State v. Jones

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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. GREGORY KEITH JONES, Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) DIVISION ONE FILED: 12/15/2011 RUTH A. WILLINGHAM, CLERK BY: DLL No. 1 CA-CR 10-0031 DEPARTMENT B MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication Rule 111, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court) Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. CR2008-122125-001SE The Honorable James T. Blomo, Judge AFFIRMED Thomas Horne, Arizona Attorney General By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section And Craig W. Soland, Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for Appellee Phoenix James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender By Edith M. Lucero, Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for Appellant Phoenix S W A N N, Judge ¶1 Defendant, convictions and Gregory sentences Keith on Jones, ten felony appeals from offenses, his including possession of narcotic drugs for sale (4 counts), possession of dangerous drugs for sale (3 counts), possession of drug paraphernalia, money laundering in the second degree and illegal control of an enterprise. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress evidence without holding an evidentiary hearing and when it denied his request for a continuance, and that there is insufficient evidence to support conviction. Because we find required to hold an his that evidentiary serious the trial hearing on drug offender court the was motion not to suppress, that Defendant was not entitled to a continuance, and that the evidence was sufficient to support his serious drug offender conviction, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1 ¶2 Edwards On January 10, 2008, Scottsdale Police Officer Timothy contacted Defendant at his home in ( the Residence ) during a patrol response. south Scottsdale Though the home was located in a working or middle class area Edwards observed a Bentley -- which he had never seen in his 15 years working that 1 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions and resolve all reasonable inferences against defendant. State v. Manzanedo, 210 Ariz. 292, 293, ¶ 3, 110 P.3d 1026, 1027 (App. 2005) (citation omitted). 2 neighborhood -- in the garage and at least a hundred shoe boxes some of which he confirmed were filled with Nike shoes.2 When Edwards asked Defendant what he did for a living, he initially replied that he owned Tipps Barbecue, but then stated that his sister owned it and that he was helping her out. Edwards told Defendant that he had never heard of Tipps Barbecue and when he asked for some reference, Defendant told him he also did consulting for a Phoenix real estate firm. ¶3 After observations speaking to his with Defendant, supervisor of In January 2008, Dersa, along with other officers, began of narcotics Scottsdale unit. surveillance the to his Detective three-month Dersa eventually relayed Police a Scott and Edwards investigations Defendant. During the surveillance, Dersa personally observed Defendant using multiple vehicles to make multiple trips between Tipps Barbecue, the Residence, a condominium at the Cofco Center Court complex ( the Condo ), and a U-Haul storage unit ( the Unit ) on east McDowell Road. video Based on his observations, Dersa had a motion-activated camera facility on installed March 20, in the 2008. public The hallway camera of the captured U-Haul Defendant entering the Unit on March 20, 22, 27 and 31, and April 1, 3 and 2 When questioned about the boxes of shoes, Defendant told Edwards he had a shoe fetish. 3 7.3 Still photos generated from the video showed Defendant handling a box containing several white plastic bottles located on a shelf in the Unit and retrieving blister packs from another box. what appeared to be On March 27 and 31, Dersa observed Defendant leaving the facility with some shoe boxes from the Unit. ¶4 Based on the surveillance information, Dersa drafted and obtained eight search warrants, including warrants for the Unit, Tipps Barbecue, the Residence and the Condo. During the search of the Unit on April 7, 2008, officers found many boxes containing numerous bottles and containers of prescription narcotic drugs, including: 3,000 tablets containing hydrocodone; 100 tablets containing morphine; 100 pills containing oxycodone; 3,300 pills morphine; containing containing 3500 tablets alprazolam; hydrocodone; containing 471 tablets 289 capsules containing methadone; 2,400 tablets containing morphine; 828 milliliters of liquid containing promethazine with codeine and 1 bottle of codeine; 3,300 tablets containing hydromorphine; 500 tablets containing diazepam; 200 tablets containing oxycodone; 100 tablets containing meperidine; 200 tablets containing methylphenidate; 500 tablets containing hydrocodone; 100 tablets containing hydromorphone; 1,200 tablets containing alprazolam; 3 The camera did not record any other individual entering the Unit during that period of time, and Dersa never observed anyone else walking in that hallway during his surveillance. 4 and 13,964 tablets of alprazolam (contained in jars). All of the various drugs were in usable amounts, including those in liquid form. In all, the quantity of drugs found at the storage unit amounted to over 34,000 dosage units 4 or the equivalent of what would be stocked by a mid-range Fry s Pharmacy. also located a briefcase containing rubber-banded Police bills in stacks labeled 1- or 2000 that added up to a total of $40,500; a roll of large industrial shrink wrap ; and a number of empty shoeboxes. ¶5 On April 8, 2008, Scottsdale Police executed a search warrant on the Condo at the Cofco Center Court complex. During surveillance, police had observed Defendant leaving the Condo and locking the front door with a key. The police found a newer model silver Mercedes-Benz and a newer model white Dodge Magnum that they had seen Defendant use. Inside the Dodge, police found two driver licenses in the name of Henry Griffin, but bearing counter Defendant s under a photograph. bed in one Police bedroom, 4 also U.S. found a currency money . . . Dersa estimated the approximate street value of the drugs as: $2/pill for diazepam; $5/pill for alprazolam/Xanax, methadone, meperidine/Demerol, hydrocodone (commonly known as Vicodin); $58/pill for Percocet/Endocet, an oxycodone similar to OxyContin; $15/pill for Avinza/morphine and/or morphine sulfate; $40/pill for hydromorphone; and $60-80/pill for an 80 milligram dose of OxyContin. One open bottle contained OxyContin in 80 milligram pills with a street value of $60/pill. 5 stacked in rubber bands in a dresser drawer, and the keys to the Mercedes. ¶6 When executing the warrant for the Residence, officers found in the garage the Bentley, which was registered to an LLC in the State of California. And beneath a large box in the garage, they found a large metal plate that concealed a safe in the concrete floor. Inside the safe, there were several shoe boxes containing stacks of U.S. currency totaling approximately $231,000. A wallet containing bank cards bearing Defendant s name, a checkbook bearing Defendant s name on the checks, and the key to the Bentley were also inside the safe. In an attic space above the garage, police located financial paperwork. ¶7 After completing the search of the Residence, Dersa interviewed Defendant,5 who was already under arrest. Dersa offered to read Defendant his Miranda rights a second time,6 but Defendant waived them and agreed to speak with him. Defendant initially denied that he sold narcotic drugs, but after being shown the surveillance photographs of him at the storage unit, Defendant told Dersa to think of him . . . [as] somewhat of a 5 The interview was taped, and a copy of the taped interview was entered into evidence and given to the jury to listen to when deliberating. 6 The officer who transported Defendant previously read him his Miranda rights. 6 to the jail had mule 7 -- that he move[d] things. Defendant also told Dersa that guys [came] from all over the country for [the drugs]. When Dersa asked him about the prescription drugs, Defendant said he was compensated for his role. ¶8 Defendant admitted that the contents of the Unit were his and that he rented it under the name Michael Griffin. Defendant also admitted using the name Michael Griffin when co-signing on the lease for the Condo and that he paid cash for the Unit. Defendant claimed ownership of one of the cash-filled shoeboxes8 found in the safe and identified the box containing $40,000 as one that was owed to somebody for a quantity . . . of drugs that he had received and that quantity was kind of fronted, and that people would be after that money. ¶9 Defendant continued to maintain Tipps Barbecue, where he was paid in cash. that he worked at Defendant told Dersa that he helped his son, a college student in San Diego, get the Residence as a business improve his credit rating. investment, to help his son Defendant denied owning the Bentley parked in the garage at the house, and claimed that it came from 7 At trial, Dersa explained that a mule was a middleman and that there would be a head of an organization that kind of calls the shots . . . [and] [a] mule would usually be literally somebody who is in charge of moving product from one location to another. 8 One of the boxes contained cash in the form of old bills, on which the presidents depictions were smaller, which Defendant said he liked and collected. 7 California and Residence. belonged to a friend who kept it at the Defendant maintained that the Mercedes he was seen riding in belonged to somebody locally . . . who could no longer afford to make the payments, therefore he had taken over the payments to help out the registered owner. The Dodge Magnum, which Defendant stated he obtained from a local car lot, had a temporary registration under the name Michael Griffin. ¶10 On April 18, 2008, indictment with: Count 1,9 the state charged Defendant by possession of narcotic drugs for sale (hydrocodone), a class 2 felony; Count 2, possession of narcotic drugs for sale (codeine), a class 2 felony; Count 3, possession of narcotic drugs for sale (oxycodone), a class 2 felony; Count 4, possession of narcotic drugs for sale (morphine), a class 2 felony; Count 5, possession of dangerous drugs for sale (diazepam), a class 2 felony; Count 6, possession of dangerous drugs for sale (methylphenidate), a class 2 felony; Count 7, possession of dangerous drugs for sale (alprazolam), a class 2 felony; Count 8, possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 6 felony; Count 9, money laundering in the second degree, a class 3 felony; and Count 10, illegal control of an enterprise, a 9 Count 1 initially charged sale or transportation of marijuana over two pounds, a class 2 felony. However, the state dismissed this charge, with Defendant s agreement, before trial and the remaining counts were renumbered accordingly. 8 class 3 felony. Before trial, the state alleged that Defendant was a serious drug offender pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3410. I. THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FROM THE UNIT ¶11 On March 17, 2009, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the execution of the search warrant at the Unit. Defendant argued that the evidence seized should be suppressed because: (1) the police violated his right to privacy when they placed the video camera at the storage facility and surreptitiously recorded his activities; and (2) the search warrant application contained false information when it recited that FBI and Scottsdale Police observed drugs in two boxes following the alleged exchange with Mario. The second assertion contained a footnote that stated: [Defendant] will seek to following supplement the examination of requested from the state. factual support additional for this discovery contention that he has The motion contained argument on the first issue raised, but none on the second. Defendant s motion maintained that the surveillance information could not be used to support probable cause, and that, when read without it, the warrant application failed to present probable cause for the search. 9 ¶12 The state argued that Defendant did not satisfy the prerequisites for a Franks10 hearing in that he did not make a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant had knowingly and intentionally made a false statement, or made a false statement in reckless disregard for the truth and that the false assertion was necessary to the judicial officer s determination of probable cause and subsequent issuance of a warrant. Defendant countered, asserting that the specific information that he claimed was false was the statement that he was seen taking two boxes from the Unit to a van and later transferred them to a Range Rover and that these same boxes or their contents were confidential source. involved in a later transfer to a He claimed the statement was false because the police report stated that the actual transfer was not seen as the view was temporarily blocked, and the inference that it was the same drugs that were transferred to the source was suspect. ¶13 Defendant did not attach a copy of the challenged police report to his reply, but instead reminded the court that he planned to supplement the factual basis for this assertion after [an] examination of additional discovery. He asserted that discovery had been requested in a separate motion and that 10 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 10 the available reports did not support the avowal in the warrant application. ¶14 At a trial management conference on May 4, 2009, the parties discussed the motion, and defense counsel informed the court that he had made a discovery request for DEA 6 s and 302 s so that suppression he issue could if file a supplemental necessary. The brief prosecutor on the could not confirm that the requested discovery existed, but qualified that it possibly existed. could, and vowed to get and disclose it if it Defense counsel never filed a supplement to his motion to suppress. ¶15 2009 On June 8, 2009, the trial court vacated the June 12, suppression hearing and denied the motion to suppress. Defendant never attempted to supplement his original motion to suppress nor asked the trial court to reconsider its decision. II. THE MOTION TO CONTINUE ¶16 On August 7, 2009, more than a year after Defendant was indicted and four days before his then-scheduled trial date, Defendant s retained counsel filed a motion to withdraw, stating that Defendant had discharged him. At a hearing on the eve of trial, Defendant informed the court that he fired his lawyer and no longer wanted his representation because they disagreed on several suppress. issues, including matters involving the motion to Defense counsel advised the court that he was ready 11 for trial except for one brief interview with an additional witness who had been on vacation. ¶17 The consequences trial of his court carefully decision and advised warned Defendant that, if the of the court appointed new counsel, he could not fire that person if he had another difference of opinion with new counsel. Defendant professed that he wished to represent himself, and the court advised him that that self-representation would not allow him to repeat anything or go back and re[-]interview the witnesses [himself]. Defendant retracted his decision to represent himself, and the court granted the motion to withdraw, appointed the Public Defender s Office, and continued the trial. ¶18 Following an appearance by new defense counsel on August 24, and with new defense counsel s agreement, the trial court set a trial management conference for November 2 and a new trial date of November 9. On September 30, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw, stating that there was a disruption in communication between both parties because he and Defendant were in disagreement on how to proceed [in] this case and because Defendant believed that defense counsel did not believe in his case. The trial court denied the motion by minute entry, noting that Defendant s last attorney had withdrawn for essentially similar reasons, that Defendant was not entitled to 12 counsel who believe[d] in his case, nor to counsel who agreed with Defendant regarding the best course of action to take. ¶19 On October 28, 2009, defense counsel filed a motion to continue the trial for forty-five days or more, claiming that he was not ready for trial and needed more time to prepare. The state objected and, after hearing argument, the court denied the motion and affirmed the November 9 trial date. On November 9, defense counsel filed several motions in limine in addition to his notice of the assigned trial judge. The next day, defense counsel informed the assigning judge that he was ready for trial and the court assigned the case for trial on November 12. ¶20 Before counsel the re-urged start his of motion opening to statements, withdraw, defense stating that Defendant wanted him to see if the Court is willing to allow me to withdraw.... Defendant addressed the trial court, stating that he and counsel had not discussed a defense, that counsel had only informed him about the 13-3410 on November 3, and that counsel had not done anything for [him], such as filing motions Defendant wanted counsel to file. ¶21 The trial court advised Defendant that the motion to withdraw had already been denied by the previously assigned judge and that the reasons Defendant continued to argue were the same ones addressed by the trial judge who denied the motion. The trial court further informed 13 Defendant that he was not entitled to an attorney who agreed with him regarding the best course of action. After noting that the jury was picked, the pretrial motions resolved, and defense counsel clearly knew the case and was prepared to proceed, the trial court denied the motion again. ¶22 At the conclusion of trial, a jury convicted Defendant on all 10 counts.11 Following an aggravation hearing, the jury also found beyond a reasonable doubt that the state had proven that Defendant had committed Counts 1 through 7 and 9 and 10 in consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of value. The jury also found that Defendant was a serious drug offender. ¶23 On January 5, 2010, Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment, which the trial court treated as a motion for new trial and denied. Defendant to On January 8, 2010, the trial court sentenced concurrent terms of life in prison on each of Counts 1 through 7, 9 and 10, and to a concurrent, presumptive term of one year in prison on Count 8. ¶24 Defendant timely appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, § 9 and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033. 11 With regard to Counts 2 (codeine) and 6 (methylphenidate), the jury found that the state had not proven that the amounts equaled or exceeded the statutory amounts. 14 DISCUSSION ¶25 On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in two respects: (1) failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on Defendant s motion to suppress; and (2) denying Defendant s request for continuance after fired counsel and new counsel was appointed. argues that the evidence was insufficient Defendant Defendant also to support the serious drug offender conviction. I. FAILURE TO HOLD EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS ¶26 Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling on the merits of his motion to suppress and failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing having been apprised that material discovery remained outstanding. 12 ¶27 We disagree. We will not reverse a trial court s decision on a motion to suppress absent an abuse of discretion and defer to the trial court s factual determinations, but review conclusions of law de novo. State v. Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63, 67, ¶ 7, 202 P.3d 528, 532 (App. 2009) (citation omitted). A trial court s denial of a Franks hearing regarding the truth of statements made in an application for a search warrant disturbed absent clear and manifest error. 174 Ariz. 131, 140, 847 P.2d 12 1078, Defendant does not challenge the regarding his privacy interest argument. 15 will not be See State v. Lopez, 1087; trial United States court s v. finding Carmel, 548 F.3d 571, 577 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a clearerror standard applies to trial court s grant or denial of Franks hearing). ¶28 An affidavit supporting a search warrant is entitled to a presumption of validity. 171 (1978). Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, To mandate an evidentiary hearing, a defendant s attack on an affidavit must be more than conclusory. Id. The defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit ; and that the allegedly false [was] necessary to the finding of probable cause. 56. statement Id. at 155- Furthermore, such allegations must be accompanied by a supporting statement of statements by witnesses. satisfies the reasons and Id. at 171. prerequisites, no affidavits or reliable And even if the defendant hearing is required if the warrant application contains sufficient information for finding probable cause without the allegedly false material. 171-72. Only if the remaining content is insufficient is a defendant entitled to a hearing. ¶29 Id. at 172. The trial court did not err in denying Defendant s motion to suppress without an evidentiary hearing. failed Id. at to conclusory make attack anything on the other than validity 16 of an the Defendant unsubstantiated affidavit for and the search warrant. showing, Defendant never alleged, let alone made any substantial or otherwise, that the suspect false assertion that he questioned in the affidavit was the result of any deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth. Defendant failed to satisfy the threshold prerequisite of an allegation and therefore was not entitled to a determination on the issue of probable cause. ¶30 Defendant also faults the trial court for ruling on his motion while there was outstanding discovery, which was material and paramount to his ability to challenge the veracity of the statements in the warrant affidavit. However, in the five Defendant months between the ruling and trial, never challenged the ruling nor moved for reconsideration because of any discovery issues related to the motion to suppress, despite the ability to do so had the state not provided the requested reports. Even on appeal, Defendant has not shown that the requested DEA 6 s and 302 s he planned to use to supplement his motion to suppress existed, so it is difficult to understand how we could find that they were material or paramount to his motion to suppress. Defendant contends that it was unjust of the trial court to deny him this procedural right to challenge the veracity of the affidavit if material discovery remained outstanding. Neither we nor the trial court may speculate as to the materiality or paramount nature of reports a defendant 17 has failed to show even exist, much less how their contents would have established the deliberate or reckless falsity needed to trigger a Franks hearing. ¶31 Defendant also argues that the dismissal of the original Count 1 (sale or transportation of marijuana) by the state is somehow related to the question of whether or not the court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing because the dismissal effectively extinguished his right to challenge the veracity of Dersa s observations. We do not see the relation. Additionally, Defendant agreed to dismissal of this count and he stated that rather than he preferred addressing that it be dismissal dismissed via before directed trial verdict. Defendant must show that the dismissal gave rise to fundamental error, or else he waived it on appeal -- he has not made the requisite showing. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). ¶32 Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he satisfied the threshold requirements that would have required the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress evidence due affidavit. to the falsity Accordingly, the of statements trial court did in the not warrant abuse its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing and ruling on the merits of Defendant s motion. 18 II. DENIAL OF CONTINUANCE ¶33 On appeal, Defendant maintains that the trial court s denial of the motion to continue was an abuse of its discretion. Defendant further contends that he was prejudiced because the denial of the continuance did not allow his counsel a reasonable amount of time to communicate that he faced a life sentence pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3410. not abuse its discretion We find that the trial court did by denying Defendant s motion to continue. ¶34 A continuance of any trial date shall be granted only upon a showing that extraordinary circumstances exist and that delay is indispensible to the interests of justice. Crim. P. 8.5(b). Ariz. R. [T]he granting of a continuance is not a matter of right, but is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Sullivan, 130 Ariz. 213, 215, 635 P.2d 501, 503 (1981). ¶35 he On November 10, counsel informed the trial court that was ready to go to trial. Although it appears that disagreements remained between Defendant and counsel regarding trial strategy on November 16, this alone does not signify that counsel was not fully prepared to go to trial. ¶36 Defendant s argument that the denial of the continuance left counsel without sufficient time to communicate with him regarding the life sentence has no bearing on whether 19 counsel was prepared for trial. Further, in the same paragraph of his opening brief, Defendant acknowledges that he was aware of the state s § 13-3410 allegation three months before trial. Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its broad discretion in denying his motion to continue. III. SERIOUS DRUG OFFENDER EVIDENCE ¶37 Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury s finding that Defendant was a serious drug offender grounds pursuant for this to A.R.S. argument: § (1) 13-3410. all of He the asserts evidence three seized against him came from one day as opposed to three criminal acts; (2) the testimony failed to establish that he organized, managed or directed an enterprise in support of illegal activity; and (3) the state offered no evidence to support the finding that $25,000 of his income was received in a calendar year. We find no merit in these arguments. ¶38 To set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatsoever is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion the jury reached. State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316, 746 P.2d 484, 486 (1987). In making our determination we will not reweigh the challenged evidence, but will view all of the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, resolve all reasonable inferences against defendant. 20 and State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 552, 633 P.2d 355, 361 (1981) (citation omitted). Further, conviction may be the substantial either evidence circumstantial or required direct, for and a the probative value of the evidence is not otherwise reduced simply because it is circumstantial. State v. Anaya, 165 Ariz. 535, 543, 799 P.2d 876, 884 (App. 1990). ¶39 A.R.S. § 13-3410 states that a person who is at least 18 years old and who has been convicted of a serious drug offense is subject to the sentencing provisions of the statute upon proof that the person committed the offense because of a pattern of engaging in conduct prohibited by this chapter, which constituted a significant source of the person s income[,] § 13-3410(A), or because of the person s association with and participation in the conduct of an enterprise13 . . . engaged in dealing in organized, substances managed, controlled directed, by this supervised chapter, or and who financed the enterprise with the intent to promote or further its criminal objectives. § 13-3410(B). A pattern is formed when a person engage[s] in conduct prohibited by this chapter if the person s conduct involves at least three criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods 13 A.R.S. § 13-2301(D)(2) defines an enterprise as any corporation, partnership, association, labor union, or other legal entity or any group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity. 21 of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. significant source of income is income § 13-3410(C). exceeding A $25,000 during a calendar year without regard to exceptions, reductions or setoffs. § 13-3410(D)(2). ¶40 The evidence to evidence support is the serious drug offender. certainly jury s sufficient verdict that circumstantial Defendant is a He is over 18 years old and has been convicted of several serious drug offenses. He was seen going to and entering the drug-filled Unit eight times in five weeks and when leaving the Unit, he was seen removing boxes (boxes that were just like those found in his garage). Copious amounts of drugs (34,000 dosage units of controlled substances), large amounts of cash (over $270,000), and many luxury items - including a Bentley, Mercedes, Range Rover, and Dodge Magnum were found at a storage unit, a house, and a condo all associated with him and which he was seen driving to or leaving from on more than three occasions. ¶41 Defendant admitted to Dersa that the drugs were his; that he was a mule and was compensated for his role; that he move[d] prescription drugs to different parts of the country ; that people came from all over the country for the drugs; that some of the seized cash was owed to others for drugs he obtained; that he had four or five people working for him by 22 picking up shipments; and that he placed in bank accounts cash deposits that were from drug proceeds. ¶42 Defendant committed and was convicted of ten different crimes, months, even though the evidence of those crimes was seized on one day. The fact which that the Defendant s were observed police criminal were acts over nearly efficient does in not three seizing evidence temper his of guilt. Defendant s Unit and garage-floor safe concealed $270,000 cash and there was no evidence that he actually worked at Tipps Barbecue or that he earned money from any other sources -- the jury could reasonably conclude that at least $25,000 of the $270,000 secreted calendar year. away represented Defendant s income for a In addition to controlling large amounts of money and drugs, Defendant told Dersa he employed four or five people in getting the drugs to him and that he was responsible for moving drugs around the country -- evidence sufficient for a jury to conclude that Defendant operated an enterprise. ¶43 Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the jury s finding that Defendant is a serious drug offender under A.R.S. § 13-3410(A) or -3410(B). 23 We therefore affirm. CONCLUSION ¶44 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant s sentences and convictions in this case. /s/ ________________________________ PETER B. SWANN, Judge CONCURRING: /s/ ___________________________________ MARGARET H. DOWNIE, Presiding Judge /s/ ___________________________________ DONN KESSLER, Judge 24

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