Griffin v. Weber
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The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a deed that was absolute on its face should have been reformed into a security agreement. Appellant Kelly Griffin owned property near Wasilla. Beginning in 2005, Appellee Michael Weber paid Griffin rent for use of a cabin on the property. One of Griffin's business creditors sued her for unpaid debts; Griffin also owed Weber for a series of small loans he made to her over the years. Griffin planned to refinance her property in order to pay off her debts, but when it became apparent she could not personally qualify for refinancing, she asked Weber to cosign the refinancing note. The refinancing bank conditioned its loan on the property being titled to both Griffin and Weber. Weber granted Griffin a power of attorney concerning the property thinking it might be useful expediting the refinancing. However, the bank opted not to refinance the property. The parties turned to a credit union who agreed to make the loan. Griffin subsequently signed a quitclaim deed of her property, granting it to both herself and Weber. Griffin used the proceeds of the loan to pay an existing loan on the property, her business debt and the debt she owed to Weber. In July 2010 Griffin sought to again refinance the property, this time with her fiancee, Ed Grube. The credit union approved, conditioned on Weber relinquishing his interest in the property. When Weber refused, Griffin signed a quitclaim deed conveying Weber’s interest to herself. The deed and an attachment to it indicated that Griffin was signing Weber’s name under the power of attorney granted in January 2009. The credit union refused to proceed with the new refinancing based on this deed. Weber filed a complaint against Griffin, claiming that Griffin’s act of signing the quitclaim deed under the January 2009 power of attorney was fraudulent, a breach of Griffin’s fiduciary duty and her duty of good faith and fair dealing, and a conversion. He sought compensatory and punitive damages, a declaration that the deed signed by Griffin was void, and partition of the property as a one-half owner. The superior court found that Griffin breached her fiduciary duty to Weber by using the power of attorney to sign the quitclaim deed of July 2010 for Weber and ruled that the deed was invalid. The court also found that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the parties intended the 2009 deed to be a security device rather than a conveyance under which they would equally share a one-half interest in the property. Griffin appealed, primarily arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to reform the deed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that reformation should have been granted because both parties to the transaction testified at trial that the deed was executed for security purposes.
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