. 5 jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), 13-4031 (2010), and 13-4033 (2010). ANALYSIS ¶11 Before trial, Appellant moved to suppress certain statements he made to Detective Hickman during his December 21, 2007 custodial interrogation on the basis that the detective had violated his rights pursuant to Miranda 4 and disregarded his request for an attorney. Appellant argued he had unequivocally requested an attorney during the interview when he uttered, At this point can I ask for an attorney? . . . Cause I don t know how much trouble I m getting myself in. He further argued that, even if his words could be viewed as an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel, the detective was obliged under Arizona law to cease all questioning until he had clarified the nature of the statement. Appellant maintained that, because the detective neither honored his request nor attempted to clarify any ambiguity in it, any statements he made in response to the detective s questions after it must be suppressed. ¶12 the At the October 3, 2008 trial management conference, trial court found that Appellant s can I ask for an attorney query was not an unequivocal request for an attorney and denied the motion to suppress as it had been framed by the 4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 6 parties. After reviewing interview, however, responsive statements whether would the statements somehow impact transcript court made those statements. the the arose was troubled the by the of detective, to any kind voluntariness December by subsequent and of wondered promise of 21 that [Appellant s] Accordingly, the court asked each side to address the issue of voluntariness in supplemental briefing, and the parties complied. Later, at the October 22, 2008 oral argument and after having reviewed a DVD of the interview, the court opined that Appellant it was believed right at Detective the Hickman s line, but did exchange not with cross it. Nonetheless, the court postponed a final decision on suppression and scheduled a supplemental evidentiary hearing on the issue. After hearing additional testimony 5 and re-review[ing] ¶13 all of the information that had been presented, including the supplemental briefing, the trial court found that Appellant s statements made to Detective Hickman after the can I ask for an attorney In exchange reaching its were voluntary decision, the and court therefore relied on admissible. our supreme court s decision in State v. Blakley, 204 Ariz. 429, 65 P.3d 77 5 The court heard testimony from Detective Hickman again; from Appellant; and from Peoria Police Officer Karaloff, who had been present at an exchange between Appellant and Detective Hickman at the Boswell Hospital emergency room, had transported Appellant to the Peoria Police Department, and had observed at least some of the detective s interview of Appellant. 7 (2003). Appellant s statements to the detective about the December 20 and 21 armed robbery and attempted burglaries before and after his can I ask for an attorney query were subsequently admitted into evidence at trial. ¶14 On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress when the court found his can I ask for an attorney query was not an unequivocal request for counsel and when it found that the detective s response was not a promise of leniency that rendered involuntary additional statements he made upon subsequent questioning. ¶15 Our review of a trial court s ruling on a motion to suppress is based solely suppression hearing. on the evidence presented at the State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 396, ¶ 22, 132 P.3d 833, 840 (2006) (citing State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 284, 908 P.2d 1062, 1069 (1996)). Further, we review the evidence presented in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling. (App. State v. Wyman, 197 Ariz. 10, 12, ¶ 2, 3 P.3d 392, 394 2000). We review the factual findings underlying the court s determination for an abuse of discretion, but we review the court s legal conclusions de novo. Newell, 212 Ariz. at 397, ¶ 27, 132 P.3d at 841. ¶16 to We will not disturb a trial court s ruling on a motion suppress Spears, 184 absent a clear Ariz. at 284, abuse 908 8 of P.2d the at court s 1069. discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n.18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n.18 (1983) (citation omitted). I. Failure to Suppress Based on Request for Counsel ¶17 Before questioning Appellant after his arrest on December 21, Detective Hickman advised Appellant of his rights pursuant to Miranda. Appellant then admitted the attempted burglary of the check cashing store where he was arrested and the armed robbery and attempted burglary cashing stores the previous day. question Appellant about another of the two check As the detective began to incident, the following exchange occurred: Q: There s another one. [Appellant]: Q: At this point can I ask for an attorney? You can. [Appellant]: Cause I don t know how much trouble I m getting myself in. Q: Well here s what I told you. [Appellant]: How much more trouble I m getting in. Q: You re not getting yourself in any worse trouble, but what you re doing is uh, you re clarifying things so when we do go to court, everybody knows that we talked truthfully. That s I wouldn t be saying there s another one if I didn t know there was another one, right? And that s like I said, you re trying to make your bills, and all I m trying to do is confirm what you did. So two reasons, one, I don t 9 hang this on someone else, okay. And two well three reasons. We clear everything up today so you don t have nothing hanging over your head next week. I book you today on these, and then soon as everything s looks like it s going okay on these, and then everything comes together on something else with the DNA or whatever we re gonna do, and then I got to come back and throw more charges on you. Do you see where I m coming from? [Appellant]: Yeah. Q: That s that s where my concerns are here. Okay. That s why I m saying there s another one. If you want to talk about it, we can talk about it. It s one that you did twice. [Appellant]: Q: Yeah, did you do it twice? [Appellant]: Q: One that I did twice? Mm-mm. Okay. [Appellant]: I ve never done one twice. Q: Okay. Well then maybe there were two people that did it, and see, that s what I m trying to figure out. Rather than try to hang both of them on you do you see what I m saying? [Appellant]: Yeah. Q: You want to talk about that? open, get it done with? [Appellant]: ¶18 Get it out in the Mm, yeah. Appellant argues that his can I have an attorney query, 6 made after previously being advised he could have an 6 As the State notes, Appellant incorrectly asserts in his opening brief that he queried, [C]an I have an attorney? Appellant s actual words were can I ask for an attorney? 10 attorney, was an unequivocal request for an attorney, and the trial court erred in not suppressing all statements made after it. A trial court s ruling on the admissibility of a confession will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been clear and manifest error. State v. Eastlack, 180 Ariz. 243, 251, 883 P.2d 999, 1007 (1994) (citation omitted). ¶19 In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that an individual who is subjected to custodial interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and have counsel present during questioning, and police are required explain this 384 U.S. at 469-73. right before interrogation begins. to In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981), the Supreme Court held that when an accused person expresses the desire to deal with police only through counsel, the person may not be subjected counsel to has further been interrogation made available, by the unless he authorities or she until initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police. ¶20 the In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994), Supreme effectively Court waives subsequently his or her held right that, to if counsel a suspect after being advised of it, law enforcement officers may continue to question the suspect. Nonetheless, if the suspect requests counsel at any point during an interview, the suspect cannot be subjected to further questioning until either 11 a lawyer has been made available or the suspect reinitiates the conversation. Id. The Court, however, specified that the suspect s request for counsel must be unambiguous, such that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Id. at 459. The Court also clarified that anything less than that - i.e., a statement that might be a request for an attorney - did not trigger the requirement to cease all questioning. ¶21 Affirming Id. at 461-62. the lower court s suppression ruling, the Supreme Court in Davis found that the remark [m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer was not an unequivocal request for counsel. 512 U.S. at 462. In Eastlack, our supreme court acknowledged the reasoning of Davis and found the suspect s statement during questioning - I think I better talk to a lawyer first - was equivocal, and the suspect could have clearly and unequivocally requested a lawyer had he so desired. 180 Ariz. at 250-51, 883 P.2d at 1006-07. ¶22 We Appellant s agree statement with the in this request for an attorney. trial case court s was not finding an that unequivocal As the State recognizes, Appellant did not ask for an attorney; instead, he merely asked whether he could ask for an attorney at that point. This inquiry is not unlike the [m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer surmise voiced by the defendant in Davis, which the Supreme Court found not to be 12 an unequivocal request for counsel. that Detective Hickman responded, Further, despite the fact You can, indicating that Appellant could do so, Appellant never replied that he therefore wanted an attorney or otherwise indicated to the detective that he no longer wished to speak without an attorney present. ¶23 Cases in which courts have found that statements arguably less ambiguous than Appellant s were not unequivocal requests for counsel conclusion here. lend support to the trial court s See, e.g., Eastlack, 180 Ariz. at 250-51, 883 P.2d at 1006-07 (deeming ambiguous the defendant s I think I better talk to a lawyer first statement); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding the questions Where s the attorney? and You mean it s gonna take him long to come? were not unambiguous requests for counsel); Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (7th Cir. 1994) (determining that the defendant s query I can t afford a lawyer but is there any way I can get one? lacked the clear implication of a present desire to consult with counsel ). ¶24 In Lord, the Seventh Circuit found further support for its conclusion from the fact that, after the officer in that case gave an affirmative response to [the defendant s] question about obtaining matter further. a lawyer, the 29 F.3d at 1221. defendant did not pursue the The same reasoning applies in this case where Detective Hickman responded to Appellant s At 13 this point can I ask for an attorney? query by stating, You can. Despite this response, Appellant never stated a present desire to have counsel present before he spoke further with the detective. ¶25 Appellant also argues that, even if we view his words as ambiguous, the detective was required to stop the interview and clarify their import. Although the Supreme Court in Davis found it would be good practice for officers to clarify whether a defendant actually wanted an attorney in the face of an ambiguous statement, the Court specifically declined to adopt a rule requiring officers to do so. 512 U.S. at 461-62. Instead, the Court concluded that, unless a suspect s statement was an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, there was no obligation on law enforcement to stop questioning him or her. Id. Contrary to Appellant s argument, in State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 127, ¶ 29, 140 P.3d 899, 910 (2006), our supreme court expressly acknowledged that Davis found no constitutional requirement for officers to either clarify a suspect s ambiguous statement or stop all questioning. 7 Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding 7 As the State notes, the cases Appellant relies on for this argument - State v. Staatz, 159 Ariz. 411, 768 P.2d 143 (1988), disapproved on other grounds by State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 440, 924 P.2d 441, 444 (1996), and State v. Finehout, 136 Ariz. 226, 665 P.2d 570 (1983) - were decided before the Davis and Ellison decisions. 14 that Appellant s statement to Detective Hickman was not an unequivocal or unambiguous request for an attorney. 8 II. ¶26 Detective Failure to Suppress Based on Voluntariness Appellant Hickman also were contends involuntary that his because statements the to detective s statement that Appellant was not getting himself in any worse trouble was a promise by the detective that he would get concurrent sentences if he cleared other crimes for the police by confessing to them. According to Appellant, this promise 8 Appellant cites several cases in which courts have found a statement to be an unequivocal request for an attorney. The cases, however, are factually distinguishable from this case. In three cases, the requests for counsel came immediately after the defendants were advised of their rights pursuant to Miranda and were couched in language that was an indication of a present desire to consult with counsel, Lord, 29 F.3d at 1221, unlike in the present case. See Alvarez v. Gomez, 185 F.3d 995, 996-97 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that, immediately after being advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda, the defendant asked the following: Can I get an attorney right now, man? ; You can have [an] attorney right now? ; and Well, like right now you got one? ); United States v. Hughes, 921 F. Supp. 656, 657 (D. Ariz. 1996) (stating that, immediately after being advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda, the defendant asked, Can I call a lawyer? ); Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 613 S.E.2d 579, 582 (Va. 2005) (noting that, before signing a waiver form, the defendant asked, Can I have someone else present too . . . like a lawyer like y all just said? and after signing the waiver, the defendant stated, I would like to have somebody else in here and Can I get a lawyer in here? ). In two cases, the courts found that the language used appeared to express unequivocal requests. See United States v. Lee, 413 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that the defendant s Can I have a lawyer? query was similar to statements previously recognized by the court as proper invocations of the right to an attorney); Kyger v. Carlton, 146 F.3d 374, 379 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the defendant s statement that he would just as soon have an attorney was a request for counsel). 15 was a significant inducement to get him to confess, and the trial court thus erred in finding that incriminating statements were voluntary. his subsequent Finding no support for Appellant s characterization of the detective s statement, we find no error in the court s ruling. ¶27 and In Arizona, confessions are prima facie involuntary, the State bears the burden preponderance of the evidence. 346, 929 P.2d confession 1288, is 1294 of otherwise by a State v. Lacy, 187 Ariz. 340, (1996). involuntary, proving we In determining consider whether, whether under a the totality of the circumstances, a defendant s will was overcome. State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 335, ¶ 44, 185 P.3d 111, 121 (2008). To find a confession involuntary, we must find both coercive police behavior and a causal relation between coercive behavior and the defendant s overborne will. 336, ¶ 44, 185 P.3d at 122 (citation omitted). the Id. at A statement is involuntary, therefore, if we find that under the totality of the circumstances, the statement was the product of coercive police tactics. State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 601, 944 P.2d 1204, 1215 (1997) (citations omitted). ¶28 A voluntary confession is one not induced by a direct or implied promise, however slight. a promise is involuntary if (1) A confession resulting from police make an express or implied promise and (2) the defendant relies on the promise in 16 confessing. Blakley, 204 Ariz. at 436, ¶ 27, 65 P.3d at 84 (quoting State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 603, 886 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1994)); accord Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (stating that the extracted promise, test by for threats however influence). voluntariness or slight; is whether violence; by or exertion by the a a confession direct of was or indirect any improper On appeal, we will not disturb a trial court s determination of voluntariness absent a finding that the court committed clear and manifest error. Blakley, 204 Ariz. at 436, ¶ 26, 65 P.3d at 84. ¶29 Appellant focuses on Detective Hickman s You re not getting yourself in any worse trouble statement and contends that, by it, the detective promised leniency by agreeing to preclude any consecutive sentences for other crimes to which [Appellant] confessed. Our review of the record shows that simply is not the case. ¶30 The detective s remark was made after Appellant admitted to an armed robbery and two attempted burglaries in the first degree and, viewed in context, appears to be nothing more than a comment that discussing another incident would not necessarily get Appellant in any worse trouble at that point. As the State notes, even if inaccurate, it was by no means a promise of leniency, let alone of any specific sentences. See State v. Huerstel, 206 Ariz. 93, 106, ¶ 55, 75 P.3d 698, 711 17 (2003) (stating that, although erroneous, detectives advice that it would be better for the defendant if he told the truth, when unaccompanied by either a threat or promise, did not render a subsequent confession involuntary); Blakley, 204 Ariz. at 436, ¶ 27, 65 P.3d at 84 ( Advice to tell the truth, unaccompanied by either a threat or promise, does not make a confession involuntary. (quoting Ross, 180 Ariz. at 603, 886 P.2d at 1359)). ¶31 Further, Detective Hickman leniency, threatening we find that nothing could preclud[ing] harsher in be the response interpreted consecutive sentences confessed to additional crimes. based as given promising sentences, on whether by or Appellant The only promise we find in the detective s comments is that they would clear everything up today and get Appellant book[ed] [] today on these so he would not have anything hanging over [his] head next week. ¶32 In Blakley, on which the trial court in this case relied in reaching its decision, our supreme court found there had been no specific mention of a deal if the defendant confessed even though the interrogating officers in that case had suggested leniency might be an option and implied defendant might receive counseling if he told the truth. Ariz. at 435-36, ¶¶ 23, 28, 65 P.3d at 83-84. the 204 We agree with the State that the statements in Blakley were significantly more 18 specific than Detective Appellant would not get Hickman s himself indefinite in any comment worse that trouble by discussing another incident. ¶33 Appellant maintains that our supreme court s decision in State v. Thomas, 148 Ariz. 225, 714 P.2d 395 (1986), is on point to the present distinguishable. case. In Thomas, Thomas, the however, defendant is readily denied any involvement in the crime until the interviewing deputy told him that the lack of a confession would have a detrimental effect on his sentence and actually discussed the probabilities of what his sentence might be. Id. at 227, 714 P.2d at 397. In the present case, had Peoria crimes before Appellant the exchange already with confessed Detective to the Hickman occurred. More importantly, the detective did not discuss sentencing or the probabilities of sentencing with Appellant in any fashion. Nor did the detective indicate, either directly or indirectly, that a confession, or lack thereof, would affect the resolution of Appellant s offenses. ¶34 The State that Appellant s also argues post-exchange that, comments even to assuming arguendo Detective Hickman were improperly admitted by the trial court, any error would be harmless because Appellant had already confessed to the Peoria crimes. See generally State v. Montes, 136 Ariz. 491, 496-97, 667 P.2d 191, 196-97 (1983) (concluding that the admission of a 19 defendant s pre-Miranda statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given that the subsequent confession recounted the events in detail and was properly admitted). Although the trial court appears not to have specifically considered this factor when rendering its decision, we find it lends further support to the court s finding that Appellant s post-exchange statements were voluntary. Here, Appellant had been advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda and had already confessed to and provided sufficient details to connect him with the three Peoria offenses before his exchange with Detective Hickman. His post- Miranda admissions prior to his query were voluntarily made, and he does not argue otherwise. The statements he made after the exchange with the detective simply fleshed out details regarding the crimes. 9 statements We find coerced the no possibility additional that statements the detective s Appellant made regarding these crimes or that these additional statements were anything other than harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 205, ¶ 39, 84 P.3d 456, 470 (2004). ¶35 court Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial committed no clear and 9 manifest error in finding A new piece of information that Appellant provided was the fact he had spent some of the money he obtained during the armed robbery, but the remainder was in his vehicle. Appellant, however, had already admitted obtaining approximately $600 from the Loan Mart before the exchange with Detective Hickman. 20 Appellant s additional statements to Detective voluntary and not induced by any promise. Ariz. at 436, Therefore, the ¶ 26, trial 65 court P.3d did at not 84 were See Blakley, 204 (citation abuse denying Appellant s motion to suppress. Hickman its omitted). discretion in See Spears, 184 Ariz. at 284, 908 P.2d at 1069. CONCLUSION ¶36 Appellant s convictions and sentences are affirmed. ______________/S/____________________ LAWRENCE F. WINTHROP, Presiding Judge CONCURRING: ______________/S/__________________ PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Judge _____________/S/___________________ PATRICK IRVINE, Judge 21

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